Deepening democracy: explaining variations in the levels of democracy by Fowler, Michael W.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-06
Deepening democracy: explaining variations in the
levels of democracy
Fowler, Michael W.















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: EXPLAINING VARIATIONS 








Dissertation Supervisor:                Harold A. Trinkunas 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for 
reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and 
reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of 
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of 
Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Dissertation 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
Deepening Democracy: Explaining Variations in the Levels of Democracy 
6. AUTHOR(S): Michael W. Fowler 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
       AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
                        A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This dissertation identified the determinants of a country’s level of democracy.  In 1996, President Clinton 
incorporated democracy promotion as a key element in the U.S. National Security Strategy.  Experience since the 
Cold War demonstrated that the implementation of reforms do not necessarily result in a Western-style 
democracy.  The selection and accountability of a country's leaders resides on a political spectrum from no 
democracy (i.e., fully autocratic) to full democracy with many variations in between.   
Using a multi-method approach including econometric, computational, and case study analysis on Mexico, 
the Philippines, and Senegal, this study proposed and tested a model of democratic change based upon the 
interaction between a country’s socio-economic conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy. The analysis 
determined that no one factor could definitively predict a change in democracy.  Each factor affected the 
preferences of key actors whose interaction resulted in changes in democracy.  Violence and poverty provided a 
centripetal effect on polity while economic crisis and the loss of an interstate war had a centrifugal effect that 
pushed polities towards the extremes of the polity spectrum.  Although economic income and development 
contributed to the potential for democracy, neither factor affected the timing of changes in democracy.   
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
299 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   
Democracy Democratization Consolidation Transition Economic Development Industrialization 
Insurgency Violence Diffusion Democratic Norms Philippines Mexico Senegal Quantitative 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN THE LEVELS 
OF DEMOCRACY 
 
Michael W. Fowler 
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force 
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1993 
MBA, Western International University, 1999 
MS, Troy State University, 2006 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 










Michael W. Fowler 
 
Approved by:  
__________________________________________________ 
Harold Trinkunas, PhD, Dissertation Supervisor 
 
______________________ _______________________ 
Tom Bruneau Robert McNab 
Professor of National Security  Professor of Business 
 
______________________ _______________________ 
Maria Rasmussen Robert Springborg 
Professor of National Security Professor of National Security 
 
 
Approved by: _________________________________________________________ 
Harold Trinkunas, PhD, Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
Approved by: _________________________________________________________ 
Douglas Moses, Vice Provost for Academic Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation identified the determinants of a country’s level of democracy.  In 1996, 
President Clinton incorporated democracy promotion as a key element in the U.S. 
National Security Strategy.  Experience since the Cold War demonstrated that the 
implementation of reforms do not necessarily result in a Western-style democracy.  The 
selection and accountability of a country's leaders resides on a political spectrum from no 
democracy (i.e., fully autocratic) to full democracy with many variations in between.   
Using a multi-method approach including econometric, computational, and case 
study analysis on Mexico, the Philippines, and Senegal, this study proposed and tested a 
model of democratic change based upon the interaction between a country’s socio-
economic conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy. The analysis determined that 
no one factor could definitively predict a change in democracy.  Each factor affected the 
preferences of key actors whose interaction resulted in changes in democracy.  Violence 
and poverty provided a centripetal effect on polity while economic crisis and the loss of 
an interstate war had a centrifugal effect that pushed polities towards the extremes of the 
polity spectrum.  Although economic income and development contributed to the 
potential for democracy, neither factor affected the timing of changes in democracy.   
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? ............................................................................3 
1.  A Theoretical Definition of Democracy .............................................4 
2. An Operational Definition of Democracy ..........................................5 
B.  DEMOCRATIC POLITY CHANGE ..........................................................12 
1. Democratic Transitions .....................................................................13 
2. Democratic Consolidation .................................................................16 
3. The Record of Democratization........................................................18 
C. WHY STUDY THE LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY? ..................................19 
D. HYPOTHESES ..............................................................................................24 
E.  THE APPROACH OF THIS STUDY..........................................................27 
1. Case Study Selection Criteria ...........................................................29 
2. Qualitative Analysis ...........................................................................31 
F.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION ........................................32 
II. PROPOSING A MODEL OF POLITICAL CHANGE .........................................35 
A.  SUPPLY AND DEMAND EXPLANATION OF DEMOCRATIC 
CHANGE........................................................................................................35 
1. Consumer Demand for Democracy..................................................37 
2. The Suppliers of Democracy .............................................................39 
B. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SUPPLY AND DEMAND...............42 
1. An Economic Theoretical Model ......................................................43 
a. Income .....................................................................................48 
b. Economic Development ..........................................................54 
2. Internal Security ................................................................................60 
a. Intent: Emotion-Driven Violence...........................................61 
b. Intent: Rational Violence........................................................64 
c. Intent: Synthesis......................................................................65 
d. Capability.................................................................................66 
e. Intent, Capability, and Democracy.........................................68 
3. Diffusion of Norms.............................................................................70 
a. Legitimacy ...............................................................................70 
b. Demographics..........................................................................71 
c. Colonial Legacy and Bureaucratic Maturity .........................74 
d. External Influences.................................................................75 
C.  THE INTERSECTION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE 
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN .........76 
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: TESTING STRUCTURAL 
DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY ..................................................................79 
A. DATA AND VARIABLES ............................................................................82 
1. The Level of Democracy: the Dependent Variable.........................82 
2. Independent Variables.......................................................................83 
 viii
a. Internal Security .....................................................................84 
b. Economic Income, Industrialization, and the Diffusion of 
Norms ......................................................................................85 
3. Control Variables...............................................................................86 
B. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................90 
1. Mathematical Model..........................................................................90 
2. Identifying the Optimal Regression Model .....................................92 
3. Computational Approach..................................................................94 
C. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS.......................................................................96 
1. Intrastate Violence .............................................................................97 
a. Rising Violence and Change in Democracy ..........................98 
b. Decreasing Violence ...............................................................99 
2. The Economy....................................................................................102 
a. Industrialization....................................................................102 
b. Income ...................................................................................104 
c. Economic Control Variables ................................................108 
3. Diffusion of Norms...........................................................................110 
a. Changes in Peer Countries’ Level of Democracy................111 
b. Normative Control Variables................................................111 
D. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................114 
IV. MEXICO: DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION DESPITE VIOLENCE ..................117 
A.  BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICAN POLITICS........................................119 
B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY ....................121 
1. The Rise and Fall of Clientalism in Mexico: Income, 
Industrialization, Oil and Crisis .....................................................121 
2. Intrastate Violence ...........................................................................126 
3. The Diffusion of Norms: The Emperor Has No Clothes ..............135 
C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY..............140 
1. Mexico’s Military .............................................................................141 
2. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) ......................................144 
3. Political Parties.................................................................................146 
4. The Ruling Regime: Gradually Increasing the Degrees of 
Democracy ........................................................................................148 
a. A Rotating Dictatorship: Autocratic Mexico 1917–1976 ....149 
b. Political Reform ....................................................................151 
D. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................154 
V.  PHILIPPINES: A RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY OVERCOMES 
INSURGENCY AND POVERTY ..........................................................................157 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS.....................................159 
B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY ....................162 
1. The Rise and Fall of Clientalism in the Philippines: Income, 
Industrialization, and Crisis ...........................................................162 
2. Intrastate Violence ...........................................................................169 
3. The Diffusion of Norms: The Emperor Has No Clothes ..............175 
C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY..............182 
 ix
1. The Philippine Military ...................................................................183 
2. NGOs.................................................................................................186 
3. Political Parties.................................................................................188 
4. The Ruling Regime ..........................................................................191 
D. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................197 
VI. SENEGAL: THE CASE OF A POOR, UNDER-DEVELOPED 
DEMOCRACY.........................................................................................................201 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF SENEGALESE POLITICS .................................203 
B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY ....................205 
1. Income, Industrialization, and Crisis.............................................206 
2. Intrastate Violence ...........................................................................210 
3. The Diffusion of Norms ...................................................................213 
C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY..............217 
1. Senegal’s Military ............................................................................217 
2. NGOs.................................................................................................219 
3. Political Parties.................................................................................222 
4. The Ruling Regime: Incremental Departures from Autocracy...224 
D. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................232 
VII. CONCLUSION: AN INTEGRATION OF STRUCTURE AND ACTORS.......235 






C. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN CONFLICT-RIDDEN 
STATES ........................................................................................................245 
APPENDIX 1: DATA MODIFICATIONS........................................................................249 
APPENDIX 2: TRANSITION CASES ..............................................................................251 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................257 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................277 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Proportion of Polity Types Over Time ............................................................22 
Figure 2. A Model for the Determinants of the Levels of Democracy ...........................27 
Figure 3. Factors that Influence Intrastate Violence .......................................................67 
Figure 4. Violence Trends across Regime Types..........................................................100 
Figure 5. Effect of Violence on Polity Scores in Democracies.....................................101 
Figure 6. Effect of Violence on Polity Scores in Autocracies.......................................101 
Figure 7. Agricultural Labor and Regime Change ........................................................103 
Figure 8. Agricultural Labor and Regime Type over time............................................104 
Figure 9. Income Level and Regime Type ....................................................................107 
Figure 10. Effect of Oil on Level of Democracy in Developing Countries ....................109 
Figure 11. Oil Rents and Regime Type...........................................................................110 
Figure 12. Latin America Democracy Trend ..................................................................113 
Figure 13. Asian and African ..........................................................................................113 
Figure 14. Map of Mexico with State Political Boundaries ............................................124 
Figure 15. Map of Philippines with Region Political Boundaries...................................160 
Figure 16. Map of Senegal ..............................................................................................204 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Case Study Selection Criteria ..........................................................................30 
Table 2. Summary of Data Sources ...............................................................................89 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Variable....................................................................90 
Table 4. Transition Cases by Regime Type ...................................................................95 
Table 5. Linear Regression Results................................................................................97 
Table 6. Regression Results with Control Variables ...................................................106 
Table 7. The GDP-democracy relationship over time .................................................107 
Table 8. Regime Change and Average Maturity..........................................................112 
Table 9. Regime Change and Colonial Legacy............................................................112 
Table 10. Regime Change and Region...........................................................................114 
Table 11. Summary of Hypotheses Results ...................................................................115 
 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFI   Agencia Federal de Investigación 
ANSD   Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie 
ARMM  Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
ASG   Abu Sayyaf Group 
 
CARP   Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program 
CNC   National Confederation of Peasants 
ConAss  Constituent Assembly 
COW   Correlates of War 
CPP   Communist Party of the Philippines 
CTM   Confederation of Mexican Workers 
 
EDSA    Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a euphemism for People Power 
ERP   Popular Revolutionary Army 
ERPI   Insurgent Popular Revolutionary Army 
EZLN   Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional  
 
FAO   Food and Agricultural Organization 
FEC   Federal Electoral Commission 
FFF   Federation of Free Farmers 
 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GLS   Generalized Least Squares 
 
IFE   Federal Electoral Institute  
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
INEGI   Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica 
 xvi
ISI   Import-substitute industrialization 
 
MEPV   Major Episodes of Political Violence 
MFDC   Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces 
MILF   Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
MNLF   Moro National Liberation Front 
 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAMFREL   National Movement for Free Elections 
NCR   National Capital Region  
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
NPA   New People’s Army 
 
ONEL   National Electoral Observatory  
OPEC   Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
 
PAN   National Action Party 
PDS   Parti Democratique Senegalais 
PFP   Policía Federal Preventiva 
PITF   Political Instability Task Force 
PNP   Philippine National Police 
PO   People’s Organization 
PRD   Party of the Democratic Revolution 
PRI   Institutional Revolutionary Party 
PS   Parti Socialist  
 
Stata   A data analysis and statistical software program 
 
UN   United Nations 
UNACOIS  Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal 
 xvii
UNTS   National Union of Senegalese Workers 
 
Xtregar  Stata command for fixed or random effects linear regression with  
   first order autoregressive disturbance. 
 
   
 
 xviii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to thank my wife Krissie for her support and understanding.  It 
was her encouragement and persistence that started me down the path of the doctoral 
degree.  I would like to thank my kids Josh, Katie, and Sarah for their acceptance of 
missed games, meals, and events.  Thanks to my parents, Mel and Mary Lee, for 
providing me some much-needed subjective criticism. 
To my dissertation committee, Harold Trinkunas, Bob McNab, Maria Rasmussen, 
Tom Bruneau, and Rob Springborg, thank you for all of your valuable guidance and 
meticulous feedback.  Special thanks to Harold and Maria for bringing me up to speed on 
the comparative literature and to Bob for the basics in econometrics. 
I am also grateful for the advice and insights of Roehl Briones, Steven Rood, 
Ferdinand Pingul, Chito Gascon, JJ Moreno, Karen Tañada, Alex Brillantes, Joel 
Rocamora, Segundo Romero, Linda Guerrero, Emmanuel de Dios, Ramon Casiple, Luis 
Rubio, Andreas Schedler, Jorge Chabat, Adam Shub, Paul Mahlstedt, Tomas Oliva, Tim 
Langford, Anthanasios Hristoulas, Jesus Velasco, Alejandro Moreno, Jean Francois 
Prud’Homme, Lorenzo Meyer, Rogelio Hernandez, Raul Benitez Manuat, Nicole Tresch, 
Karl Asmus, Babacar “Buuba” Diop, Babacar Diouf, Aminata Diaw, Olivier Sanga, 
Ismaila Madior Fall, Penda Mbow, Ibrahima Thioub, Latif Coulibaly, Mathurin “Matt” 
Houngnikpo, David Mosby, and General Mamadou Seck.  To each and every one of you, 
a heartfelt thanks.  Finally, I want to thank the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force 
Institute of Technology, and the United States Air Force Academy for support and 
facilitation of research.   
 xx
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
This study is an exploration of the factors that determine a country’s level of 
democracy.  Using a multi-method approach, this study proposes and tests a model of 
democratic change based upon the interaction between a country’s socio-economic 
conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy.  Quantitative research, supplemented by 
case studies on Mexico, Philippines, and Senegal, demonstrated that structural factors 
affected democracy through their influence on the preferences of key actors including 
civil society, the military, non-government organizations, political parties, and the ruling 
regime.   
Democracies are not created equal.  While anywhere from half to two-thirds of 
contemporary governments can be classified as democratic, there is significant variation 
between governments in the practice of democratic processes.  Even many autocracies 
practice limited democratic processes.  After the end of the Cold War, the popularity of 
democracy (and democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool) dramatically increased.  
In 1996, President William Clinton incorporated democracy promotion as a key element 
within the U.S. National Security Strategy.  Experience since the Cold War demonstrated 
that regardless of the method of change, the implementation of political reforms in a 
country do not necessarily result in a western European-style democracy.   
There is a variation in the level of democracy between countries, accentuated by 
the wide divergence in styles of democracies since 1980.  Governments reside on a 
political spectrum from no democracy (i.e., fully autocratic) to full democracy with many 
variations in between.  Although there are several instantiations of democracy, this study 
analyzes democracy as a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and electoral 
constraints upon the selection and accountability of a country's leaders.  The two ends of 
the political spectrum are easy to identify.  Hereditary, strongman dictatorships such as 
North Korea and Syria clearly lack any semblance of democracy.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, democracy rating entities such as Polity and Freedom House consistently give 
top marks to countries such as Canada, Japan, the United States, and most of Europe.  
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Although these governments are not without their problems, the people, without 
repression, can vote in regular, competitive elections that actually influence the type of 
government that forms.   
Between the two extreme regime types lay governments with significant 
variations in their political processes.  Venezuela, for example, has a history of 
democracy dating to 1958.  The 1998 election of Hugo Chavez was democratic, but his 
party’s success in the legislature gave Chavez almost unlimited power to change the 
constitution allowing Chavez to become increasingly autocratic.  So far, his manipulation 
of the constitution has only been limited by the public referendum that rejected his bid to 
allow indefinite re-elections. Georgia has had a democratically elected government since 
1991.  However, the government continues to coerce the opposition.  During a 2007 
political crisis, the government declared a state of emergency in order to use force to 
disperse protestors and suppress the media. 
In other cases, democracy is little more than a façade that provides a legal 
framework from which a dictator can claim authority.  Ethiopia’s elections were plagued 
with violence and voting irregularities.  Multi-party competition was a myth.  In practice, 
the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) dominated the 
government since the return to elections in 1995, negating the effectiveness of the checks 
and balances that the legislature should have upon executive authority.  The EPRDF is 
dominated by the Tigrayan, an ethnic group that comprises only eight percent of the total 
population.  Malaysia and Singapore have similar systems.  The two ruling parties (the 
National Front in Malaysia and the People’s Action Party in Singapore) have dominated 
their respective governments for decades, using government resources to limit the 
oppositions’ competitiveness.  These examples suggest that democracy is not a simple 
yes or no classification.  But, if regimes are instead classified as a spectrum of grays, 
what factors shape these differences?  Why did Malaysia adopt less democratic practices 
then Canada?   
While Ethiopia, Venezuela, Malaysia, and Singapore may not be models of 
democracy, they cannot be easily classified as autocratic regimes.  They do not have the 
closed political systems of Cuba, North Korea, or Syria.  But, if they qualify as 
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democracies, why do they lack so many democratic processes?  If a country becomes a 
democracy, why does it not become fully democratic?  What influences countries with 
low levels of democracy to achieve higher levels?  To answer these questions, this 
dissertation used a holistic approach to identify the determinants of the levels of 
democracy though the examination of the interaction between a country’s socio-
economic conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy.   
This chapter is organized into five sections.  The chapter begins with an 
exploration of the definition of democracy.  Section A explores the theoretical and 
operational definitions of democracy and explains why this dissertation chose to define 
democracy as a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and regulation of a state’s 
electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability.  Section B analyzes the broad 
literature in democracy studies, which is dominated by discussions of democratic 
transition and consolidation.  Section C introduces the motivating factors behind the 
study.  This study fills a gap in the democracy studies academic literature while providing 
policy-relevant recommendations for democratization and democracy promotions efforts.  
Section D presents a literature-based model of the process of democratic change and 
hypotheses for quantitative and qualitative study.  Section E discusses the quantitative 
and qualitative methods used for this study.  A combination of econometric analysis, 
computational analysis, and qualitative case studies was used to empirically test the 
model and hypotheses identified in Section D.  The chapter ends with a brief introduction 
to the other chapters of the dissertation.   
A. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?  
Democracy is a common word in the Western vernacular.  Yet, the term is often 
used with little regard for its meaning.  To complicate the matter, the academic 
community has no common taxonomy regarding the field of democracy.  There is no 
universally accepted term for those governments that are not dictatorships but have not 
yet achieved some key aspect of a democracy.  The definition of what constitutes a 
democracy and the factors that contribute to a successful transition to democracy greatly 
vary. 
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The term democracy originated in Athens and passed down through the writings 
of Aristotle; the Greek words demos (the people) and kratos (rule) indicated rule by the 
people.  The Athenians used a direct form of democracy in which the majority of male 
citizens directly participated in the legislature.  The limited executive authority was 
administrative in nature.  Without the need to select leaders, democracy was equivalent to 
the legislative decision-making process.  Since then, suffrage has greatly expanded, 
representation became the norm, and the power of the executive greatly increased.  This 
expansion changed the very nature of democracy.  The addition of representation and 
strong executives brought additional challenges: who and how should rulers be elected?  
How would they be held accountable so that the people still ruled?  The expanding nature 
of the issues concerning democracy has clouded the issue of what a democracy is and 
when a government qualifies as a democracy.  
1.  A Theoretical Definition of Democracy 
Part of the confusion about the definition of democracy arises from the different 
theoretical lenses within the field of democracy studies.  There are two theoretical 
approaches with which to view democracy: democracy as it should be and democracy as 
it is—ideal versus practical.  Democracy as it should be is the realm of democratic 
theory, or perhaps more accurately described as the philosophy of democracy, which 
conceptualizes democracy as an ideal type of society.  This approach seeks to fine-tune 
the various aspects of democratic government in an effort to attain the ideal, egalitarian 
society.  From this perspective, the threshold of democracy is so high that no government 
has yet achieved democracy but instead resides at a sub-type which Robert Dahl calls a 
polyarchy.1   
Conceptualizing an ideal society, and with it an ideal government, is largely a 
debate of competing decision-making processes and outcomes.  Who gets to decide the 
public good?  What is the process for determining the public good?  Is ensuring the 
equality of man a public good?  If so, is it economic or political equality, or both? What  
 
                                                 
1 Robert Alan Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 223. 
 5
is the threshold for equality?  Who should be excluded from equality (e.g., children)?  
The answers to these questions theoretically identify the appropriate decision-making 
process or outcome.   
However, the term “decision-making process” oversimplifies the complexities in 
the elements that make up a democracy.2  A brief list of some major choices in the type 
of democracy include: majoritarian versus consensus (i.e., majority rule versus 
unanimous voting), president versus parliament, majority versus proportional 
representation, two-party versus multi-party, federal versus unitarian system, bi-cameral 
versus uni-cameral, the checks and balances that the legislature or judicial has over the 
executive, the size of cabinets (smaller cabinets concentrate power), the level of 
independence of the central bank, and the procedures for constitutional change.  Attempts 
to define the ideal government have given rise to concepts such as pluralism (i.e., 
existence of extensive social groups), deliberative participation (i.e., a mix of direct and 
representative democracy), and consociationalism (e.g., power sharing with the minority 
group[s]).  
The alternative approach views democracy as an existing type of government: 
democracy is real.  The practical view of democracy recognizes the current existence of 
democracies while appreciating that these democracies are not flawless.  While the 
minimum thresholds for democracy may change over time, researchers in democracy 
studies select a threshold that tends to qualify dozens or scores of governments for 
comparative analysis.  Since this study is a comparative research project, this work uses 
the theoretical lens of real democracy as the approach to identify the likely determinants 
of the level of democracy. 
2. An Operational Definition of Democracy 
Democracy is a socially constructed concept that has evolved over time.  In its 
original form in Greece, democracy meant direct representation.  In the early days of the 
American Revolution, democratic ideals were shaped by what was, at the time, referred 
                                                 
2 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 
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to as Republican values: small government (i.e., libertarian), human rights, anti-
aristocracy, constitutionalist and, less directly, individualism.3  The importance of certain 
elements: small government, individualism, and anti-aristocracy have either waned over 
time or were not universally accepted as democratic ideals as more countries took the 
opportunity to craft democracy in their own way.  On the other hand, human rights have 
grown in importance and evolved over time.  Certain human rights norms, such as the 
abolition of slavery, have even extended to non-democratic regimes.  Similarly, the 
concept of suffrage has evolved over time.  Initial voting rights were typically limited to 
male landowners.  Over time, universal suffrage came to include all citizens including 
minorities and women. 
While the definition of democracy may continue to change over time, the change 
occurs slowly enough that polities can be defined as democracies based on the 
contemporary definition.  The level of democracy within a country is typically measured 
in one of three ways.  First, democracy can be viewed as a binary variable; if a country 
does not meet the minimum qualifications for a democracy, then it is an autocracy.  
Results using this method greatly vary depending upon the threshold chosen for the 
minimum qualifications of democracy.  If the threshold is high, then weak democracies 
such as Malaysia and Venezuela are pooled into the same category as North Korea and 
Syria.  If the threshold is low, then the limited democratic procedures in Malaysia are 
considered equivalent to those in Western Europe.   
The second method for measuring democracy involves a multi-tiered structure.  
This method requires the identification of multiple thresholds so that countries may be 
classified into three or four different categories.  In the middle categories lie regimes that 
do not adequately fit definitions of either democracy or autocracy.  These intermediate 
regimes go by many names: hybrid regimes, semi-democracies, electoral democracies, 
electoral autocracies, pseudo-democracies, illiberal democracies, procedural democracies, 
partial democracies, semi-authoritarian, and anocratic are a sampling of the most 
                                                 
3 Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address; Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1961). 
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prominent.4  The third method for measuring democracy uses a spectrum.  It provides a 
scale based on selected attributes of democracy.  For instance, Freedom House uses a 
seven point scale while Polity IV uses a twenty one point scale.  Interestingly, though 
both scales measure democracy across a spectrum, both recommend thresholds for 
democracy.   
This study uses both the second and third methods of measuring democracy.  The 
multi-tiered structured was used for computational analysis while the political spectrum 
was used for econometric analysis.  Following David Epstein, et al., this study used three 
tiers: autocracy, partial democracy, and full democracy.  In order to identify the 
boundaries of each tier, we next explore the various thresholds of democracy.       
Democracy is a socially constructed term that means different things to different 
people.  Even among academics, there is much disparity over the minimum requirements 
required in order to classify a country as a democracy though many attempts have been 
made to define a threshold.  Schumpeter used a minimalist (inclusive) definition of 
democracy: a system in which rulers are chosen in free, competitive elections.  
Schumpeter’s choice for his definition is a paradox.  Schumpeter’s view was partly 
influenced by his opposition to proportional representation.  He argued that it was the 
will of the people that led to discriminatory practices such as anti-Semitism.5  Yet, his 
definition failed to account for democratically elected governments extending their rule 
beyond the limits of the constitution.  Ironically, Schumpeter’s definition technically fails 
to exclude Nazi Germany, a constitutionally elected government that usurped supreme 
power. 
The use of Schumpeter’s definition for research on democracy is counterintuitive.  
Schumpeter’s book was not about democracy; democracy was a side-bar topic on the 
struggle between capitalism and socialism.  His definition of democracy is not even 
                                                 
4 Diamond, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies; Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism: The 
Dynamics of Unfree Competition; Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions "; Schmitter and Karl, "What 
Democracy Is. . . And Is Not."; Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes."; Monty Marshall and Keith 
Jaggers, "Polity Iv Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2007" (Center for 
Systemic Peace). 
5 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper, 1950), 
241–2, 69, 72–3. 
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presented until two-thirds of the way into the book.  His minimalist definition lacked a 
filter for post-election accountability.  Schumpeter’s definition was far too inclusive.  The 
much-cited Dahl introduced a more exclusive definition by introducing a second metric: 
participation.  Dahl also argued that the concept of competition implied the accountability 
that comes from political liberalization.6   
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter strengthened Dahl’s threshold for 
liberalization by highlighting the important relationship between the development of civil 
liberties and democracy.  When the two are not implemented together, they are weak.  
Civil liberties granted by an authoritarian regime can just as easily be taken away. 
Democracy without civil liberties suppresses participation and dissension, which suggests 
that citizens are not truly being represented.7  O’Donnell and Schmitter also introduced a 
higher threshold: the application of rules and procedures that protected competition and 
participation.  Participation was necessary, but no longer sufficient; codification of 
participatory rights and adherence to the law was also necessary.  Countries that had free 
elections and participation, but failed to follow Constitutional procedures were called 
delegative democracies, essentially meaning that the executive was delegated supreme 
powers through the democratic process.8 
The threshold laid out by O’Donnell and Schmitter is captured by Karl’s 
definition of democracy as “a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to 
act as citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and 
regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees 
for political freedom, and limited military prerogatives.”9  Karl not only identified a 
specific level of participation required for his threshold (universal suffrage), but also 
added a new dimension: civilian control of the military.   
                                                 
6 Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1971), 3–7. 
7 Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7–18. 
8 Guillermo O’Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 61. 
9 Terry Linn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 
(1990): 2. 
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Schmitter and Karl, analyzing the third wave of democracy of 1974-1989, argued 
that they were witnessing a period that had “produced a convergence towards a common 
definition of democracy” which they defined as “a system of governance in which rulers 
are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”10  While 
Schmitter and Karl followed Karl’s earlier threshold for participation, they raised the 
threshold for accountability.  They developed a set of procedural norms from which to 
measure accountability that enforced limits on executive power.  For instance, the 
executive of a democracy should not be able to extend the length of his or her term or 
abolish term limitations on the executive’s own position.    
Schmitter and Karl’s 1991 article was the last serious attempt to raise the 
threshold of democracy.  These successive evolutions of democracy had raised the 
threshold of democracy so high that a considerable number of countries were left in a no-
man’s land.  Countries with limited democratic procedures such as Malaysia and 
Singapore did not qualify as democracies and yet they did not deserve the pejorative 
connation of autocracy.  Over the next 15 years, a variety of attempts would be made to 
define that middle ground.   
Collier and Levitsky thoroughly defined the middle ground, arguing that the 
multiple variations that make up a democracy created a widely divergent spectrum in 
which each possible combination of democratic processes was given its own unique 
nomenclature.11  While defining democracies based on their various elements 
(parliamentarian vs. presidential, single vs. bicameral legislature) provided explanatory 
power for individual countries, it provided no foothold for conducting a comparative 
study.   
Diamond created a more practical solution for the field of comparative politics.  
Finding the dichotomous solution for polities unsatisfying, Diamond created multiple 
thresholds permitting polities to be defined in four categories: liberal democracy, 
                                                 
10 Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy Is. . . And Is Not," 76.  
11 David Collier and Stephen Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives," World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997). 
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electoral democracy, pseudo-democracy and non-democracy.12  Schmitter and Karl’s 
high threshold for democracy became Diamond’s threshold for liberal democracy.  
Although Diamond considered partial democracy to be a sub-field of pseudo-democracy, 
many contemporary quantitative researchers use the term partial democracy to pool 
together Diamond’s concepts of electoral democracy and pseudo-democracy.13 
Attempts to create multiple thresholds would later be validated by Gerardo 
Munck and Jay Verkuilen.  They argued that the use of a maximalist definition, by 
adding additional criteria such as economic freedom or civil liberties to the baseline 
requirement of the definition of democracy, overburdens the definition and excludes 
those attributes from potential empirical research.14  If everything is included in the 
definition of democracy, then there are few variables left with which to discern the 
determinants of democracy.   
While the debate to establish a threshold for democracy has not yet concluded, 
three of the basic measures of democracy are widely accepted.  For the purposes of this 
study, democracy is a measure of political openness and competition in accordance with 
electoral rules. Open in the sense of participation (i.e., suffrage, political parties) and 
competitive in the sense that the population can constitutionally elect their leaders and 
hold them accountable.  The ability of the executive to change the electoral rules should 
be very limited.  A government that lacks all three attributes of democracy is an 
autocracy.  All other governments can be graded on a scale based upon their individual 
adaptation of the three attributes.  Those governments with a high amount of all three 
attributes are considered full democracies.  Partial democracies are those regimes that do 
not have high amounts of democratic attributes but have a preponderance of democratic  
 
                                                 
12 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 15–6. 
13 For example, see Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions"; Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a 
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” The American 
Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001). 
14 Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating 
Alternative Indices," Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 1 (2002): 9. 
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procedures relative to autocratic practices.15  Democratization, then, is the process of 
increasing one or more of the attributes of democracy; a process that can last from a few 
days to decades.   
It should also be clear that there is no such thing as a perfect democracy.  Even 
full democracies find that they can improve upon the quality of their democracy.  The 
United States did not attain a high level of democracy until 1809 when suffrage was 
changed from landowners to taxpayers.  The secret ballot was not introduced until the 
1880s.  Participation dramatically increased when women’s suffrage was finalized in 
1920 and culminated with the National Voting Rights Act of 1965.  This evolution 
illustrates the socially constructed nature of democracy.  While the United States has 
reached the definition of a full democracy, it still has much work to do before attaining 
any semblance of an ideal society.16         
Democracy today is often defined depending upon the perceived end of 
democracy.  There are three interdependent phases to democracy.  First is the process of 
selection and accountability of political representatives.  This approach tends to focus on 
the election, continuation, and removal of political leaders.  Second is the decision-
making process used by those political representatives to determine policies and the 
distribution of resources.  An example of this approach would be an analysis of the voting 
patterns of legislators.  Third is the actual process of distribution.  This approach tends to 
focus on the equality (i.e., normal distribution) of the means of production and economic 
benefits. This research focuses on the first phase of the three variations of democratic 
process.  For this study, then, democracy is a measure of the competitiveness, openness, 
and regulation of a state’s electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability.   
                                                 
15 For a quantified definition of democracy, refer to Chapter III, Sections A and B. 
16 For a balanced analysis on U.S. shortcomings towards an ideal democratic society, see Larry Jay 
Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World, 1st ed. 
(New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2008), 345–70. 
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B.  DEMOCRATIC POLITY CHANGE 
Democracies do not just happen.  They are created.  Excluding a few democratic 
experiments from ancient and medieval history, there were no democratic regimes prior 
to the 18th century.  For the most part, democratic regimes are born out of autocratic 
regimes (or colonial regimes) through a process known as a democratic transition.  Since 
there is a lack of research on the levels of democracy, we explore the literature on 
democratic transition and consolidation to inform variable selection.  This section 
concludes with a brief overview of the history of democratization. 
The democratization literature evolved from a focus on precondition structural 
factors as the gatekeepers of democracy.  These structural factors range from factors 
internal to the state such as income, ethnicity and age of the bureaucracy to external 
factors such as the end of the Cold War.  Over time, as more democracies appeared, the 
precondition theories appeared to have little predictive power.  Although a few factors 
such as economic growth, economic development and internal security continued to 
receive scholarly and policy attention, they failed to explain all cases.  Analysts 
converted to an action-oriented focus that explained democracy as the result of key actors 
such as the military, political parties, non-government organizations (NGO), and the 
ruling regime.  Other analysts attempted a process-oriented analysis that examined the 
methods of transition or the design of the constitution.  While each approach had some 
explanatory power, they individually lacked a holistic explanation for why a state would 
or would not change its level of democracy.  Each approach lacked a consistent, 
predictive capability.  The literature on democratic consolidation has had little more 
success.  The majority of such literature is focused on features that help prevent the 
collapse of democracy after it is achieved.  It does little to explain the factors that deepen 
the level of democracy besides providing a long list of features necessary to qualify as a 
consolidated democracy. 
A more recent thread within the scholarly literature expresses the diffusion of 
democratic norms as the determining factor in the growth of democracy.  However, 
norms are not a simple construction independent of the other variables.  Economic 
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growth and development often lead to increased political participation from the masses 
accompanied by an increased awareness of democratic norms.  In short, changes in the 
economy are expected to increase the preference for democracy among the masses and 
the elites.  Numerous other factors from demographics to colonial legacy and the maturity 
of the bureaucracy also shape individual and group identity.  Additionally, a focus on 
norms as the determining factor appears to assume that political issues take primacy over 
security issues.  Internal security appears to have a bi-directional relationship with 
democracy.  A transition from autocracy to democracy could encourage violence due to 
decreased state capacity for repression or an inability for the new regime to meet 
expectations.  On the other hand, violence, which is the “deliberate use of physical force 
on behalf of collective goals”17 by a non-state entity, could also affect democracy.  A 
government may be motivated to decrease its level of democracy in an effort to contain 
an insurgency.   
1. Democratic Transitions 
Governments do not instantly transform from autocracy to democracy.  They go 
through a process for this transformation.  Philippe Schmitter depicts five overlapping 
phases of transition: persistence of authoritarian rule, demise of authoritarian rule, 
transition to democracy, consolidation of democracy, and persistence of democracy.18  
The literature analyzes the movement between these phases both towards and away from 
democratic persistence.  There is a dense literature that has attempted to denote the ideal 
formula for a successful democratic transition.  Explanations of these movements have 
coalesced around three main themes: socio-economic conditions, processes, and actors.   
Precondition theories attempted to define the specific social or economic 
conditions that would make a country ripe for democracy.  Seymour Lipset was one of 
the contemporary trailblazers of precondition theory.  He argued that favorable economic 
                                                 
17 Sidney G. Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 77; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2nd ed. (New York: New 
York University Press, 1986), 30. 
18 Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," in Transitions to Democracy, 
ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), 541. 
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factors (e.g., per capita income, literacy rates) were the key preconditions for a successful 
transition.  A variety of other preconditions were submitted by the field as broad 
preconditions: social values, political norms, culture, religion, race, geography, and 
bureaucracy.19  Linz and Stepan provided very specific preconditions.  They argued that 
certain civil liberties and the rule of law must either pre-exist or co-develop with 
democracy.  They argued that a transition’s success was more likely if the state had the 
capacity to govern (i.e., collect taxes, provide basic services, and maintain a monopoly on 
the use of force) and the “institutionalization of a socially and politically regulated 
market.”20   
The second democratization theme is that of process.  The term process is broad 
in scope.  It includes a variety of processes that lead to democracy.  Processes of interest 
include methods of autocratic demise, methods of transition, sequence of events, and 
paths to democracy.21  In a slightly different interpretation of process, some argued that 
the success of democratization is based upon the process of democratic 
institutionalization.  This perspective focuses on the process of selecting democracy 
options into a constitutional design.22   
The third theme in democratization is the primacy of actors.  Much of the same 
literature that explored democratic processes found that actors, especially elites, were an 
important influence in democratization.  In some cases, the demise of an authoritarian 
regime was caused by a split among the ruling elites.23 Much of the exploration of the 
                                                 
19 Larry Jay Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries 
(Boulder: L. Rienner, 1988), 6. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 29. These factors will be discussed in more detail in section IV of this chapter. 
20 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe, 13. 
21 Terry Linn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition," in Transitions to Democracy, ed. 
Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Darthmouth Publishing, 1995), 164; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies; Juan J. Linz, "Transitions 
to Democracy," in Transitions to Democracy, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 
1990). Ibid., 435. 
22 See: Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries. 
23 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About 
Uncertain Democracies, 19. 
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effect of actor involvement in the success or failure of a democracy was closely 
intertwined with themes on structural and procedural issues.24  Karl and Schmitter found 
that the involvement of the elites was more important than the involvement of the masses.  
Linz and Stepan, and to a lesser extent O’Donnell and Schmitter, explored which actors 
initiated transitions and which actors controlled the transition.  Schmitter discussed the 
various interactions of groups and their influence in defining the regime type.  Key actors 
that can influence a democratic transition include: military, political parties, police, social 
groups, and the all-encompassing civil society.   
The variety of arguments merely serves to reinforce Schmitter’s point that there is 
no one single form of democracy and no one way to get there.25  Throughout the 
democracy literature, authors tried to propel their theoretical approach above the other 
two.  Few attempted a holistic, empirical approach to democracy in which preconditions, 
processes, and actors were examined as an interactive system. The few attempts to 
provide a holistic view of democracy lacked an empirical approach.  Taking a conceptual 
approach, Huntington lists a variety of democratization influences including historical 
democratic experience and values, culture, and economic equality.26  Diamond argues 
that a successful democratic transition is based on “resources, legitimacy, and societal 
support.”27  Of course, these factors are built upon underlying issues such as the presence 
of a colonial administration, leadership, the international environment, and the stance of 
the military.  
Huntington also weighed in on factors that contribute to the breakdown of 
democracy based on his analysis of the first and second democratic waves.  Some of his 
                                                 
24 See Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups," 
American Behavioral Scientist 35(1992); Karl and Schmitter, "Modes of Transition."; Linz and Stepan, 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe, 66–72; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies.  
25 Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups," 
American Behavioral Scientist 35(1992). 
26 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991): 137–48; 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978).  
27 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries, 6. 
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findings most relevant include: rapid reforms cause social and/or political polarization; 
and violence causes the failure of the rule of law.28  Linz and Stepan found that a 
prolonged bad economy will lead to regime demise regardless of its level of 
democracy.29  To a large extent, many of these factors can be summarized in Linz’s 
concept that “breakdown is the result of processes initiated by the government’s 
incapacity to solve problems for which disloyal oppositions offer themselves a 
solution.”30  The government commits to solving a problem, but when it fails to deliver, 
the government refuses to acknowledge its failure.  “This process leads from the 
unsolvable problem to the loss of power, the power vacuum, and ultimately to the transfer 
of power…or civil war.”31 
2. Democratic Consolidation  
The actors, problems, and processes for democratic consolidation are different 
than those of transition.32  There is no distinct threshold for the transition from autocracy 
to democracy.  Likewise, there is no distinct level of democracy that is necessary to move 
from democratic transition to democratic consolidation.  The start and end periods of the 
transition and consolidation phases varies by author.  Linz suggests that the line is 
crossed once the elected government has taken office and the new constitution is 
complete.33  Schmitter argues that the transition phase is only ended when there is no 
“threat to revert to status quo ante.”34  The consolidation phase may begin when the first 
free election occurs, the executive takes office, the legislature has its first session, or 
some other metric that indicates that the new government has begun.   
                                                 
28 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991): 134–5. 
29 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe, 80. 
30 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978), 50. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 537. 
33 Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," in Transitions to Democracy, ed. Geoffrey Pridham 
(Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1990), 121. 
34 Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 541. 
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Schedler’s concept definition of democratic consolidation finds that experts use 
the term differently depending upon their theoretical lens of the perceived end.35  
Consolidation can mean essentially one of two things.  First, consolidation can focus on 
those factors that prevent movement away from democracy.  The majority of researchers 
of consolidation focus on factors that influence the persistence or survival of democratic 
regimes or the erosion of democratic processes.36  These studies see democratic 
consolidation as the phase in which the ad hoc activities of the transition phase are 
normalized into democratic institutions such as political parties, respect for the rule of 
law, civil liberties, a culture of compromise, and civilian control of the military.37 
Through the lens of consolidation as the persistence of democracy, democracy is 
consolidated when it is “the only game in town.”38  This means that the regime has the 
support of the majority of the population and can withstand crisis.39 
The second concept of consolidation focuses on movement towards democratic 
deepening, the increasing of the level of democracy. These studies explain the steps 
necessary to achieve full democracy and methods for full democracies to attain, what 
Schedler calls, advanced democracy.40  These studies look at increasing democratic 
                                                 
35 Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998). 
36 For example, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World, 1950–1990, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Milan Svolik, "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation," SSRN 
Working Paper Series (2007); Samuel Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," Journal of Democracy 
7, no. 2 (1996).  
37 See Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 74–6; Seymour Martin Lipset, 
"Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups," European Journal of Sociology 1, no. 1 (1960); 
Geoffrey Pridham, Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, The International Library of Politics and Comparative Government 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), 598–600; Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," 124–25. 
38 See for example: Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 65; Linz and Stepan, 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe, 5; Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 544. 
39 Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Political Democracies,” 551–553; Linz and Stepan, Problems, 6; 
Diamond, Developing Democracy, 67. 
40 Larry Jay Diamond, Leonardo Morlino, and American Political Science Association. Meeting, 
Assessing the Quality of Democracy, Journal of Democracy Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2005), 181; Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 
(1998); Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary 
Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions," Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997): 323. 
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quality through the establishment or improvement of democratic institutions such as civil 
society, party systems, and executive systems. 
It is important to note that consolidation, persistence, and deepening do not 
suggest permanence or irreversibility.  Some countries regress partially or fully to 
authoritarianism.  While many countries have established successful democracies, a 
handful of countries seem to have stagnated partway through the democratization 
process.   
3. The Record of Democratization 
Since the rebirth of democracy in the 18th century, the world has experienced an 
inconsistent, yet positive trend towards democratic governments.  Huntington argued that 
democracy has tended to arrive in cyclical surges that he called waves.  He identified 
three major surges towards democracy: 1820–1920, 1945–1962, and 1974–1990.41  It is 
possible that the new millennium brought a fourth wave of democracy.  Although 
Huntington’s methodology was weak, trend data support the general conclusion of the 
continued rise of democracy.  These surges are typically followed by what Huntington 
calls reverse waves as failed transition attempts revert to autocracy.  Since World War II, 
the number of democracies in the world has been on an uphill trend doubling from 20 in 
1946 to 40 in 1980.  The total number of democracies would nearly double again to 75 in 
1992 after the end of the Cold War. While recent, highly publicized reversals in Russia 
and Venezuela provide the perception that democracy is failing throughout the globe, the 
number of democracies actually increased by 25% since 1992.42 
While a democracy is certainly not a perfect government, most other government 
types have been found to be far worse.  Larry Diamond argues that democracy owes its 
success to the fact that “the great competing ideologies of the twentieth century have 
largely been discredited.”43  Whether a country attempted transition because they were 
                                                 
41 Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave.”  
42 Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2008;  available at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed 1 May, 2010). 
43 Diamond, Democracy in Developing Countries, x. 
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encouraged by the international community, perceived the benefits of democracy, or 
found that their previous ideology was bankrupt, the logic associated with democracy 
promotion highlights the perceived benefits of joining the club of democratic 
governments. 
Democratization is openly encouraged by many in the international community.  
For the last century, the United States has varied in its use of rhetoric, economic aid, and 
military intervention in support of democracy promotion.  The United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Taiwan, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Germany have 
democracy assistance programs.  Several international organizations including the United 
Nations, European Union, Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, the World 
Bank, the Organization for American States, and the G-8 promote democracy.  The 
causal nature between democracy promotion and transitions to democracy is somewhat 
ambiguous.  For example, democratization via military intervention succeeded in less 
than fifty percent of the cases.44  Military occupations in Japan, Germany, Austria and 
Italy turned out strong, long-lasting democracies.  Smaller interventions in Grenada and 
Panama also succeeded.   
C. WHY STUDY THE LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY? 
This research had four motivating factors.  First, there is little substantial research, 
much less quantitative work, on the levels of democracy.  Second, there is little 
quantitative work on democratization beyond the realm of economic theories.  
Specifically, there is a lack of quantitative research on the effects of violence and 
diffusion upon democracy.  Third, there is a lack of a holistic democratization model that 
combines the various approaches to democracy studies.  Finally, understanding the 
determinants of the levels of democracy has important policy and strategy implications 
                                                 
44 James Meernik, "United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy," Journal of 
Peace Research 33, no. 4 (1996): 393–7; Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University 
Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 194–207; Christopher J. Coyne, After War: The 
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for democracy promotion efforts across the globe, including those in conflict-ridden 
states such as contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Existing democratization studies predominantly focus upon the movement into 
and out of the transition and consolidation phase of democracy and were not specifically 
designed to test the levels of democracy.  Differentiations between low and high levels of 
democracy are primarily laundry lists of attributes or institutions required to achieve a 
high level of democracy.  Much academic work has been done to define democracy and 
its minimum qualifications.  Yet, little work has been done to identify the factors that 
influence the deepening of democracy, which “makes the formal structures of democracy 
more liberal, accountable, representative, and accessible—in essence, more 
democratic.”45  Literature that explored variations in levels of democracy only emerged 
at the turn of the millennium.46  However, it has not yet explored the factors that 
influence movement either between levels of democracy or across the threshold from a 
partial to a full democracy.  Even though the definitive threshold for the boundaries 
between phases remains elusive, there is little discussion on the nuances that differentiate 
the levels of democracy.  While the literature provides a lengthy list of qualifying factors 
for a country to be considered consolidated, the empirical link between structural 
variables, actors, and the resulting achievement of consolidation is limited.  Further, no 
testable theories recognized the combined contribution of both structural variables and 
actors to the democratic outcome.  
The democratization literature lacks methodological balance.  The collective 
democratization knowledge is largely based upon rich case studies from Latin America 
and Eastern Europe.  Broad quantitative tests using panel data (large number of cases 
over time) on these theories are scant and are primarily limited to testing economic 
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variables.  The majority of quantitative research in the field focuses on the outcomes of 
democracy, not the inputs.  One study that did attempt a broad look at the multiple 
variables that affect democracy used a simplistic linear regression (unsuitable for time-
series data on countries) and examined factors in piecemeal fashion.  Within the 
quantitative literature, there is only limited exploration of violence and diffusion as 
influences upon democracy.  Although violence is widely regarded as an obstacle to 
democratization, the majority of quantitative research in the area focuses on the effect 
that democracy has on interstate conflict.  Violence is generally accepted as an inhibitor 
to democracy.  Yet, the quantitative literature uses the violence variable only as an 
outcome of democracy.  Diffusion, on the other hand, is a relatively new concept that has 
not been adequately tested. 
A variety of academic approaches are used within democracy studies.  Qualitative 
studies analyzed democracy from a structure, agency, or process perspective.  Few 
studies combined these approaches into a holistic understanding of democracy.  Narrowly 
focusing upon a single approach greatly simplifies the analytical problem but fails to 
provide a broader understanding of the process of democratic change. 
This study has important policy and strategy implications for democracy 
promotion efforts across the globe, including those in conflict-ridden states such as 
contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq.  Despite U.S. democracy promotion efforts over the 
past sixty years, there has been little consideration of the variations in the levels of 
democracy.  Hybrid regimes have existed since the American Declaration of 
Independence and continued to maintain a presence throughout the twentieth century.  
While the proportion of these hybrid regimes shrank during the waves of decolonization 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the end of the Cold War introduced a glut of hybrid regimes.  
By 2006, approximately 30% of governments fell within this middle ground (see partial 
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Figure 1.   Proportion of Polity Types Over Time47 
Despite their pervasiveness, the literature has only just begun exploring the 
negative outcomes of low levels of democracy.  History has shown that conversions to 
democracy are fraught with complications.  Partial democracies are more prone to 
interstate war, insurgency, political instability, and ethnic violence than their autocratic or 
fully democratic counterparts.48  “Where many citizens are illiterate, per capita income is 
low, society is ethnically divided, religious sects or other illiberal groups dominate civil 
society, powerful spoilers fear democracy, nationalist mythmakers control the media, 
and/or oil revenue makes the state unaccountable to taxpayers, the path of 
democratization is likely to be neither smooth nor peaceful.”49  Partial democracies 
violate human rights as much as autocracies.50  These undesirable secondary effects of 
                                                 
47 Table created from Polity IV data; for this chart, polities were categorized as follows: -10 to -7 (full 
autocracy), -6 to 0 (partial autocracy), 1 to 7 (partial democracy), 8 to 10 (full democracy).  The rationale 
for this categorization is discussed in Chapter III. 
48 Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 
1816–1992 ": 33–49; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional 
Strength, and War," International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 298; Jack A. Goldstone et al., "A Global 
Forecasting Model of Political Instability," in American Political Science Association (Washington, 
DC2005).  
49 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Turbulent Transitions," in Leashing the Dogs of War, 
ed. et al. Chester A. Crocker (DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007), 173. 
50 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997): passim. 
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democracy promotion can negatively affect U.S. interests abroad.  These issues have 
repercussions on a regional and global scale.  They can adversely affect global trade, 
regional stability, and collective security efforts (e.g., counter-proliferation, counter-
smuggling, counter-terrorism).  Internal conflict can also lead to under-governed spaces 
which can be exploited by transnational criminal or terrorist groups.  Since the United 
States, as stated in U.S. Special Operations Command Concept Plan 7500, desires to 
minimize the operating areas of insurgents and terrorists, it is in the U.S. interest to 
mitigate the effects of conflict and under-governed spaces. 
Understanding the determinants of the levels of democracy is also important for 
those policy makers that advocate the democratic peace theory: a theory that democracies 
are less likely to go to war against each other or at all.51  Some contemporary policy 
makers have a “widely-shared belief that democracy, development, and security are 
inextricably linked even if the correlations have not yet been proven.”52  However, recent 
studies suggest that the theory only applies to fully democratic countries since newly 
transitioning partial democracies are actually more prone to violence than autocracies.53  
In order to protect long-term U.S. interests and achieve U.S. policy objectives, it is 
important for policy makers and strategists to understand which factors affect the 
resulting level of democracy during planning for democracy promotion.  Democracy is 
not a panacea; it “will not necessarily bring in its wake economic growth, social peace, 
administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets, or ‘the end of ideology.’”54  
                                                 
51 Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001), 127–55; David Rousseau et al., "Assessing the 
Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace, 1918–1988," American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (1996): 
522–6.  Counter-arguments to the democratic peace theory can be found in Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed 
Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003); Halvard Buhaug, 
"Dangerous Dyads Revisited: Democracies May Not Be That Peaceful after All," Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 22, no. 2 (2005). 
52 Jim Kolbe, Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing: Foreign Assistance 
Reform in the Next Administration – Challenges and Solutions, April 23, 2008.   
53 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and 
War," International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 297–337.  
54 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is. . . And Is Not," Journal of 
Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 15. 
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Without full consideration of the variations between the levels of democracy, U.S. 
democracy promotion efforts could have adverse effects upon U.S. interests. 
The initial concept of this research was to use existing theory to test the structural 
determinants of the levels of democracy.  However, the direct application of existing 
theories is limited by a reliance on the phased approach to studying democracy.  Studies 
focused on the movement into and out of the transition and consolidation phase of 
democracy and were not specifically designed to test the levels of democracy.  Even 
though the definitive threshold for the boundaries between phases remains elusive, there 
is little discussion on the nuances that differentiate the level of democracy among those 
countries within the consolidation phase.  While the literature provides a lengthy list of 
qualifying factors for a country to be considered consolidated, the empirical link between 
structural variables, actors, and the resulting achievement of consolidation is limited.  
Further, no testable theories recognized the combined contribution of both structural 
variables and actors to the democratic outcome.  In order to fill these gaps, this study 
deduced a model of political change from existing theory (see Figure 2).   
D. HYPOTHESES 
This study views democracy as a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and 
regulation of a state’s electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability.  A 
government that lacks all three attributes of democracy is an autocracy.  Democratization 
is the process of increasing one or more of the attributes of democracy; a process that can 
last from a few days to decades.  Though the transition from autocracy to democracy is 
rightly celebrated, democracy is not a singular event but a recurring process of selection 
and accountability.  A full discussion on the development of the hypotheses is contained 
in Chapter II but will be briefly outlined here. 
This dissertation seeks to identify the determinants of the levels of democracy 
though the examination of the interaction between a country’s socio-economic 
conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy.  The study converged seemingly 
disparate hypotheses on democracy into a coherent, holistic framework to understand the 
variations in the levels of democracy within and across countries.  This study deduced six 
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hypotheses based upon a review of the democracy studies literature.  This study 
aggregated the various theories on the socio-economic causes of democratization into 
four structural factors: income, economic development, diffusion of democratic norms, 
and intrastate violence.  A hypothesis was constructed around each of the four structural 
factors.  One, increasing economic income leads to democracy through the development 
of the middle class.  The middle class, with a growing disposable income, becomes more 
active in civic organizations and more likely to purchase the means to acquire increased 
access to media and other information sources.55  Two, increasing economic development 
leads to democracy through an urbanized, educated, literate work force.  This leads to the 
development of unions and demands for increased political say.56  Three, the diffusion of 
norms leads to democracy through the development of civil society.57  It is through 
interactions with other countries that the population learns the disadvantages of autocracy 
and the advantages of democracy.  Four, while a lack of intrastate violence does not 
cause democracy, violence can lead to the breakdown of democracy.58  This suggests two 
hypotheses.  First, an increase in the level of violence is likely to lead to a decrease in the 
                                                 
55 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science 
Review (1959); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in 
the World, 1950–1990, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions " American Journal of Political Science 50, 
no. 3 (2006); Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: 
The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
56 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: Free 
Press, 1958); Simon Smith Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread, Studies in 
Comparative Economics 7 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1966); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and 
John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
57 Steven  Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," Journal of 
Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005); Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International 
Context of Democratization," International Organization 60 (2006). 
58 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968); Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation; Larry Jay Diamond, Consolidating the 
Third Wave Democracies, A Journal of Democracy Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997); Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991); Juan J. 
Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Linz and 
Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
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level of democracy.  Second, increases in the level of democracy amid high levels of 
violence unrelated to the political change are unlikely to be sustainable.   
While security, economy, and norms are critical factors in influencing the 
evolution of democracy in a country, they are not in themselves determinative of a 
country’s level of democracy.  Instead, each of these structural factors influences the 
preferences of a country’s key political actors: civil society, the military, NGOs, political 
parties, and the ruling regime.  This study combines the structural factors of the economy, 
intrastate violence, and the diffusion of norms with the key actors of civil society, the 
military, non-government organizations, political parties, and the ruling regime.  This 
research proposes a supply and demand model as the analytical framework for studying 
the interaction between structural factors, key actors, and the resulting democratic 
processes (see Figure 2).  The effect of a single variable upon the level of democracy is 
not universal over time or across cases because actors’ preferences are affected by all 
three factors simultaneously.  To complicate matters, the structural factors do not occur in 
isolation of one another.  Increases in violence can have a negative effect upon the 
economy and opportunities for the diffusion of norms.  A bad economy can increase the 
potential for people to turn to violence as a means of survival or protest while inhibiting 
the diffusion of norms.  Further, the diffusion of democratic norms affects citizens’ 
perceptions of security and economic policies.  Therefore, this study hypothesized that a 
change in the polity preferences of key actors leads to a change in the level of democracy.   
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Figure 2.   A Model for the Determinants of the Levels of Democracy 
E.  THE APPROACH OF THIS STUDY 
Using a mixed methods approach, this study integrated literatures from the fields 
of political science, behavioral science, history, and economics to explore the factors that 
influence levels of democracy.  While the study seeks to identify those factors that inhibit 
or encourage the development and maturation of democratic institutions, the research 
recognizes that it is unlikely that any single variable can cause democracy since there are 
many forms of democracy and there are many paths to democracy.  The quantitative 
portion of this study explored the relationship between the level of democracy and 
structural variables with emphasis on intrastate violence.  The quantitative analysis 
included econometrics, trend data, and computational analysis of major regime 































Education & Literacy 




The second phase of the study is a qualitative analysis of three country case 
studies to complement the quantitative research.  Qualitative analysis helps to make sense 
of quantitative findings.  The findings from the computational analysis were used to 
identify cases that met the qualitative case study selection criteria.  The qualitative 
approach was designed to explore those cases that demonstrated an ability to overcome 
structural obstacles to democratization.  The qualitative portion of this study used a 
combination of rational choice and rational choice institutionalism to explore the effect 
that structural variables had on actors’ preferences for democracy.  Within this paradigm, 
the resulting equilibrium between supply and demand determines the level of democracy 
typically through the development of the constitution and electoral laws.    The purpose 
of the mixed methods approach in this study was two-fold.  First, this method was chosen 
for the purpose of development; the findings from the quantitative analysis identified 
appropriate case studies for the three-case qualitative analysis.  Second, mixed methods 
provided complementarity; varied perspectives to the same problem.59 
Demand for democracy is an analytical opinion of the aggregate change in 
preferences for the various civil society groups within a country.  Supply for democracy 
encompasses four key groups that can deliver some element of democracy.  These groups 
will supply democracy when the cost-benefit analysis of democracy exceeds that of 
autocracy.  Typically, the military, political parties, NGOs, and the ruling regime benefit 
from the persistence of autocracy through economic, political and social advantages.  The 
change in costs and benefits can occur in several manners.  The benefits of democracy 
could increase through increased awareness or a change in socio-economic conditions.  
Or, the increasing costs for maintaining autocracy could overshadow any perceived gains.  
This model does not ignore the influence of rebellions or foreign invaders.  Once they 
control one of the four key actors within the country, they gain influence over the supply 
of democracy.  For instance, when the United States invaded Iraq and established a new 
regime, it faced a choice for the new polity type.   
                                                 
59 For an introduction to the mixed methods approach, see Jessica T. DeCuir-Gunby, “Mixed Methods 
Research in the Social Sciences,” in Jason W. Osborne, ed., Best Practices in Quantitative Methods 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), 125–136. 
 29
1. Case Study Selection Criteria 
Three cases were selected in order to explore the three potential combinations of 
the two primary structural variables: security and industrialization (see Table 1).  Cases 
were selected based on their relevance and representativeness.  Relevant cases had either 
significant levels of internal violence or a low level of industrialization as measured by 
the proportion of agricultural labor.  Additionally, each case study was required to have 
some aspect of contemporary strategic importance: large economy, large population, 
proximity to major shipping lanes or have value as a potential forward operating base for 
U.S., NATO or EU forces for regional counterterrorism, conventional, or disaster 
assistance operations.60  In order to maximize representativeness, the case study countries 
were selected from different geographic regions in countries with populations larger than 
five million.  Finally, in order to be representative of future transitions to democracy, 
colonial transfers to full democracy (e.g., Papua New Guinea) were not selected as case 
studies.   
                                                 
60 Following Larry Jay Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, The Global Divergence of Democracies / 
Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, A Journal of Democracy Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 360–1. A large economy is $100+ billion; large population is 100+ million people. 
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(Percent Ag Labor) 
Case #1 YES YES Indonesia (46%) 
Philippines (48%) 
Case #2 YES NO Mexico   
South Africa 
Case #3 NO YES Senegal (74%) 
India (79%) 
Kenya (75%)  
Solomon (77%)  




Table 1. Case Study Selection Criteria 
For the first case, Indonesia and Philippines are equally relevant and 
representative.  Both countries transitioned during periods of violence with a high 
percentage of agricultural labor, large populations, significant economies and 
strategically important locations.  The Philippines was selected because its democracy 
has been sustained for a longer period and it skipped the partial democracy phase 
entirely.  For the second case, both Mexico and South Africa are equally relevant.  
However, Mexico’s situation is slightly more representative as South Africa faced a 
combination of rare occurrences: intense international diplomatic pressure, a charismatic 
opposition, and a government-enforced racial cleavage. 
The third case was a far more difficult selection.  India and Papua New Guinea 
lack representativeness since their transition to democracy was via colonial transfer.  The 
Solomon Islands was excluded due to its lack of strategic importance and, as a tiny, 
remote island nation, is not representative.  Botswana and Bolivia are poor examples of 
underdeveloped countries since both had relatively low agricultural labor (around 50%) 
and twice the GDP per capita of the other cases.  Additionally, both countries have only a 
limited strategic significance.  Kenya’s recent regression to partial democracy reduces its 
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relevance for the study.  This process of elimination left Ghana and Senegal.  While both 
countries fit the criteria, Senegal is the preferred choice due to its extremely high 
proportion of agricultural labor.  While Ghana would be an interesting study, Senegal is a 
more appropriate choice for exploring the effect of underdevelopment on the level of 
democracy.         
2. Qualitative Analysis 
As indicated in the hypotheses section above, the qualitative section seeks to test 
the hypothesis that all else being equal, a change in the polity preferences of key actors 
may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  To test this hypothesis, country-unique 
literature reviews contributed to a detailed historical narrative for each period of 
democratization.  The literature review was supplemented with personal communications 
with local subject matter experts including academics, think tanks, NGOs, and embassy 
personnel.  These communications filled data gaps from the literature review and 
providing a local perspective to the narrative.  In total, 54 personal communications were 
conducted: 19 in Mexico, 17 in the Philippines, and 18 in Senegal.   
Following George and Bennett, this study analyzed each case using structured, 
focused comparison based upon the hypotheses discussed in the previous section.61  The 
case studies analyzed how each independent variable affected the democratic preferences 
for five key actors: civil society, the military, political parties, NGOs, and the ruling 
regime.  Each case was tri-sected into three analytical sections.  The first part of each 
case provides a brief historical background with emphasis on significant political history 
and socio-economic conditions, particularly those that might serve as obstacles to 
democratization.  The second part examines the changes in the demand for democracy 
among civil society as affected by security, economy, and norms.  The final part analyzes 
the factors that affected supply of democracy among elite groups (those groups capable 
of delivering democracy: military, NGOs, political parties, and ruling regime [old or 
newly installed]).  Sections two and three are evaluations of how structural factors and 
                                                 
61 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 67–72. 
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events shaped group preferences. These preferences were analyzed in an aggregate sense 
using a rational actor model—change in group cost-benefit analyses of regime types over 
time. 
In some cases, public opinion surveys provided insights into the beliefs and 
perceptions of a country’s citizens such as those gathered by Eurobarometer since 1974, 
Latinobarometer since 1996, Afrobarometer since 1999, Asian Barometer since 2002, 
and the Arab barometer since 2005.  To the extent possible, these surveys were used to 
inform the work of this study.  However, these surveys provide only general information 
about the preferences of the citizens and not of each key actor group.  Furthermore, the 
surveys are often aggregated, preventing analysis at the sub-state level. 
F.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The next chapter analyzed literature across several fields to formulate a model of 
political change.  The model draws upon theories from political development, economic 
development, and political violence.  From this literature, the study deduced several 
hypotheses for testing the proposed model of political change.  Chapter III presents the 
methods, sources, and results for the quantitative analysis; a combination of econometric 
and computational analysis.  The computational analysis was used to augment the 
econometric analysis in order to present the findings in a more compelling manner for the 
non-econometrician.  This study demonstrated that high levels of economic income, 
industrialization, security, and diffusion of norms each individually had a positive effect 
upon the level of democracy.  Of these factors, security and diffusion were the most 
important.  Yet, the determinative nature of these factors falls short in two respects.  First, 
several countries with positive structural factors do not have high levels of democracy.  
Second, several countries with very poor structural factors do have high levels of 
democracy.  The qualitative portion of the study found that the determinative factor was 
the strategic interaction among actors.   
Chapters IV through VI present three different case studies on countries that were 
able to overcome supposed economic and security obstacles to democracy: Mexico, 
Philippines, and Senegal.  Each case study explores the factors that affect the preferences 
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of citizens and key political institutions.  Chapter VII closes with a conclusion, policy 
implications, and recommendations for future research.  The qualitative analysis 
indicated that the positive effects of economic income and industrialization upon 
democracy could be negated through the development of a patron-client system which 
provided organized workers with a stake in maintaining the existing political structure.  
However, periods of economic crisis or eruptions of violence led to increased demands 
for leadership change.  Whether this demand for change also resulted in a demand for 
democracy appeared to rely upon the level of diffusion of democratic norms.   
 34
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II. PROPOSING A MODEL OF POLITICAL CHANGE 
How does a high level of democracy come about?  Does the international system 
have an influence or are the determinants primarily internal to the state or, perhaps, group 
actors?  Is democracy simply incompatible with some countries?  Is there some 
unchanging element to a country (e.g., location, age) that makes democracy unattainable?    
This chapter presents a model of democratic (and undemocratic) change and six 
testable hypotheses shaped by insights from a review of the existing literature.  This 
study argues that security, economy, and norms shape the preferences of a country’s key 
political actors: civil society, the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. 
This research builds upon the literature by combining structure, actors, and process into a 
testable model that explains the determinants of the level of democracy (see Figure 2).  
This chapter breaks down empirical arguments in order to analyze the logical cause-effect 
chain.  Combined, four of the hypotheses state that, all else being equal, a change in the 
level of intrastate violence, industrialization, income, or the diffusion of democratic 
norms, may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  Hypothesis five argues that the 
presence of intrastate violence during a transition to a higher level of democracy may 
limit the sustainability of that level of democracy.  Finally, the sixth hypothesis connects 
the structural factors to the actors; it states that a change in the polity preferences of key 
actors may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  Section A analyzes how actors, 
including civil society, the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime 
influence the level of democracy.   Section B reviews the various structural arguments, 
which are aggregated into three categories: the economy, internal security, and the 
diffusion of norms.  Section C discusses the process of democratic change as the result of 
actor interaction.   
A.  SUPPLY AND DEMAND EXPLANATION OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE 
Following Inglehart and Wetzel, Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, Bratton, Mattes 
and Gyimah-Boadi, a supply and demand model explains the democratic output of the 
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competing preferences of actors.
62
  Changes in the level of democracy are not simply a 
matter of elite choice or the capacity of social movements.  Group preferences are a 
rational choice based on institutional interests and changes in the costs and benefits of 
autocracy versus democracy.  Changes in the structural factors affect the cost-benefit 
analysis of these actors.  Further, each group has multiple rational choice actors that, in 
some cases, have varying preferences.   
This study uses the supply and demand model to provide a general logic to the 
interaction of multiple actors based upon the costs, benefits, and level of democracy.  For 
economic purists, this is the price, utility, and quantity of democracy.  However, in this 
instance the purist terms suggest an overly mathematical and exact nature that is not 
intended.  The model is not intended to identify a specific price point.  Such a project 
would be futile since many of the costs and benefits of democracy are not measured in 
dollars.  Instead, the model is used in a logical fashion to explain changes in costs, 
benefits, and levels.  For this study, supply and demand is simply used as an organizing 
principle with which to study the rational choices of various actors.  After all, rational 
choice is “an equilibrium analysis in which actors respond to each others’ decisions until 
each is at a position from which no improvement is possible.”63   
The importance of actors during a democratic transition cannot be overstated.  
Nothing happens without the involvement of group and individual actors.  A single 
individual, such as Nelson Mandela or Lech Walesa, can serve as a rallying figure to 
motivate democratic change.  However, not every transition has such a charismatic figure 
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to rally around.  The heavy lifting is done by the faceless group called civil society.  Civil 
society is a normative measure of group and individual social and political activism.  
Social groups, professional organizations, and labor groups act as advocates for group 
interests.  Citizens staff the democratic institutions.  They choose to become constructive 
members of the civil society.  They develop political parties, work in the bureaucracy, 
create, publish and debate political stories, and vote.  The military, NGOs, political 
parties, and the ruling regime can have a direct influence on the level of democracy.  
Although their actual involvement varies from case to case, these actors collectively can 
reform and respect the constitution, develop branches of government, and ensure free 
elections.  
1. Consumer Demand for Democracy 
Demand is a measure of citizens’ willingness and ability to commit resources in 
order to maintain or increase the level of democracy.  The benefits include increased 
input into the selection and accountability of leaders and representatives which make 
policy and resource decisions.  The costs represent the citizens’ commitment of resources 
to maintain, increase, or improve democracy.  In the context of the supply and demand 
model, it should be noted that democracy is far from an efficient market.  In many 
countries, a limited oligopoly of democracy suppliers makes the supply highly inelastic: 
changes in demand do not immediately result in a change in the level of democracy.  This 
inelasticity is possible because “repressive police authority, a powerful army, and a 
willingness by rulers to use brute force may maintain a regime’s power almost 
indefinitely.”64  This tendency towards inelasticity explains why many democratic 
theorists focus on the actions of elites as the key to democratization.  
The citizens’ preference for autocracy or democracy is the result of a cost-benefit 
calculation, which is shaped by normative, economic, and security factors.  The 
citizenry’s preference for democracy is a critical element to the level of democracy.  If 
the citizens see democracy as an expendable luxury or see autocracy as a cure for their 
                                                 
64 Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential 
Address," American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (1994): 9. 
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socio-economic ills, then democracy will not survive without considerable, sustained 
effort by those that supply democracy.  Similarly, a high level of demand for democracy 
is not enough to bring it about without some effort on the part of the suppliers of 
democracy.  Even the concept of democracy is not homogenous among the citizens 
beyond a desire for change from the existing regime.65  Of course, supply and demand do 
not always remain unmixed.  It is possible for a segment of consumers to become 
suppliers (through revolt) and it is possible for suppliers to influence demand (through 
marketing or coercion). 
The core of the citizens’ polity preference resides within the civil society.  
Although some consider all non-government actors to be a part of civil society, other 
authors narrow their definition to formal or informal non-government groups that 
promote the collective interest.66  In either case, civil society implies an evolution of 
norms through meetings and discussions; the sharing of ideas, complaints, and 
successes.67  Civil society can be thought of as an aggregation of the citizens’ views on 
cooperation, decision making, justice, and dispute resolution.  It can also be a normative 
measure of individual and group socio-political activism.  Civil society affects the 
development and strength of political parties, the media, and pluralist non-government 
organizations such as unions and professional societies.  It is this sense of civil society 
that is widely regarded as the bulwark to creating a sustainable democratic government.68  
However, since the sources of political activism vary across countries, a single 
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measurement is difficult.  Even if available, a single measurement would be misleading 
since the collective interest of a civil society is an aggregation of individual and group 
interests which may or may not be inclined towards democracy. 
2. The Suppliers of Democracy 
The term supply should not be misconstrued to suggest that democracy is a good 
(or event) that is manufactured, purchased, and delivered.  The term supply is merely 
meant to convey a group’s physical or legal ability to enact or prevent political activities 
which affect the level of democracy in either a positive or negative manner.  While 
suppliers could be categorized into neat categories of supporters and opponents of 
democracy, this study uses a more nuanced approach arguing that the support for a 
specific polity type is a far more incremental scale.  This study argues that the suppliers 
of democracy can be aggregated into four categories of rational choice institutions: the 
military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling 
regime.  The relative power of these organizations and their ability to deliver or impede 
democracy varies from case to case.   
This study does not see any of these actors as inherently supportive of or opposed 
to a particular polity type.  The supply of democracy in a country hinges upon the 
decisions of these four entities, which are not necessarily homogenous in themselves nor 
independent of the actions of the other actors.  Each group’s preference for autocracy or 
democracy is the result of a cost-benefit calculation, which is shaped by normative, 
economic, and security factors.   
The military is often in the unique position to use physical force to defend or 
remove democracy.  Therefore, some see civilian control of the military and an apolitical 
military as critical components to building a democracy.69  The military’s decision to 
remain apolitical or to seek or allow civil oversight of the military is influenced by the 
same security, economic, and normative issues that concern the broader civil society.  
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Crises of security or economy can be a test of a military’s apolitical measure. In many 
cases, the military is a bastion of conservatism that will naturally prefer the status quo or 
take action to return to the status quo ante.  In some cases, democracy may contain direct 
costs with budget cuts, manpower reductions, the implementation of human rights 
commissions, or the expulsion of the military from advantageous government positions or 
businesses.  The norms that affect the military are not necessarily those that affect civil 
society; democratic norms specifically relate to the military’s perception of its role in the 
constitutional process.   
NGOs can be an important contributor to democracy.70  This study views NGOs 
in a broad context that covers all nongovernment organizations including non-profits, 
charities, grassroots organizations, religious organizations, and unions.  NGOs have 
neither the force of the military to implement democracy nor the authority to adopt 
changes to the constitution.  However, NGOs do have the ability to improve the freedom 
and competition of elections through election monitoring.  NGOs can also improve 
participation by monitoring government repression and lobbying their group’s interests to 
government officials.  While they do not have direct authority over changes to the 
electoral system, NGOs do provide increased accountability of the other suppliers of 
democracy.  Some domestic NGOs have the additional power of leveraging transnational 
NGO networks to put international pressure onto the regime to implement reforms.71  
NGOs with transnational links are likely to have a higher density of interaction with 
western ideals and will therefore generally support the supply of democracy. 
Political parties can have an influence over the supply of democracy.  However, 
there is great disparity in the strength of political parties across and within countries.  In 
many cases, political parties have no power, especially in those systems that lack 
elections.  The inclusion of elections, though, creates competing interests for shaping the 
electoral rules.  By its nature, the majority power has more political power than the 
opposition parties.  The influence among the various opposition parties also varies based 
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on party resources, organization, and mobilization.  In a repressive country that bans 
opposition parties, the opposition may lack an organization vehicle with which to 
influence the supply of democracy.  Absent the use of force, parties provide the primary 
process for the competition of political power.72  Political Parties reduce uncertainty, act 
as advocates, and provide legitimacy to the government 73  Political parties are important 
to democracy for three other reasons.  The opposition provides a limited constraining 
effect upon the ruling regime’s policy options.  Second, parties provide an alternative 
outlet (besides violence) for the expression of grievances and policy preferences.  Third, 
political parties act as the pinnacles of group interests.  Issues of security, economy, and 
norms are important drivers for motivating an opposition to form, voice its dissent, and 
mobilize the citizens to demand change.  The factors that influence civil society partially 
affect a citizen’s preference for a particular political party.  In that sense, security, 
economic and normative issues have a direct influence on the relative power between 
parties.  One or more of those political parties, either in or out of the legislature, could 
have a direct hand in designing or approving electoral changes.  In general, political 
parties will prefer to shape the electoral system in a manner that provides their party an 
advantage over its competitors.   
No ruler acts without constraints.  Even in those states that appear to have 
supreme executive power, the ruler is mindful of how his actions will affect his patron-
client supporting coalition.74  If the clients find that their personal relationship with the 
patron is no longer enough to guarantee their privileged status, they seek to solidify their 
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privileged status through the development of institutions and the rule of law.75  In other 
cases, cleavages may exist within ruling regimes between hard-liners and soft-liners, 
conservatives and reformists.76  Within these constraints, the ruling executive can change 
the level of democracy at will: the freedom and competition of elections, the level of 
repression, and electoral laws that guarantee free and competitive elections with open 
participation and a regular changing of the ruling executive.  From a rational actor view, 
the ruling regime will prefer to limit the supply of democracy because it threatens a 
potential change in executive power.  If the costs of maintaining autocracy become too 
high, the ruling regime may choose to supply democracy by enabling reform, stepping 
down, or by negotiating a new government with dissidents.  For instance, democracy in 
Chile and the Philippines was possible because the ruling dictator agreed to step down.  
In some cases, the death of the ruling executive removed a significant obstacle to 
democracy such as Rafael Trujillo in Dominican Republic, Idi Amin in Uganda, and 
Francisco Franco in Spain.       
In many cases, the ruling regime was removed by military force in the form of a 
coup, international intervention, or an insurgency.  However, democracy is not a natural 
follow-on to regime change by force.  In most cases, the victorious party establishes a 
new ruling regime, which then begins its own cost analysis of supplying democracy. 
B. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
In order to build a holistic model of the process of political change, key studies 
are explored in-depth in order to understand the logical underpinnings that explain how 
the various determinants affect the level of democracy.  This research groups structural 
variables into three categories: the economy, internal security, and the diffusion of norms.  
Note in Figure 2 that these variables are not independent of each other.  Internal security 
affects economic income and, over time, economic development.  Conversely, a healthy 
economy is expected to reduce the probability of intrastate violence.  It is possible that 
                                                 
75 North, Wallace and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 191. 
76 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About 
Uncertain Democracies, 15–17. 
 43
democratic norms affect economic norms and violence norms.  Economic development 
affects the diffusion of norms as it relates to the ability for democratic ideals to spread 
from foreign influences via technology.  The spread of democratic norms could provide 
an alternative to violence as a means to achieve political objectives.  The overall effect of 
structural factors upon democracy can be viewed in Figure 2.  Actor preferences for 
democracy are affected by structural factors that can be aggregated into economic, 
security, and norms.  This section analyzes the causal chain of each structural factor to 
identify hypotheses that will further exploration of the determinants of levels of 
democracy.      
1. An Economic Theoretical Model 
Some of the most advanced quantitative democracy studies come from the field of 
economics.  From this research, econometricians developed a mathematical 
representation between democracy and key economic variables.  Following Acemoglu 
and Robinson, as well as Haber and Menaldo, the Cobb-Douglass production function 
can be used as a starting point to estimate a mathematical model of the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables.77  For use in this study, the equation is 
recalculated to solve for changes in the level of democracy.  The Cobb-Douglass 
production function is expressed as: 
                                                                                                                            t t t t t tY A K H G L
α β γ δ=    (1)  
where α > 0, β > 0, γ > 0, δ > 0   and  α+β+γ+δ ≥ 1 
 
Where Y is economic growth, K is private capital, G is public capital, H is human capital, 
and L is labor force participation and A can be defined as;  
 
   At = TtGovt                            (2) 
 
Where T is technological progress and Gov is governance defined as: 
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Govt  =  g(DtNtStXt)        (3) 
 
Where D is the level of democracy, N is the level of democratic norms, S is the level of 
security, and X represents undetermined exogenous variables.  Substituting for Govt and 
simplifying capital and labor into production variable Pt,  
                  Tt t t t t tY D S P N
α β γ ε δ=  
 
In order to solve for the steady state levels of capital and labor, ik, ih, and ig are 
defined as the fractions of income invested in private, human, and public capital, 
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At steady state, change in the rate of accumulation is zero or kt = ht = gt = 0. 
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Substituting the steady states of capital from equation (5) back into the production 
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If order to solve for change over time, the speed of convergence to steady state per capita 














      (10) 
 
Let y(0) be initial per capita income, so 
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Noting that A(t) = T(t)Gov(t) where Gov(t) = f(S(t), D(t), N(t), X(t)) and 
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   (14) 
 
Equation (14) demonstrates that the change in the level of governance (ln Gov(t2)-ln 
Gov(t1)) is determined by GDP per capita [y(t2)], private capital to GDP (ik), human 
capital to GDP (ih), public capital to GDP (ig), technological progress (T) as well as other 
unknown factors.  Therefore, these factors also have a determinative influence upon the 
subcomponents of Gov(t) including democracy, security, and diffusion.  In order to 
understand these relationships in a more contextual manner, the study reviewed existing  
 
 48
theory to further shape hypotheses development.  The most prominent economic 
variables explored in democracy studies are economic growth, economic crisis, the 
resource curse, and economic development.   
a. Income 
The terms economic growth and economic development are often used 
interchangeably.  While the practice is acceptable in some cases, for this research it is 
important to identify the nuanced differences so that a full exploration of the causal 
interaction with democracy can be investigated.  Income is the most common metric of 
economic growth.  As a determinant of democracy, there are two variations of income 
used.  One variation is the exploration of an income threshold.  Once a country’s income 
moves above or below this threshold, the probability of democracy is influenced.  The 
second variation involves exploration of the effects of precipitous drops in income 
creating an economic crisis.  Again, this approach requires the development of a 
threshold to identify when an economic crisis has occurred.  
The claim that only wealthy countries can become democracies is an old 
argument dating back to Aristotle’s analysis of Athenian democracy.  The relationships 
between economic growth and democracy as well as economic development and 
democracy are still highly debated today.  Seymour Lipset set the stage for both of these 
debates, arguing that economic prosperity was a prerequisite for a successful democratic 
transition.78  Comparing “less democratic” and “more democratic” governments, Lipset 
found that the more democratic countries had a considerable advantage in income as well 
as several economic development factors.  We will address economic development 
shortly, but will first explore the arguments on economic growth. 
Lipset’s findings were based on cross-sectional data: a single snapshot in 
time that included only Latin America and Europe.  The cross-sectional approach 
provides useful information on differences between countries, but does not explain 
changes within countries.  Lipset’s findings showed that the economically advanced 
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countries were democratic.  However, his empirical analysis provides no insight into the 
direction of causation or advance a theory for why or when an individual country would 
democratize.  Surprisingly, Lipset’s theory does not address the reason that the Axis 
powers became democracies in the post-war environment rather than prior to the war.  
But, the political landscape of the late 1940s and 1950s provided overwhelming evidence 
in support of Lipset’s theory.  The Axis powers had recently transitioned to democracy.  
Almost every stable democracy was a developed country.  Poor democracies were 
dropping like flies: Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria. 
Burma and India were democratic, but on the verge of civil war.  Colombia and Peru 
were politically unstable.  Malaysia and Venezuela had only entered the democracy scene 
and had not yet proved themselves.  The only country at the time to achieve a high level 
of democracy that appeared sustainable was wealthy Uruguay (though even Uruguay’s 
democracy would not last).  The political environment changed drastically in fifty years.  
Reality seemed to have disproved Lipset’s theory.  Moderate-income countries like 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and even poor 
Mongolia were able to create sustainable, highly democratic regimes.  Meanwhile, 
wealthy countries like Belarus, Malaysia and Singapore had only limited democracy.   
A slew of researchers have debated Lipset’s theory for decades.  
Przeworksi, et al., seemingly put the final nail in the coffin of Lipset’s theory with their 
finding that income level was not a factor in determining democratic transition, but only a 
factor in democratic sustainability.79  While critics agreed that wealth does not cause 
democracy, the political landscape seemed to suggest that poor countries had a tough 
time with democracy.  David Epstein, et al., argued that Przeworki’s results were skewed 
because he chose a dichotomous variable for polity type.  Epstein retested using a three-
tier regime type (autocracy, partial democracy, and democracy) and found that income is, 
after all, a significant factor in democratic transitions: wealthy countries are both more 
likely to transition to and to sustain full democracy.80  
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Though they may disagree on the outcome, the above arguments all agree 
that economic growth is an input to democracy.  Yet, there are many that argue that this 
causal direction is backward: economic growth is the output of democracy.81  However, 
this debate is equally contentious.  A recent survey of the literature found that less than 
half of 14 studies show that democracy has a positive affect on economic growth.82  
Attempts to change the economic system in order to boost economic growth can create 
short term losers.  An autocracy can repress the dissent of the losers.  Citizens in a 
democracy are likely to complain (and vote accordingly) about the pain associated with 
economic reforms.83  It is possible that this debate affected the preferences for 
democratic change among ruling regimes and intellectuals.  While the proper sequencing 
of political and economic reforms may be debated, it is clear that the simultaneous 
transition of politics and economics runs some risks.  Simultaneous, or near 
simultaneous, economic and political transitions provides an opportunity for the losers 
from political reform to ally with the losers of economic reform.  The experience of 
Eastern Europe during the 1990s demonstrated that these risks are not insurmountable.84 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the income-democracy debate is not 
the causal direction between the two factors, but how the relationship has changed over 
time.  Gasiorowski and Poptani found that the effect of democracy on economic growth 
is dependent upon the time period.85  Their findings, based on a study of Latin America, 
show that it is the economic policy choices of a democracy that matter.  Populist policies 
of the 1960s were a drag on the economy while free market policies of the 1980s 
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produced long-term economic growth.  This effect likely varies from region to region and 
even country to country.  If the correlation between economic growth and democracy 
varies over time, then it is possible that the causal direction between economic growth 
and democracy also varies over time. 
Two explanations for the rationale that income drives democracy stand 
out.  Both are built upon the assumption that economic growth leads to increases in the 
individual incomes of at least a portion of the population, creating what could be called a 
middle class.  This change in income creates disposable income, provides independence 
from the patronage of the state, and changes the spending priorities of those achieving 
middle class status. 
The first rationale for the connection between economic growth and 
democracy focuses on disposable income.  More income means increased opportunities 
for purchasing technological goods (i.e., television, radio, internet, and cell phone) that 
provide access to formal and informal sources of international news and sources for 
learning about the advantages and disadvantages of democracy relative to autocracy.  As 
citizens in autocracies get greater access to information, they will gain an increased 
ability to monitor the decisions, actions, and performance of their government relative to 
its peers.  An increase in income leads to an increase in demand for democracy and an 
improved ability to monitor and evaluate government legitimacy.       
An increase in income also changes the needs priorities of individuals.  
The poor are focused on meeting their basic needs of food, water, shelter and safety.  The 
middle class, having secured enough income to satisfy their basic needs, has the ability to 
address what Maslow called social and self-esteem needs.  These needs drive individuals 
to seek social interaction, develop mutual respect with their peers, and take on social 
responsibilities.  The development of these values coincides with the development of the 
democratic norms of tolerance, trust, and the expression of choice.86  Social and 
professional organizations are formed.  Social and political problems and solutions are 
debated.  The widespread adoption of these democratic norms is often referred to as civil 
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society, a potential determinant of democracy, which will be explored in more detail 
later.  Both of these rationales suggest that income is not the immediate determinant of 
democracy.  Income affects some intervening variable, which produces, or at least 
increases the probability of, a democratic outcome.  One explanation is that income is 
part of a cost-benefit analysis.87  For example, Singapore’s consistent economic growth 
and ability to successfully provide basic and advanced services, the people perceive the 
government of Singapore as legitimate and have no reason to rebel or demand change. 
The income-democracy correlation (via intervening variables) shows 
promise, but the relationship likely fluctuates over time.  Although the direct connection 
is tenuous, some foreign policy makers have adopted economic assistance programs to 
encourage democracy. The Kennedy administration created the Alliance for Progress 
while the Reagan administration implemented the Caribbean Basin Initiative.   
Economic crisis as a variable is simply a subset of economic growth.  If a 
country sustains economic growth, then it should not suffer an economic crisis.  But, the 
business cycle is not so forgiving.  All countries suffer the occasional economic crisis 
regardless of their growth pattern.  Countries with poorly designed policies may suffer 
more than their peers.  If economic growth encourages democracy, then the logical 
extension of the argument is that economic loss should discourage democracy.  An 
economic crisis threatens individuals’ incomes.  Priorities revert to meeting basic needs 
while maintaining a civil society becomes a secondary priority.  In some cases, an 
economic crisis shatters the perceived legitimacy of the government.  This would be 
especially true if the autocratic government began under the premise of fixing the failed 
economic policies of the past.  However, evidence suggests that economic crisis is not 
necessarily bad for democracy; economic crisis is a catalyst for regime change but has no 
preference for autocracy over democracy.88   
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The theory that rising incomes leads to a middle class is not universal.  
Countries with high-priced, high-demand natural resources like diamonds, oil, and gold 
can suffer from the resource curse, originally called Dutch Disease (the term originally 
referred to the Dutch experience with natural gas).  Countries with the resource curse fail 
to, or choose not to, develop industry beyond that required for resource exploitation.  
Other industries become unappealing and unaffordable.  The high profitability of natural 
resources decreases the relative benefit of developing, operating, or investing in 
alternative industries.  Meanwhile, the rising prosperity that comes with a boon in natural 
resources drives up local prices, driving low margin businesses into the red.  When 
industrial capacity is limited, the middle class remains small, decreasing the demand for 
democracy and the number of participants in civil society.   
There are a plethora of both quantitative and qualitative studies that 
conclude that oil is an inhibitor of democratization.89  Almost all of the high oil rent 
states are autocracies.  This is one possible explanation for the lack of democracy in the 
Middle East.  However, recent events suggest that the resource curse may be only a 
secondary factor.  Latin American oil producers were able to become democracies in the 
1980s.  Since the end of the Cold War, oil producers across Africa, Asia, and Europe 
have democratized, albeit with mixed success.  Previous large-N studies focused on 
variances between countries but failed to examine changes within countries over time.90  
In contrast, Haber and Menaldo examined seventeen resource dependent countries from 
1972–1999.  Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Papua New Guinea remained 
democratic throughout the period.  Malaysia substantially decreased its level of democracy, 
but long before the country was receiving large oil rents.  Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, 
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Nigeria and Mexico were autocratic prior to oil and managed to become democracies in spite 
of their resource dependence.  Chad, Iran, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, and Angola were also 
autocratic prior to oil, but have made considerable political reforms since.  The remaining 
states, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Equatorial Guinea, were autocratic both before and after oil.  
However, these states are in a region that has a poor overall democracy rate.  Egypt and 
Syria have only small oil programs and Jordan has no oil, yet their movements towards 
democracy have been limited.  Most of the Middle East was autocratic long before they 
had considerable amounts of oil, limiting the explanatory value of the resource curse.    
There are only a handful of cases in which the resource curse directly correlated to a change 
in democracy.  In Indonesia, Syria, and Gabon, democracy turned autocratic when oil rents 
jumped.91  Taiwan and Mexico turned towards democracy during a period of declining oil 
rents per capita.   
The most convincing aspect of the economic growth-democracy causal 
chain rests on changes in income.  While economic crisis and oil rents appear to have 
some influence, they do not appear to be determinative in nature. Based on this 
discussion and the results from equation (14), this study hypothesized that all else being 
equal, a change in the level of per capita income (Yt – Yt-1) ≠ 0 may lead to a change in the 
level of democracy (Dt – Dt-1) ≠ 0.  However, economic crisis and oil rents will be 
considered as alternative explanations. 
b. Economic Development 
The relationship between economic development and democracy is 
extremely difficult to measure largely due to the amorphous nature of the concept of 
development.  Theorists do not agree on either the basic components or where it resides 
in the causal chain.  The literature is divided on whether economic development is an 
input or output to economic growth.  Others argue that the causal chain is bi-directional.  
The input crowd looks at the societal factors that influence economic growth.  These 
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factors include technology, education, and infrastructure as well as more abstract factors 
such as industrialization and economic liberalization.  The output crowd, including the 
United Nations Development Program, sees economic growth as a means to achieve the 
end of economic development.  In this case, economic development is perceived as an 
increased quality of life such as health, nutrition, and employment.   
In either case, the term “development” suggests some type of 
advancement.  Some refer to this advancement as modernization.  Modernization, in its 
broadest form, is an aggregation of the social and technological changes that have 
occurred since the 16th century.  The actual time frame or the specific social and 
technological changes that are relevant to modernization vary from author to author.  The 
congruence of spreading democracy and societal advancements led to the creation of 
modernization theory.  Daniel Lerner, arguably the founder of modernization theory, 
emphasized the social aspects of development such as urbanization, literacy, mass media, 
and education.  This social development led to increased knowledge of and demand for 
democratic processes while providing increased opportunities to organize, share 
information, and discuss politics.  Simon Kuznets, on the other hand, emphasized 
technological advances of modernization such as those in agriculture, food processing, 
transportation, and distribution.  Advances in technology led to increased productivity 
and an abundance in depth and breadth of goods.  Over time, this abundance disrupted 
the relative position of economic groups and bred social and normative changes towards 
a spirit of inquiry and critical examination of evidence that were in favor of democracy.  
Despite their differences in the makeup of development, Lerner and Kuznets agreed that 
economic development contributed to democracy.92   
Both theories have weakness in the definitions. Does the adoption of 
modern equipment and transportation methods qualify as industrialized or must a country 
have a certain amount of manufacturing capacity as well?  Does it have to be industrial or 
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can a transition to a service-based economy serve the same purpose?  Does a high rate of 
technology make a country modern or does the society have to embrace contemporary 
international norms on issues such as gender equality and human rights?  Is it simply a 
measure of per capita income or is there some combination of quality of life metrics that 
must be met?  We will not fully explore the details of modernization theory here, but will 
merely provide a brief summary of the arguments that demonstrate linkages between 
economic development and democracy. 
Regardless of the weaknesses in the definition, the majority of Lerner’s 
contribution is still part of the debate.  Yet, Lerner’s theory had one major flaw.  Lerner 
posited that modernization was a phased evolution that would end up at democracy.  
Urbanization would lead to increased skills and resources as workers adapted to industrial 
jobs.  The need for increased skills required increased training and, therefore, increased 
literacy.  Literacy and the media would grow concomitantly, in a manner spreading the 
good news on democracy.  The growth of literacy and media would eventually lead to a 
desire to participate in politics and a migration to democracy.  Lerner’s evolutionary 
theory was modified and championed by Walt Rostow in his book The Stages of 
Economic Growth.  Rostow would later become an influential foreign policy advisor in 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.  The Kennedy implementation of the Alliance 
for Progress, a foreign assistance program for Latin America, suggests that this academic 
theory was applied to foreign policy.  
Over time, the theory of sequential phases of modernization was dealt 
several mortal blows.  Countries like India were achieving democracy out of sequence 
prior to achieving high levels of either social or technological advancement.  Some critics 
argued that the developing world’s economic dependency on the developed world 
prevented the evolution argued by modernization.  Others argued that in some cases, the 
social changes involved in modernization appeared to be directly responsible for 
devolution into political instability or internal violence instead of democracy.93  The  
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combination of these attacks has largely killed the sequential portion of Lerner’s theory.  
However, the linkage between economic development and democracy has largely 
survived. 
Lipset tested the economic development aspects of modernization theory.  
Lipset confined his study to seeking correlations between the various elements of 
modernization theory as laid out by Lerner and Kuznets.  Lipset tested education levels, 
percentage of agricultural labor (as a metric for level of industrialization), urbanization 
rates, the mass media, and the availability of cars and doctors.  Lipset found correlations 
between all of the various metrics of economic development and democracy.  However, 
his study was a single snapshot in time, a comparison between existing autocracies and 
democracies.  It was not a study in the change from autocracy to democracy.   
More recent studies have attempted to address this change factor, but have 
slightly modified their approach to the problem.  Following Kuznets, Daren Acemoglu 
and James Robinson and Charles Boix suggest that industrialization involves a change in 
the domestic balance of power and the dispersion of resources.  Industrialization 
contributes to civil society through the development of labor groups and professional 
organizations.  Civil society becomes more educated.  Education breeds tolerance and 
proliferates the benefits of democracy and highlights the evils inherent in autocracy.  The 
dispersion of resources causes changes in the distribution of income resulting in the rise 
of a middle class.   
Democracy brings the prospect of resource distribution.  If a society with a 
high amount of income inequality transitioned to democracy, the poor (the majority) have 
an economic incentive to redistribute the resources of the rich (the minority) in order to 
ease their situation in life.  Because of this prospect, many of the rich and politically 
powerful will oppose giving more say to the poor.  The development of a middle class 
creates a more normal (linear) distribution of income.  As the middle class grows, the rich 
feel less threatened by the prospect of democracy due to the reduced threat of aggressive 
redistribution.94   
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Prevention of redistribution is not the only interest of the rich.  
Landowners in an agricultural society have an interest in maintaining cheap labor.  
Democracy encourages organization which could lead to labor unions and, consequently, 
rising labor prices.  Even in cases where cheap labor was plentiful, landlords worked to 
prevent the establishment of small landholders that would eat into their profits.  All other 
things being equal, land-owners in agricultural societies are likely to oppose 
democracy.95  Costa Rica’s early democratic success has been partially attributed to its 
small farms and lack of large landholders. Guatemala and El Salvador both had 
oligarchies based on the landed class and were late adopters of democracy compared to 
their more industrialized Latin American peers.96  Politics in the Philippines and arguably 
in the early days of the southern United States were also dominated by a landholder 
oligarchy. 
Capitalists enjoy democratic institutions such as the rule of law, but tend 
not to be interested in sharing power with the lower classes.  Landowners in agricultural 
societies hold the keys to the means of production and control resources, activities and 
positions within the production process.  That ownership enables landowners to dominate 
politics and regulate access of the workers.97  This dominant relationship comes to be 
accepted as a norm.98  Only if the norm changes can the balance of power be shifted.  
The rich tend to desire an internal balance of power between workers and the rich such 
that "the dominant classes accommodated to democracy only as long as the [political] 
party system effectively protected their interests."99  As the country develops, landowners 
become less dominant.  Industrialization not only creates a middle class while reducing 
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the number of peasants but entices some land-owners to become industrialists.100  The 
rise of industrialists and the importance of industry as a contributor to the economy and 
the government’s tax revenues lessens the regime’s reliance upon the landed class.  
Industrialized workers are far more densely populated than farm workers.  This density 
enabled the organization of labor unions.  This organization extended into the political 
arena providing a driving force for democratization.  In days past, peasants in rural areas 
had little ability to organize.  For contemporary peasants, modern communications and 
transportation enable organization and the sharing of ideas of disparate peoples. 
Industry Barons desire political stability.  Coups lead to work stoppage 
and trade stoppage, which hurts profitability.  Agriculture is a seasonal business that is 
unaffected by trade stoppages during the off-season.  Rural labor is likely far from the 
coup and can continue daily operations.  Industrialists have less to fear from democracy 
since industry is mainly about the application of skilled labor.  Land is relatively easy to 
tax and redistribute due to its immobile nature.  Industry can be both more difficult to 
find, and thus tax, and more difficult to redistribute since industrial capital is a flight risk.  
If government policies increase the costs of business too much, industry can often move 
to a move suitable location.   
In sum, economic development, more specifically, industrialization leads 
to increased organization and education.  These lead to increased democratic norms and 
lobbying power.  As the economy moves from a land-based economy, the wealthy 
become more interested in market and political stability and less concerned about the 
threat that democracy has on the redistribution of land.  Since industrialization represents 
changes in both knowledge and the means of production, this study hypothesized that, all 
else being equal, a change in the level of industrialization, represented in equation (14) as  
(Ht – Ht-1) ≠ 0, (Kt – Kt-1) ≠ 0, and (Gt – Gt-1) ≠ 0, may lead to a change in the level of 
democracy (Dt – Dt-1) ≠ 0. 
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2. Internal Security 
Recent research indicates that the relationship between intrastate violence and 
democracy is in the shape of an inverted U-curve.101  The lack of violence in full 
autocracies can be attributed to two factors.  First, autocratic states can rule by fear and 
repression, deterring citizens from using violence.  Second, states can form “a dominant 
coalition that limits access to valuable resources—land, labor, and capital—or access to 
and control of valuable activities—such as trade, worship, and education—to elite 
groups" forming various patron-client networks.102  These networks give important 
groups and individuals a stake in maintaining the autocratic system.   
Although Hegre’s work did not specify the direction of causation, it is accepted as 
common knowledge within the field that internal violence is both an inhibitor to 
democracy and a detractor to democratic sustainability.103  However, there is little 
empirical work to back up these claims.  Security is a key aspect of government 
performance.  Internal violence is a black mark on regime performance because it 
threatens the state’s monopoly on the use of force.  This decrease in government 
performance threatens the perceived legitimacy of the government.  The regime may 
autocratize in order to regain its monopoly on the use of force and boost its perceived 
performance and legitimacy. The existing theory, then, clearly suggests that a significant 
increase in internal violence should lead to autocratization.  Similarly, the theory also 
indicates that the existence of violence during democratization will prevent democratic 
consolidation.  The majority of empirical research in democracy studies is dedicated to 
the outcomes of democracy: how and why democracy contributes to interstate or 
intrastate violence.  Before adopting intrastate violence as an independent variable, this 
study will first explore the causal directions between polity type and violence.   
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Within the context of this study, violence is the “deliberate use of physical force 
on behalf of collective goals” by a non-state entity.104  Political violence has political 
ends (e.g., autonomy, regime change).  Criminal violence is a means to, or byproduct of, 
attaining illegal profit.105  However, in some instances, organized criminal groups blur 
the line between political violence and criminal violence.  For instance, criminal groups 
may use violence against other groups or the state as a means to gain territorial control or 
autonomy.  Within these instances, organized crime challenges the state’s monopoly on 
the use of force.  At the local level, this threat to security is little different from the threat 
from local insurgents.   
Arguments on the causes of intrastate violence can be aggregated into two factors: 
capability and intent.  A group’s capability to conduct violence is based on its ability to 
organize and the state’s ability to repress.  However, early researchers in the violence 
field initially focused on intent in order to determine why individuals and groups would 
resort to violence.  The theories on intent primarily fell into two shaping factors: 
emotion-driven and rational choice.   
a. Intent: Emotion-Driven Violence 
The emotion-driven argument views violence as the result of anger.  This 
does not mean to suggest that violence is perpetrated by individuals that are in a barbaric 
rage.  It merely suggests that some grievances can drive people towards violence.  Ted 
Gurr pioneered the emotion-driven argument with his theory of relative deprivation.  
Relative deprivation is the difference between people’s perception of what they deserve 
and what they have.106  This perception can be influenced by loss of something they had 
or failure to gain something that they anticipated.  Wilkinson summarized the concept as 
articulated by psychologist John Dollard’s: “severe frustration leads to anger and anger to 
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acts of aggressive violence.”107  The sources of relative deprivation can be tied to any 
part of Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy, especially physical needs (i.e., food, water, shelter) 
and safety needs (i.e., security, public health, job security).108  Imagine these relative 
deprivation scenarios: troops burn down your house; land reform was promised but did 
not happen; your land was seized and given to someone else; government policies ruined 
your employment opportunities; the state education system promised you a good job 
upon graduation, but failed to deliver; improved literacy and access to media highlights 
how poor and unhealthy your situation is relative to others.  The higher tiers of Maslow’s 
hierarchy are also relevant.  Love (the government kills your family) and self-esteem (the 
raid on your home dishonored you) can also contribute to relative deprivation.109 
While relative deprivation can come in many forms, much of the literature 
focuses on the economic causes of violence.110  Economics can result in relative 
deprivation in one of two ways.  During economic crisis, it can degrade an individual’s 
ability to meet basic physical needs.  During economic growth, individuals may perceive 
that they are missing the benefits of growth.  It is important to note that the emphasis is 
on the change in relative deprivation, not absolute deprivation (though an absolute 
change could result in a relative change).  For instance, if a poor person has always been 
poor and anticipates being poor in the future, then that person is unlikely to resort to 
violence, based solely on economic deprivation.   
The theory of relative deprivation is often misunderstood due to a similar 
sounding political economy concept called relative gains.  The adoption of the concept of 
relative gains indicates that an individual desires to gain more than his competitor.  
Relative deprivation, on the other hand, is rarely competitor based.  For instance, if you 
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were a middle-income earner living in California during the “dot com” 1990s, your 
neighbors involved in technology were gaining far more than you.  Unless you had some 
expectation that you should have gained from the dot com boom, then you suffered a 
relative loss compared to neighbors (although you may have had an absolute gain in your 
income), but did not necessarily suffer relative deprivation.  On the other hand, if you had 
lost your life savings in a dot com bust while all of your neighbors had dot com booms, 
the potential for relative deprivation exists. 
The problem with Gurr’s theory is not that it has been discredited as some 
claim, but that the theory, like many sociology theories, is not falsifiable.  There is no 
threshold that indicates how much a person needs to be relatively deprived before they 
decide to rebel.  Without a threshold, the theory is a tautology: if a group does not rebel, 
it is because they were not been relatively deprived enough.  Because of this fault, his 
theory fails to explain why some relatively deprived people do not rebel.  While he 
successfully made the relative deprivation—violence connection, Gurr did not explore 
alternative outcomes of relative deprivation (e.g., suicide, drug addiction, crime).   
However, Gurr’s theory has additional explanatory power when it is 
combined with James Davies’s theory of rising expectations.  Davies argues that 
revolution occurs when needs satisfaction is in the shape of an inverted J-curve.  Using 
examples from the United States, Russia, and Egypt, Davies shows that rebellion 
occurred when “rising expectations [were] followed by their effective frustration.”111  
Similar to Gurr, though, Davies fails to explore alternative outcomes to frustrated 
expectations.  Davies’ primary measure of needs satisfaction is GDP growth.  However, 
not all periods of recession or depression are accompanied by rebellion. 
The theories of Davies and Gurr provide some theoretical backing to the 
notion that a democratic transition can increase the near-term probability of intrastate 
violence.  As countries democratize, there is likely an expectation or hope that the new 
regime will achieve a high level of democracy.  Often, there is an assumption that a 
transition to democracy will also bring about some other socio-economic benefit.  If the 
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country instead becomes mired in a low level of partial democracy or fails to achieve the 
expected socio-economic benefits, this frustrates citizens’ rising expectations, a type of 
relative deprivation.  However, the focus on expectations fails to consider each country’s 
tactical situation.  The prominence of the tactical situation is the realm of the rational 
choice approach to violence. 
b. Intent: Rational Violence 
Much of the literature on violence shows a sharp divide between the two 
camps that explore intent.  This is exemplified in the greed versus grievance arguments.  
The grievance argument believes that emotions drive an individual to violence.  The 
individual is angry about some way that he was wronged and seeks vengeance.  The 
greed camp, and other rational choice theorists, argues that there is a type of cost-benefit 
analysis for participation in political violence.112  The benefit of righting the wrong is 
worth the cost of rebellion.  Even experts not committed to rational choice theory find 
that there are some rational aspects to choosing violence.113  Within this context, people 
are driven to the cost-benefit analysis of violence when they find that they are unable to 
address their grievances through the existing political process. 
The rational argument indicates that individuals must perceive that they 
will gain some benefit from political violence.  Violence must be perceived as a useful 
method for achieving some ends.  This perception can be influenced by the success of 
other groups either domestically or internationally.  For instance, a variety of Latin 
Americans were inspired to rebel by the Cuban Revolution.  The perception can also be 
reinforced by domestic history.  “The greater the extent of historical violence, the more 
likely it is that some groups have found it effective.”114  Even failed rebellions tend to 
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result in some positive changes (from the rebels perspective).  The benefits of violence 
vary upon the situation, but often include power, profit, or civil liberties.    
Benefits, of course, are only part of the equation.  Costs must also be taken 
into account.  However, cost is not solely considered in numbers of lives or resources in 
this case.  It is primarily a risk management decision.  Internal assessments are based on 
the available group resources, group leadership, group support from the masses and/or 
elites, the perceived legitimacy of the state, and the state’s capacity for repression.  It 
seems unlikely, though, that violence is purely based on cold calculations.  This would 
not do well to explain rebellions in countries that have a massive capacity for repression 
(e.g., Egypt) or the lack of rebellion in militarily weak countries (e.g., Iceland).  Perhaps 
violence results when the emotional argument and the rational argument intersect to 
create the perfect storm. 
c. Intent: Synthesis 
The rational thought versus emotion appears to be a false dichotomy.  
Intent requires a combination of emotion and rational thought.  The theories of Gurr and 
Davies suggest that some partial democracies might rebel because they are not getting the 
expected benefits of democracy and are frustrated by their inability to influence the 
political system.  The theories of rational thought suggest that citizens of partial 
democracies may perceive their government as less legitimate and have limited 
alternatives for addressing grievances due to their low level of democracy.  These factors 
reduce the perceived costs of rebellion. 
Another perspective on the interaction between emotion and rational 
thought is found in Jack Snyder’s From Voting to Violence.  Snyder argues that 
nationalism is led by elites who want to maintain their hold on power.  During democratic 
transitions, elites use nationalism to win over the support of the masses.115  The elites 
exploit new freedoms to promote their nationalist cause. Elites may own the mass media 
or at least have the resources to exert influence over an immature media.  The immature 
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government may have difficulty refuting elite arguments.  Nationalism tends to 
exaggerate the threat from an enemy (typically based on ethnicity, religion, or state) and 
therefore usually results in violence against that enemy which would seem to explain 
Mansfield and Snyder’s findings that new democracies are more likely to go to war.  The 
choice of nationalism by the elites is a rational choice while nationalism itself is an 
emotional appeal to the masses. 
Intent is a key factor in understanding why some partial democracies 
experience rebellion.  Initial studies in the field focused on intent and provided only a 
cursory examination of capability.  For example, Gurr recognized that group resources 
were important.  Wilkinson and Wickham-Crowley both discussed the importance of 
group leadership.  However, it was not until the development of social movement theory 
that the full aspects of capability were studied in detail. 
d. Capability 
Contemporary social movement theory, as refined by the likes of Sidney 
Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, incorporates 
aspects of both intent and capability for the production of rebellion.  These studies 
highlight two aspects of capability.  One, highlighted by Charles Tilly, is the ability and 
resources to organize a group.  Organizing a violent group requires facilities, funds, 
weapons, and management skills.  Without these skills and resources, the group will not 
function.  This concept convinced some social movement theorists that Ted Gurr’s theory 
on relative deprivation was discredited.  Since people in poverty do not have the 
resources to organize; some assumed that deprivation could not be a cause of rebellion.  
However, this assumption is clearly a perversion of Gurr’s theory, which is not about 
poverty itself, but an individual’s frustration created by a radical life change (or failure of 
expected change).  The second aspect to capability involves the ability to mobilize.  
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Regardless of the ability to organize, the group will die if it cannot get people to show up 
and participate. Effective mobilizations rely upon social and professional networks.116 
While some theories have argued that intent was irrelevant, contemporary 
experts acknowledge that rebellion is the result of both intent and capability.  While the 
phraseology may be different, the end result is the same.  Changes in the cost-benefit 
analysis equation are sometimes called “opportunities” based on the possibility of 
success.  Intent is summarized as “collective interests.”  Collective interests are formed 
by a collective identity, which tends to be a cultural or ideological response to outsider 
attempts to impose adjustments on society (e.g., adjustments such as economic or 
political reforms, modernization [cultural reforms]).117 
 
Figure 3.   Factors that Influence Intrastate Violence 
                                                 
116 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge Studies in 
Comparative Politics (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2; Charles 
Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison–Wesley Pub. Co., 1978), 7. 
117 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed., 





















Violence is the result of a process involving both intent and capability (see 
Figure 3).  While social movement theory is a reasonable explanation to explain why 
individuals join protests and riots, it does not convincingly explain why individuals join 
groups that routinely use political violence.  For instance, the concept of collective 
interests formed by a collective identity does not fully explain why some individuals 
would associate their personal interests with the collective interests while others would 
not.  By itself, this concept fails to explain why individuals would provide resource 
support to a rebellion, but not participate in the group itself.  The major problem of solely 
focusing on capability without viewing intent is the failure to explain which group an 
individual would join: the revolutionaries versus the counter-revolutionaries.   
This process is not purely linear.  Often times, the planned benefit of a 
rebellion is to counteract the negative repercussions associated with a system change.  
The rebellion and the government’s response cause more system changes, some intended, 
some not.  As a country democratizes, it should experience less political violence.  Free, 
competitive elections increase the legitimacy and accountability of the elected 
government, increasing the democratic alternatives to conflict resolution.  Similarly, as 
insurgencies come to a close, the international community, the provider of reconstruction 
aid, often encourages democracy and elections as a method for the prevention of future 
conflict. 
e. Intent, Capability, and Democracy 
From the discussion above, the idea that changes in democracy can cause 
an eruption in violence seems well established.  A regime change from autocracy to 
partial democracy creates conditions conducive to the increase in both intent and 
capability for intrastate violence.  Citizens may feel that they have been cheated of full 
democracy.  A change in regime to a partial democracy suggests that those previously in 
power will suffer a reduction in power.  Contemporary partial democracies are 
predominantly developing countries and face increased economic risk and tend to lag in 
economic development and quality of life.  Many partial democracies were former 
colonies turned oligarchies and have little distribution of power due to a lack of land 
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reform or industrialization.  Some partial democracies practice repressive tactics and 
discrimination, causing further relative deprivation.  The administrative disturbance 
inherent in a regime change can involve a temporary disruption in the provision of basic 
services, decreasing the perceived legitimacy of the new government.   
Movement from autocracy to a partial democracy increases the potential 
capability of political violence.  As a country democratizes, it allows various freedoms in 
order to increase electoral participation, competition, and accountability.  Some of these 
newfound freedoms can be exploited by groups that seek to use political violence.  It may 
give them the capability to recruit via free speech and freedom of the press.  It may grant 
them freedom of religion which could allow the spread of extremist millenarianism.  
And, it could grant the freedom to organize, making it simpler for illicit actors to move, 
assemble, and plan violent activities. 
A transition from a dictatorship to a democracy often involves a decrease 
in internal security efforts as the state intelligence apparatus is dismantled, groups are 
given new freedoms, the state reduces repression of opposition forces, and certain aspects 
of the law may be suspended while a new constitution is developed.  This does not 
suggest that a transition is the sole cause of group formation.  Existing revolutionary 
groups that initiated the transition may refuse to disband, take advantage of the reduced 
security, and challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force.  Furthermore, the 
success of violent opposition during the transition establishes a perception that violence 
can be a useful tool for achieving objectives.   
There is a surprising lack of causal chain theory that explains how 
violence affects the level of democracy.  The literature suggests three potential 
explanations of the relationship between violence and democracy.  First, the government 
may believe that high levels of democracy will enable or reward insurgents.  In this case, 
the government will seek to minimize or reduce the level of democracy.  Second, actors 
may disengage from the political process due to increased security concerns.  Their lack 
of participation degrades the level of democracy.  Third, the government may believe that 
its inability to provide security jeopardizes the ability to be reelected in a fully democratic 
government.  In this case, democracy will be kept at low levels in order to ensure regime 
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continuation.  In order to more fully explore the violence-democracy relationship, this 
study hypothesized that all else being equal, a change in the level of violence or intrastate 
security (St – St-1) ≠ 0 may lead to a change in the level of democracy (Dt – Dt-1) ≠ 0 (see 
equation 3). 
3. Diffusion of Norms  
The norms of a society are a social construction with numerous influencing 
factors.  Though norms are a heterogeneous mish-mash across society, norms can be 
evaluated in a general way over time and between countries.  The norms of democracy 
are diffused in many ways as democratic ideals are shared through demographic factors, 
the colonial legacy, the evolution of the bureaucracy, and a variety of domestic and 
foreign interactions.  This section will first address the concept of legitimacy and then 
examine the applicability of the determinants of demographics, colonial ruler, the age of 
the state, access to information technology, and peer country influence upon the level of 
democracy. 
a. Legitimacy  
The preferences of consumers and suppliers of democracy is the product 
of the concept of legitimacy.  It is widely argued that regime legitimacy is a key 
determinant of regime change and persistence.118  A common reference for legitimacy in 
democracy studies is Linz and Stepan who argued that legitimacy was the result of 
government effectiveness and efficacy that resulted in “the belief that in spite of 
shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that 
might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience.”119  But, legitimacy 
is not directly a determinant of democracy.  It is a subjective belief of an individual or 
group.  This subjective belief is arguably formed by three interdependent normative 
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perceptions of the regime: legality (e.g., conformance with electoral rules or local 
customs), government performance (e.g., effectiveness and efficacy), and consent (e.g., 
compliance motivated by fear or charisma).120  There does not appear to be a standard 
adopted within the literature.  Linz and Stepan adopted government performance.  Weber 
argued charisma.  Eckstein and Gurr favored the legal aspect of legitimacy as the 
“perceptions that authority patterns are rightly constituted and therefore worthy 
of…actions that tend to keep the patterns in existence and functioning effectively.”121  
This study argues that these three normative perceptions should be used cooperatively as 
a theoretical lens in order to analyze the effects that structural factors have upon actors’ 
preferences for democracy. 
b. Demographics 
A variety of demographics are proffered as catalysts or obstacles to the 
spread of democratic norms.  Most demographic theories are based on the premise that 
homogeneity is better for democracy.  These theories largely evolved from Aristotle’s 
argument that democracies must be small.  Beside the geographical or logistical 
difficulties of the personal interaction of a large population there is more potential for 
political conflict due to differing regional, religious, ethnic, and linguistic interests.122  
Although population would seem to be a poor determinant of democracy today at the 
country level, the correlation to the theory highlights lack of homogeneity as a serious 
obstacle.   
This lack of homogeneity primarily comes in four forms: regional, 
religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences.  Ethnicity and religion, specifically, are 
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widely noted as obstacles to democracy due to cleavages that complicate the process of 
democratization and its sustainment.123  Social cleavages can complicate democratization 
when political fragmentation occurs as newly developing political parties coalesce along 
ethno-religious cleavages, preventing progress towards the greater good.  The existence 
of a cleavage provides an opportunity to take advantage of the minority by passing laws 
that provide preferential treatment to the majority.  Empirical results suggest that this 
exploitation primarily occurs in medium size minorities (five to twenty percent of the 
population).124  Large minorities are more difficult to marginalize due to their sheer size 
and their breadth throughout the community.  The benefits of exploiting small minorities 
is likely not worth the effort.   
However, social cleavages are surmountable obstacles.  An empirical 
evaluation of the social cleavage argument indicates that the theory is weak.125    
Botswana and Mauritius both had ethnic cleavages and yet were able to achieve 
democracy.  Arend Lijphart and Benjamin Rielly identified consociational and electoral 
solutions to lessen the negative impact that social cleavages have on democratization.126  
Perhaps the availability (and implementation) of their recommendations explains why 
empirical evidence shows that there is very little correlation between social fragmentation 
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and democratization.127  Ironically, it is possible that social cleavages, as long as they are 
nonviolent, support democratic stability.  The difficulty of creating a coalition in multi-
cleavage societies, so-called pluralist democracies, prevents the implementation of 
excessive redistribution efforts, making the elites comfortable with sustaining 
democracy.128     
Even without cleavages, some argue that specific religions and ethnicities 
are simply incompatible with democracy.  It has been postulated that Protestantism and 
Buddhism are compatible with democracy while Catholicism and Islam are unsuited for 
democracy.  Catholicism was considered unsuited due to its adherence to a rigid 
hierarchy and lack of the Protestant work ethic.  Islam was considered unsuited due to 
fundamental Islam viewing democracy as a corruption, putting man’s law above God’s 
law.129  Similar arguments have been made suggesting that the value systems in Arab, 
Asian, and Latin societies made them unsuitable for democracy.130    
 The success of democracy in Latin America and Asia indicates that the 
very theoretical basis for culture as an inhibitor were unfounded.  The argument that 
religion (i.e., Protestant) was a key factor in determining democracy was dealt a severe 
blow when Catholic Southern Europe (i.e., Greece, Spain, and Portugal) democratized in 
the mid 1970s and Catholic Latin America democratized in the 1980s.  Further, recent 
studies provided evidence that Islam is not the determining factor in polity type.131  
While certainly much of the Islamic world continues to be ruled by autocracies, there are 
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several examples of Islamic democracies including high levels of democracy in Albania, 
Indonesia, and Senegal and moderate levels of democracy in Krygyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Turkey.  Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone have also been 
working towards democracy, but remain politically unstable.  Even autocracies in 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia are moving away from autocracy.  While it is 
too soon to say that the naysayers are wrong, the core of the culture argument lacks a 
logical causal chain. 
c. Colonial Legacy and Bureaucratic Maturity 
While demographics change over time, some aspects of society are 
immutable.  A country cannot change the legacy of its colonialism any more than it can 
change the region of the world that it is located in or the date of its independence from 
colonialism.  Colonial legacy is often claimed to be an impact on the success of 
democracy.132  It is common knowledge within the field that the British colonial 
experience was more conducive to democracy than any other colonial rule.  A cursory 
look at the world in the 1970s provided ample evidence.  British colonies all over the 
globe became democracies: the United States, the anglo-phone Caribbean countries, 
India, and the various members of the British Commonwealth.  Developing democracies 
across the globe seemed to have had an advantage from being a colony of Britain: Fiji, 
Gambia, Sri Lanka, and Mauritius.  By comparison, democracy appeared to be a lost 
cause in Latin America, Belgian Congo, French West Africa, French Southeast Asia, and 
the Dutch East Indies.  Portuguese and Spanish former colonies suffered political 
instability.  Former French colonies were dominated by dictatorships.  Supposedly, the 
strength of the civil service and the culture of the rule of law established by the British 
created a state conducive to democracy.  But, the third wave of democracy largely 
negated the colonial legacy theory as Spanish and French colonies adopted democracy in 
droves.   
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State age as a determinant of democracy is a branch concept of 
modernization theory.  This concept believes that states go through a maturation process.  
For its first two centuries, democracy was primarily constrained to the region that was 
responsible for the formation of the modern state: Europe.  It took centuries for modern 
states to develop into democracies.  This observation suggests that a threshold of state 
institutions or bureaucratic maturity must be developed prior to democratization.133  But, 
the argument seems to have little weight.  Throughout the later half of the twentieth 
century, newly decolonized countries had widely divergent polity types.  For example, 
the Baltic States, long under the Soviet umbrella, had a largely successful democratic 
transition.  While a strong bureaucracy may actually have been a factor in the transition, a 
simple measurement of age would appear to provide little useful insight into the state’s 
potential for democracy.    Although colonial legacy, region, and state age do not appear 
to have a determinative effect, all three were incorporated as control variables into the 
study. 
d. External Influences 
Regardless of the effects of demographics, colonial legacy, and 
bureaucratic age on a society’s willingness to adopt democracy, none of these factors 
address variations in how democratic ideals spread.   The concept of diffusion indicates 
that ideas about democracy spread from those that have them to those that do not.  
Increased diffusion can occur either through advances in technology or increased 
personal interaction.      
As technology increases, the ability to receive exterior media information 
enhances citizens’ ability to monitor the government’s performance and enable 
comparisons with other country’s governments.  Of course, this technological 
advancement presupposes that a significant proportion of the population can afford it, 
making the technology metric difficult to separate from economic income and economic 
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development.  Furthermore, in strong autocracies, the media is controlled by the 
government.  Therefore, changes in communications technology do not appear to be a 
good predictor of diffusion.   
Regardless of the level of internal control that a government has, no 
country is immune from external influences.  As peer countries successfully transition to 
democracy, citizens may raise their threshold of expectations for their own government.  
As states develop political, military, and economic relationships, their personnel interact 
and, intentionally or not, spread information about democracy.  The norms of democracy 
can also be spread socially through foreign travel, migration, and student exchanges.  One 
study has found that these linkages are largely based on geographic proximity and similar 
studies have found that democracies appear to occur in regional clusters as can be seen in 
Europe and the Western Hemisphere.134  Therefore, this study hypothesized that all else 
being equal, a change in regional democratic norms (Nt – Nt-1) ≠ 0 may lead to a change in 
the level of democracy (Dt – Dt-1) ≠ 0 (see equation 3).   
C.  THE INTERSECTION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE POLITICAL 
EQUILIBRIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
As depicted in Figure 2, the intersection of civil society’s demand for democracy 
and political institutions’ supply of democracy determines the process of democratization 
largely through constitutional design or redesign.  It is the design of and the adherence to 
the constitutional rules that make up the democratic processes within a country.  
Democratic constitutional design is a buffet.  There are many options available 
singularly, in combinations, or in hybrids.  Each option can be selected independent of 
the others.  Major choices include the type of executive (president versus parliament), the 
method of representation (proportional or majority), the legislative process (uni-cameral 
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or bi-cameral), the type of sovereignty (unitary or federal), the question of royalty 
(constitutional monarchy or a republic), and the type of checks and balances (e.g., 
independent judiciary, Ombudsman, civilian oversight of the military and the national 
intelligence apparatus).  Theory suggests that the optimum democratic design includes a 
parliamentarian, federal, bicameral, republican, and proportional representation system 
due to increased accountability and reduction of political polarization.135   
However, the implementation of constitutional design is not so simple.  Most 
design choices involve a great number of subordinate choices.  Advocates of federalism 
argue that unitary systems favor the distribution of resources near the center of 
government at the expense of outlying regions.  However, as Mexico can attest, 
federalism is not a guarantee for improved distribution of resources or prevention of 
ethnic conflict.  The introduction of a second legislative house in Senegal in 2005 
actually reduced the level of democracy as the majority of the seats in the newly created 
senate were appointed by the president.  A parliamentary system in early 1980s 
Philippines enabled Ferdinand Marcos to retain his position as head of the government 
without facing a general re-election.  This study does not attempt to find the ideal process 
blueprint that will lead to high levels of democracy.  It is likely that a blueprint for one 
country would not work for the next.  It is the tailoring of the constitutional design to 
meet the specific requirements of each country that results in a high level of democracy.       
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III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: TESTING STRUCTURAL 
DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY 
This chapter explores the effect of structural factors upon the level of democracy.  
While the interaction of key actors (e.g., civil society, the military, and the ruling 
executive) may be the final arbiters in determining a country’s level of democracy, the 
political preferences of those actors are influenced by structural factors.  From the 
literature, the structural factors with the most explanatory power upon both democracy 
and actor preferences include security, economic development, and the diffusion of 
norms.   
Although democracy is sometimes viewed as a decision-making process or a 
measure of egalitarian policies, this study views democracy as a measurement of the 
competitiveness, openness, and electoral constraints upon the selection and accountability 
of political leaders.  Many contemporary democracy theories were derived from the 
classical works of Aristotle and Tocqueville.  Both argued that a wealthy society was an 
important attribute of a functioning democracy since it provided a large number of 
citizens who “possess enough wealth to want order.”136  Tocqueville also argued the 
importance of democratic norms largely built through associations.137  Twentieth century 
works argued that these norms and associations were built through industrialization, 
urbanization, and modernization.138  More recently, analysts argued that the diffusion of 
democratic norms came not through changes to the economic system but through 
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increased travel, migration, and trade.139  Security is often assumed to be a prerequisite 
that allows the development of norms, associations, wealth, and industry.  Without 
security, democratic norms and processes take a back seat to survival.140   
This chapter seeks to build upon previous research by identifying the relative 
relationship between four key structural factors and the spectrum of polity types from 
fully autocratic to fully democratic.  While there is a wealth of econometric analysis on 
the economy-democracy link, there is a lack of econometric analysis using other 
structural factors such as security or the diffusion of norms.141  Those studies that do 
broaden the scope to other structural factors tend to focus on democracy as a 
dichotomous relationship.  The view of democracy through a dichotomous lens typically 
resulted in a nominal analytic approach in order to indentify thresholds for transition and 
consolidation.  Because of the need to broach a defined threshold, these studies missed 
the ordinal effect of variables upon incremental changes in democracy.      
To explore the relationship between the four structural factors and the level of 
democracy, this chapter presents econometric and computational analysis using a large-N 
panel data design.142  The panel included annual data on 171 countries over 61 years for 
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the period 1946–2006 (n = 171, t = 61).  The post World War II timeframe was used for 
analysis because it encompasses the majority of movement towards democracy in what 
many refer to as the second, third, and fourth waves of democracy.143  The panel dataset 
was used to test four hypotheses.  Combined, the four hypotheses state that, all else being 
equal, a change in the level of intrastate violence, industrialization, income, or regional 
democratic norms, may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  For a more detailed 
analysis on the development of each hypothesis, see Chapter II, Section D.    
This chapter is organized into four sections.  Section A is a description of the 
variables (dependent, independent, and control) and data sources for both econometric 
and computational analysis.  Section B describes the quantitative methodology used for 
this study.   The section begins with an explanation of the process used in selecting the 
estimable model for econometric analysis.  In order to compensate for serial correlation, 
heteroskedascity, and an unbalanced panel, random effects linear regression with first 
order autoregressive disturbance was used as the estimable model.  Next, the section 
reviews the computational approach that augmented the econometric analysis with 
historical trend data and insight into the value of independent variables during transition 
between regime types.  Section C presents the results of the quantitative analysis. The 
quantitative results support the hypotheses that intrastate violence, industrialization, 
income, and diffusion had an effect on the level of democracy.  Of the four factors, 
violence and diffusion returned the most significant results.  The explanatory power of 
development waned over time to the point of obsolescence.  The timing suggests that the 
decreasing costs of transportation and information sharing provided an alternative 
mechanism for the development of associations and democratic norms though diffusion 
making industrialization less of a requirement. 
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A. DATA AND VARIABLES 
The definition and data source of each of the eleven variables used in the 
quantitative analysis is covered in detail in this section.  The dependent variable, or the 
outcome, was the level of democracy.  There were four causal, or independent, variables: 
internal security, economic income, industrialization, and diffusion of norms.  In 
addition, six control variables were used: economic crisis, oil rents, colonial legacy, 
region, bureaucratic maturity, and the loss of an interstate war. 
1. The Level of Democracy: the Dependent Variable 
Democracy has always been somewhat difficult to quantify.  Throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, analysts used Schumpeter’s and Dahl’s definitions of democracy to 
create a dichotomous dependent variable.144  Attempts to define an adequate threshold 
with which to bifurcate polities into neat groups of democracies and autocracies 
contained an intrinsic catch 22.  The difficulty resided in the decision of what to do with 
hybrid regimes such as Malaysia and Singapore; countries with limited democratic 
processes.  Classifying them as democracies would tarnish the image of other countries 
with stronger democratic practices.  Classifying them as autocracies equated their 
government systems to the likes of North Korea.  The binary classification of regime type 
is an inadequate approach that provides misleading results. 
A broader sense of democracy came in the mid 1970s as efforts to quantify 
democracy began to blossom, resulting in the creation of four major empirical databases: 
Freedom House, Gasiorowski, Polity, and Vanhanen.  While both Freedom House and 
Polity provide data across significant time frames, Polity is the preferred metric for 
quantitative researchers such as Mansfield & Snyder, Hegre et al., and Epstein, et al.145  
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The only major author that uses Freedom House is Diamond.  However, Diamond used 
the data for trend, not statistical, analysis.  Although there is no perfect database, Polity 
has a slight edge on Freedom House with regards to conceptual logic, internal reliability, 
measurement, and aggregation.146   
Although the Polity score is an imperfect aggregation, it is the best alternative 
available.  The composite Polity score is computed from three measurements: the fairness 
and freeness of elections; the openness of political participation to all groups regardless 
of differences such as ethnicity, religion, region, or income class; and the sanctity of the 
electoral process, which prevents the executive from manipulating the constitution in 
order to perpetuate tenure.  Each of the three components is a key component to the 
study’s definition of democracy.  Therefore, this study used Polity as the proxy for the 
level of democracy for each country at year t.  Polity uses a 21-point scale (-10 to 10) 
polity score for countries with a population greater than 500,000 from 1800 to 2008.  The 
polity2 metric is a modified version of the polity score made suitable for time-series 
analysis by modifying the polity score for regimes in transition, a period of interregnum 
(i.e., anarchy), or a period of interruption (e.g., by invasion).  Following Plumper and 
Neumayer, scores for interregnum periods and related transition periods were modified 
using interpolation.147  The specific conversions for interregnums can be found in 
Appendix 1.  For ease of interpreting the econometric results, the polity score was 
converted to a zero-to-twenty scale by adding ten to each polity2 score.   
2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables, derived from the democracy studies literature in 
Chapter II, are hypothesized to have an influence on the level of democracy.  This study 
included four independent variables: internal security, economic income, 
industrialization, and diffusion of norms.  Additionally, six control variables were 
                                                 
146 Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative 
Indices." 
147 Thomas  Plumper and Eric Neumayer, "The Level of Democracy During Interregnum and 
Affected Transition Periods: Recoding the Polity2 Score." 
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included to account for alternative explanations of polity change.  A summary of all of 
the variables and data sources can be found in Table 2 at the end of the Section A. 
a. Internal Security 
This study used an inverse proxy measure for internal security: intrastate 
violence data from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Database and the Center for 
Systemic Peace’s Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset.148  The PITF 
and MEPV datasets used slightly different coding criteria and therefore have slightly 
different event data.  Both datasets include fatalities as only one of a number of factors 
that affects a society at war.  The primary MEPV metric for the magnitude of total civil 
violence in a country, CIVTOT, is built on a zero to ten scale based on an assessment of 
the conflict’s effect upon human resources (e.g., deaths), population dislocation, social 
networks, environmental quality, infrastructure damage, and quality of life.  On the other 
hand, PITF is a combination of three different datasets coded by type of violence: 
revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, and genocides / politicides.  The datasets for 
revolutionary and ethnic wars both use the AVEMAG variable, which is the average 
magnitude based on three composite scores: the number of insurgents, the number of 
causalities, and the portion of the country affected.  Both of the components are measured 
on a zero to four-point scale.149  For genocides and politicides, PITF’s DEATHMAG is a 
measure of the magnitude of the number of deaths on a zero to five-point scale. 
Unfortunately, there is no single ideal dataset for intrastate violence.  
MEPV is more inclusive while PITF more accurately captures nuanced changes in the 
level of violence.  For instance, the MEPV dataset captures the student revolts and 
general strike in 1968 France while PITF does not.  On the other hand, MEPV uses only a 
single magnitude for the duration of a conflict while PITF captures annual variations in 
                                                 
148 Monty Marshall, Ted Gurr, and Barbara Harff, "Political Instability Task Force State Failure 
Problem Set, 1955–2006," (Center of Systemic Peace); Monty Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political 
Violence (Mpev), 1946–2004," (Center for Systemic Peace); Meredith Sarkees, "The Correlates of War 
Data on War: An Update to 1997," (Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2000).  The Correlates of 
War dataset was used to confirm the timeframes of event data in the PITF and MEPV datasets. 
149 In addition, two missing numbers for Pakistan (1997–98) were extrapolated from existing data in 
the PITF Ethnic Wars dataset.   
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the intensity of a conflict.  In order to capture the best of both datasets, a combined 
variable (Intrastate Violence) was generated.  The Intrastate Violence variable was the 
sum of PITF’s AVEMAG for revolution, PITF’s AVEMAG for ethnic war, PITF’s 
DEATHMAG, and MEPV’s CIVTOT; creating a scale of zero to 23.     
b. Economic Income, Industrialization, and the Diffusion of Norms 
Economic development is a broad term that incorporates changes in 
workforce knowledge as well as changes in the means of production.  Following 
Lipset,150 this study simplified the level of industrialization into a single proxy using 
agricultural labor as a percentage of the total labor force as measured by the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  To make the econometric results easier to interpret, 
the study used a zero to 100 scale instead of 0% to 100%.  For economic income, the 
research used Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita from the Penn World Tables.151  
Following a standard practice in the field, this study used the log base ten of GDP per 
capita in order to reduce the effect of skewness and extreme outliers upon the results.152   
As a proxy for diffusion of norms, the study used peer countries’ levels of 
democracy; the sum of polity scores for all other countries in the region for that year.  
Although norms are diffused in a variety of different methods, peer region was selected 
as the proxy due to studies linking democratic diffusion to geographic proximity 
regardless of the method of diffusion.153  Several alternative variables for diffusion were 
                                                 
150 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." 
151 Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, "Penn World Table Version 6.2," (Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 2006). 
152 Jason W. Osborne, "Best Practices in Data Transformation: The Overlooked Effect of Minimum 
Values," in Best Practices in Quantitative Methods, ed. Jason W. Osborne (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
2008), 197–204; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History 
Analysis," The American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 886.  
153 Steven  Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," Journal of 
Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 22–3; Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the 
International Context of Democratization," International Organization 60(2006): 932–5; Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch, All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 21–3; Harvey Starr and Christina  Lindborg, 
"Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996," The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (2003): 510–5; Michael Colaresi and William Thompson, "The Economic 
Development-Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?," Comparative Political 
Studies 36, no. 4 (2003): 394–7. 
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considered interesting but unsuitable including number of memberships in international 
organizations, number of social interactions, and number of economic interactions.  
Membership in international organizations does not equate to more frequent or significant 
interactions.  Unstable Afghanistan is involved in 42 organizations, the same number as 
highly democratic Botswana.  Democratic Albania has only 47 memberships while 
Algeria has 59.  In a more extreme case, the special status of Taiwan limits it to 9 
international memberships.   
Although social, economic and military interactions are also considered 
important, data for interactions based upon foreign travel, military exchanges, and NGO 
activities is limited.  Although data for access to information technology is readily 
available for certain timeframes, technology has the least theoretical backing as a method 
of diffusion.  Technology increases the opportunity to interact with citizens of a 
democracy, but in many cases this potential interaction is limited.  States can control the 
information distributed through print, television, and radio media.  While cell phones and 
the internet are less easily controlled by the government, both inventions are relatively 
new, especially in developing countries.  While data for trade, migration, and remittances 
are more plentiful, they are not currently designed for panel data analysis but should be 
considered for future analysis.     
3. Control Variables 
Correlation does not, by itself, suggest causation.  The fact that two variables 
move in tandem does not explain which variable causes the other to change or whether 
the change is not more accurately described by some third variable or a combination of 
other variables.  Correlation via regression suggests causation if the model is realistic and 
includes additional variables to account for alternative viable hypotheses.  This study 
accounted for several alternative hypotheses through the use of six control variables.  
Each of these variables had been claimed to be a significant influence upon democracy.  
In most cases, the causal explanation of these variables is dated and has either been 
disproven or lacks a consistent, logical cause-effect chain.  In other cases, these factors  
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act as catalysts for polity change without influencing the subsequent type of polity.  In 
order to not entirely discount their explanatory value, these variables are included within 
the analysis as control variables. 
Research suggests that economic crisis motivates regime change, but has no 
preference over the resulting regime type.154  Following Gasiorowski, the study used a 
combination of GDP loss and inflation as a measure of economic crisis.155  GDP growth 
data was obtained from the Penn World Tables while inflation rate data was gathered 
from the IMF.  The data was used to create a dummy variable for economic crisis.  A 
score of one was given for those country-years that had a greater than eight percent loss 
in annual GDP growth, had a cumulative loss of twenty percent in GDP growth over five 
years, had inflation rates greater than 100%, or suffered a major currency crisis.  A score 
of zero was given to those country-years in which no economic crisis occurred.  For 
major currency crises, 1994 Mexico, 1998 Russia, and 1999 Argentina were coded as 
economic crises.  The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis did not required additional coding 
since countries most affected already had significant GDP loss.  In all, 717 economic 
crises were coded (out of 7,843 country-years).   
Oil dependence is often cast as an obstacle to democracy since it provides a ready 
source of easily exploitable revenue that an autocratic regime can use to create and 
maintain a patronage network.156  As the major provider of resources, key actors have a 
stake in maintaining the autocratic system.  This is one potential explanation for why the 
countries with the highest oil rents are staunch autocracies.  However, the high oil rent 
                                                 
154 Haggard and Kaufman, The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, 
Distributive Conflicts, and the State; Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An 
Event History Analysis." 
155 Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis." 
156 Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," Comparative Politics 20 no. 1 
(1987); Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State, Nation, State, and Integration in the Arab 
World V. 2 (London ; New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and 
Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge Middle East Library 24 (Cambridge England ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and 
Institutions in the Middle East, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997); Jay Ulfelder, "Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy," Comparative Political 
Studies 40, no. 8 (2007); Michael Ross, "Oil and Democracy Revisited," (UCLA, 2009); Benjamin Smith, 
"Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999," American Journal of Political 
Science 48, no. 2 (2004).  
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states are also located in regions with few democracies.  Despite their high income, they 
lack the industrialization and diffusion of norms that might otherwise encourage 
democracy in their country.  Recent studies shed some doubt on the causal connection 
between oil and lack of democracy.  Many resource-dependent countries in the Western 
Hemisphere and, to a lesser extent, in Africa and Asia, increased their level of democracy 
in the last twenty years.157  Data for oil rents per capita was used to test and control for 
oil.158 
The outcome of interstate wars affects regime change.159  Severe physical or 
economic costs during war decrease the perception of the state’s ability to maintain 
security and economic development and lead to a change in government.  However, this 
factor does not necessarily affect the type of new regime created.  In order to control for 
the effect of interstate wars upon regime change, a dummy variable for war loss was 
created based upon data from the Correlates of War.160  Five sets of loss of interstate 
wars were added: Armenia to Azerbaijan (1991–4), Egypt to Britain (1951–2), USSR to 
Afghanistan (1980–88), and Yugoslavia to NATO (1995 and 1999).  Including these 
additions, the dataset contains 88 instances of war loss. 
Three enduring structural variables were controlled for: colonial legacy, state age, 
and state region.  Each country was given a code for its colonial legacy or lack thereof 
based on the colonial power that had occupied the country.  In those cases in which a 
country was affected by more than one colonial power for a substantial period, the 
country was given a colonial legacy code of “mixed.”  State age was calculated based on 
the year of independence from the Correlates of War Dataset.  To minimize skew caused 
by centuries-old countries, state age was right-censored at 100 years.  Regions were 
drawn from the MEPV dataset.  In cases where countries bordered two regions, a single 
                                                 
157 See Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?  A Reappraisal of the 
Resource Curse." 
158 Michael Ross, "Oil, Gas, and Minerals Stata Dataset" (2009). 
159 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: 
A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," The American Political Science 
Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 850–1. 
160 Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997." 
 89
region was chosen based upon analytical judgment. For example, the MEPV region code 
for South America is eight while the region code for Central America is nine.  Since 
Panama connects the two regions, MEPV coded Panama as 89.  For the study, Panama 
was recoded as a nine for Central America (see Appendix 1).  
 
*DV=Dependent Variable; IV=Independent Variable; CV=Control Variable 
Table 2. Summary of Data Sources 
                                                 
161 Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800–2007" (Center for Systemic Peace). 
162 Heston, Summers, and Aten, "Penn World Table Version 6.2." 
163 "Resources Popstat Annual Time Series" (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), 2006). 
164 Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, "Political Instability Task Force State Failure Problem Set, 1955–2006."  
The dataset includes all internal conflicts that terminated after 1955 and therefore includes conflict data as 
early as 1948 but should not be considered inclusive for 1948–1954. 
165 Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political Violence (Mpev), 1946–2004." 
166 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 Edition.  
167 Ross, "Oil, Gas, and Minerals Stata Dataset." 
168 D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires; a Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson Universal History, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).  See also Matthew 
Lange, James Mahoney, and Matthias vom Hau, "Colonialism and Development: A Comparative Analysis 
of Spanish and British Colonies," American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 5 (2006): 1417–8. 
169 "Correlates of War 2 Project.  Colonial / Dependency Contiguity Data, 1816–2002." 
170 Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997." 
Variables Metric Type* Metric Source Years Available 
Level of Democracy Polity2 DV Polity IV
161
 1800–2007 
Economic Income GDP per capita IV Penn World Tables (PWT)
162
 1950–2006 
Development Percent of Labor 
in Agriculture 
IV UN FAO
163  1961–2005 
 
Internal Security 
   
Calculated IV PITF.
164   
MEPV.
165   
1948–2006 
1946–2004 
Peer Pressure Democracy in 
Region 
IV Calculated from Polity IV 1946–2006 
Economic Crisis Dummy CV PWT, IMF Database
166
 1980–2002 
Resource Curse Oil Rents CV Ross, Oil dataset
167
 1950–2006 












 COW Colonial Data 
1700–1947 
1816–2002 




The descriptive statistics in Table 3 provide the minimum, maximum and mean 
values, standard deviation, and number of observations of each variable.  Descriptive 
statistics are included for each variable as described in its original format as well as the 
first differenced variable in its modified form. 
  
Variable Min Max Mean SD Count 
Polity (original scale) -10 10 0.06 7.55 7743 
Polity modified  (0 to 20 scale) 0 20 9.97 7.56 7743 
Change in the level of polity modified -18 16 .064 1.70 7561 
Intrastate Violence 0 20 1.04 2.71 7843 
Change in the level of intrastate violence -14 14.5 0.004 1.08 7669 
Agricultural Labor 0 0.95 0.45 0.29 6144 
Change in Agricultural Labor -3 1 -0.54 0.59 5976 
GDP per capita 171 84408 6653 7675 6163 
Change in log base ten of GDP per capita -1.87 0.4 0.007 0.04 5998 
Change in regional polity -27 133 2.89 12.12 7561 
Oil Rents 0 63089 832 3665 3705 
Change in oil rents -18242 38125 11.6 1110 7369 
Maturity 0 100 56.50 37.50 7840 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Variable 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Part 1 in the methodology section is a brief portrayal of a mathematical 
representation of the hypothetical effect that the independent variables have upon the 
dependent variable.  From this model, data analysis identified the optimal regression 
model in Part 2.  This section ends with a summary of the computational approach. 
1. Mathematical Model 
Based upon the literature reviewed in Chapter II, four hypotheses were identified.  
Using the proxy variables described in the previous section, the polity of country i at time 
t is expressed in four separate mathematical models, one for each hypothesis: 
  Pit = β (Intrastate Violenceit)  + Uit (Error) 
 
 Pit = β (Ag Laborit) + Uit (Error)          (15) 
 
 Pit = β LN(GDPit) + Uit (Error) 
 
 Pit = β (Diffusionit) + Uit (Error) 
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However, this study does not assume that the independent variables act in isolation of one 
another.  On the contrary, there are a variety of interconnections.  Therefore, this chapter 
expresses the level of democracy, D, as: 
 
D = f(Y, S, N, P, X) 
 
Where D is the level of democracy, Y is the level of economic income, S is the level of 
security, N is the level of democratic norms, P is the level of industrialization, and X 
represents a vector of control variables defined as: 
 
X  = g(C, O, L, R, M,W ) 
 
The culmination of the control variables is made up of six factors where C equals 
economic crisis, O equals oil rents, L equals colonial legacy, R equals the region, M 
equals bureaucratic maturity, and W equals loss of an interstate war. Combining the four 
hypotheses and substituting the proxy variables as described in Section A of this chapter, 
the mathematical model can be expressed as: 
 
Pit = β (Intrastate Violenceit) + β (Ag Laborit) + β (Diffusionit) + β LN(GDPit) 
+ β (econ_crisisit) + β  (oilit) + β (legacyit) + β (regionit) + β (maturityit) 
+ β (war lossit) + Uit (Error)          (16) 
 
Note that the Greek character β, beta, represents the standard coefficient for each 
variable.  Since the value of the dependent and independent variables are provided from 
the dataset, the regression analysis solves for the error and the coefficient for each 
independent variable.  It is the comparison of these standardized coefficients that explains 
the significance of each independent variable relative to the others as an explanatory 
cause of the dependent variable.  However, prior to calculating the coefficients, it is 
important to first conduct some routine tests upon the dataset in order to select the 
optimum regression model to maximize the accuracy of the results.    
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2. Identifying the Optimal Regression Model 
There are five standard tests that assist in the identification of an optimum 
regression model or models: unit root, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, 
and fixed versus random effects.  Conducting regression analysis without these tests runs 
the risk of choosing the wrong method of regression or underestimating the error in the 
results.  These tests work to minimize spurious correlations so that the results indicate a 
causal relationship to the extent possible. 
When analyzing data over time, some variables have a natural trend (positive or 
negative) over time.  For instance, country rates of access to cell phones over the past 
twenty years are on a growth trajectory as technology evolved and prices dropped.  
Although the growth rate changes from year to year, the growth rates are nearly all 
positive.  These long-term trends, called trend stationary variables, must be accounted for 
in order to reduce bias in the results.  In order to check for trend stationarity, each 
variable of interest was tested using the Fisher augmented Dickey Fuller Test (xtfisher in 
Stata); a test compatible with unbalanced panels.  The test indicated trend stationary 
results for polity, GDP per capita, and peer region polity.171  In order to account for the 
positive trend in these three variables over time, the study used the first differenced 
variables (i.e., annual change).  Using the Fisher Test upon the first differenced variables, 
the test indicated no trend stationarity.172 
When analyzing data over time, there is also a possibility that the observations of 
some variables behave in a repeated pattern.  This condition, known as serial correlation, 
if present, adversely affects the parameter estimates and must be corrected.  This study 
used the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data models (xtserial in Stata) to test 
for serial correlation.  Using the first differenced data, the test indicated that serial 
correlation was present.173  Due to this finding, the study could not use Ordinary Least 
Squares based estimators because they would underestimate the standard errors. 
                                                 
171 The study was unable to reject the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity). 
172 The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of unit root. 
173 The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.   
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With an unbalanced panel over 60 years, heteroskedasticity (significant 
differences in variance over time and space) was likely to be present.  This was expected 
because not all 162 countries are represented for the entire timeframe largely due to the 
dramatic increase in the number of countries during post World War II decolonization.  
Only 72 countries were part of the dataset for 1946.  This number climbs to 112 by 1961 
and 158 by 1991.  In some cases, there is country attrition such as when West Germany 
and East Germany merged into a single Germany.  Due to these variations in the size of 
observations, the study expected to find variance in the error term over time.  This study 
used the Modified Wald Test for Group-wise Heteroskedasticity (xtreg followed by 
xttest3 in Stata).  The test indicated that heteroskedasticity was present.174  Fortunately, 
the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator corrects both for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
Endogeneity is present if an independent variable is correlated with the error term.  
The literature suggests that causality between intrastate violence and level of democracy 
are bi-directional or co-determined and are therefore endogenous.  That is, changes in 
violence may lead to changes in democracy and changes in democracy may lead to 
changes in the level of violence.  The literature also suggests that GDP-violence, GDP-
industrialization, diffusion-democracy, and GDP-democracy also have bi-directional 
relationships.  Using the Hausman Test for Endogeneity upon the first differenced 
variables, endogeneity was not found.175  Therefore, no correction for endogeneity was 
necessary. 
The final pre-test that was conducted compared the fixed effects versus random 
effects generator.  Fixed effects tend to be more consistent while random effects are more 
efficient.  The Hausman Test (xtreg with fe, then xtreg with re, then hausman fe re in 
Stata) determines if the difference in the coefficients between fixed and random effects is 
not systematic.  The test returned a P-value of 1.83 with Prob>chi2 of 0.7665, indicating 
that random effects should be used.  
                                                 
174 The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity. 
175 The study was unable to reject the null hypothesis that the regressor is exogenous.   
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Unfortunately, the existing literature provides little insight into the selection of an 
appropriate regression model.176  However, the requirements for GLS, in order to correct 
for serial correlation and heteroskedascity, as well as the recommendation for random 
effects, led to an optimum model selection of the random-effects linear model with first-
order autoregressive disturbance (xtregar in Stata).  The xtregar model is suitable for 
unbalanced panels and provides the option of a GLS estimator with random effects.   
This study tested two model variations.  Model One included all polities.  Since 
the study expected that violence has a non-linear relationship with democracy and cannot 
rule out similar relationships with other independent variables, the polity database was 
bifurcated in order to more accurately understand the causal nature.  Therefore, Model 
Two included those polities that never achieved a polity2 score greater than zero.  This 
model specifically focuses on the lower half of the polity scale in order to differentiate 
the effect of variables across the polity spectrum without the natural bias of the more 
numerous democratic polities.  Both models were tested for the time period 1946–2006.  
In order to test for changes in variable sensitivity over time, Model One was tested for 
five time period subsets: 1961–69, 1970–79, 1980–89, 1990–99, and 2000–06.  Although 
the time period subsets substantially reduced the number of observations, the purpose of 
the test was intended to identify changes in variable significance over time.   
3. Computational Approach 
Computational analysis augmented the econometric analysis.  While the 
econometric analysis identified relationships over time, the computational analysis 
focused exclusively on the year of change between polity types.  Although the 
econometric approach is more accurate, the computational approach provides more easily 
interpretable results.  For the computational portion, the study used a modified three-tier 
dependent variable of democracy based upon resulting regime type.  Following Epstein, 
et al., this study coded a polity score of eight or greater as a full democracy, from one to 
                                                 
176 The major econometric studies of the determinants or outcomes of democracy focus almost 
exclusively upon dichotomous variables, a method antithetical to the exploration of democracy as a 
spectrum of levels.  For example, Przeworski, et al., Michael Ross, Goldstone, et al., Hegre, et al., 
Mansfield and Snyder, and Russett and Oneal used dichotomous dependent variables. 
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seven as a partial democracy, and zero and less as an autocracy.177  The score of eight is 
significant because it requires a maximum score in at least one of the three elements that 
make up polity.  The score of zero was a natural breakpoint for autocracies since it 
indicates a tendency towards autocracy over democracy.  Differentiation between the 
variations in autocracy was beyond the scope of this phase of the research.  Additionally, 
any country that gained its independence during the time period studied was coded as a 
colony for its first transition.  The computational method analyzed 277 cases; 190 of the 
cases involved an increase in the level of democracy while 87 were a decrease in 
democracy (see Table 4).   
 
Transition from: Transition to: Number of Cases 
Partial Democracy Full Democracy 35 
Colony Full Democracy 18 
Autocracy Full Democracy 30 
Total increase to Full 
Democracy 
 83 
Colony Partial Democracy 27 
Autocracy Partial Democracy 80 
Total increase to 
Partial Democracy 
 107 
Total increase in 
democracy 
 190 
Full Democracy Partial Democracy 19 
Full Democracy Autocracy 14 
Total decrease from 
Full Democracy 
 33 
Partial Democracy Autocracy 54 
Total decrease in 
democracy 
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Table 4. Transition Cases by Regime Type 
The independent variables analyzed were largely the same as those used for the 
econometric analysis: GDP per capita, economic crisis, bureaucratic maturity, 
agricultural labor, oil rents per capita, war loss, geographic region, and colonial ruler.  In 
addition, four dummy variables were also created to test for constitutional design: 
                                                 
177 Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions.”   
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parliament, proportional representation, bicameral, and federal.  Each category was given 
a score of zero or one.  Hybrid designs were given a score of one-half.   Instead of using 
the level of intrastate violence, dummy variables were used to represent the current status 
of violence within the country: increasing violence preceding transition, existence of 
violence during transition, and reduced violence preceding transition.   
Results were calculated for each variable by transition type.  For instance, the 
mean level of agricultural labor was calculated for all transitions from partial democracy 
to full democracy and compared with the seven other types of transition.  Additionally, 
the averages (totals for dummy variables) were aggregated into and compared across 
three categories: transitions to full democracy, transitions away from full democracy, and 
transitions to autocracy.  Note that transitions from colonial rule to autocracy are not 
considered because this study considers colonies to be a type of autocracy.  Finally, each 
variable was compared as to the proportion of increases in democracy compared to the 
proportion of decreases in democracy.  For example, war loss corresponded to nine 
increases in democracy (5% of upward transitions) and four decreases in democracy (5% 
of downward transitions).  Although the absolute number suggests that war loss favors 
transitions to democracy, the lack of difference in proportion indicates that while war loss 
may be a catalyst for political change it favors neither democracy nor autocracy.  Finally, 
one additional hypothesis was tested using the intrastate violence dummy variables; all 
else being equal, the presence of intrastate violence during a transition to a higher level of 
democracy may limit the sustainability of that level of democracy.  This hypothesis was 
analyzed using a simple comparison of success rates; the proportion of long-term 
successes of transitions towards increased democracy during periods of violence 
compared to those same transitions during periods of no reported violence. 
C. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
The results for the quantitative analysis are organized into three sections.  The 
first part reports on the results of the effect of intrastate violence upon democracy.  The 
Part 2 offers the findings of the various economic-related variables including 
industrialization, income, and the control variables of economic crisis and oil rents.  The 
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final part reviews the results of the diffusion of norms including the change in peer 
country democracy and the control variables of bureaucratic maturity, colonial legacy, 
region, and the loss of an interstate war. 
1. Intrastate Violence 
The study’s first hypothesis posited that a change in the level of intrastate 
violence may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  This section reports the results 
of intrastate violence in three segments; the effect of rising intrastate violence on the level 
of democracy; the effect of decreasing violence; and the long-term effect of the presence 
of violence during large increases in democracy. 
The regression results support the hypothesis that a change in violence leads to a 
change in democracy.  Model One in Table 5 indicates that there is an inverse 
relationship between intrastate violence and level of democracy.  It is interesting to note 
that the significance and magnitude are considerably less for the smaller sample of 
observations in Model Two.  This suggests that autocracies are less influenced by 
changes in intrastate violence perhaps due to fewer normative and legal limitations on the 
repression of dissenters.   
 





Violence -0.080*** -.020 
 0.022 0.019 
Δ Industrialization 0.022 0.018 
 0.043 0.035 
Δ Income 1.024 -1.457** 
 .788 0.546 
Δ Peer Democracy 0.005** 0.005* 
 0.002 0.003 
Number of 
Observations 5174 897 
Note: Table shows coefficient with standard error in parentheses and p-value indicated by asterisk:  
*p=<.10; **p=<.05; ***p=<.001 
Table 5. Linear Regression Results 
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a. Rising Violence and Change in Democracy 
A change in the level of intrastate violence was a factor in 30% of 
significant regime changes.  As suggested by the quantitative results in Table 5, the 
computational results confirmed that violence has a non-linear effect upon the level of 
democracy.  A rise in the level of violence could claim responsibility for 20% (17 of 87) 
of substantial decreases in democracy in the post-war era.  Of 39 cases of rising violence 
in democracies, 44% resulted in a significant decrease in the level of democracy.  On the 
other end of the political spectrum, of 65 cases of rising violence in autocracies, 31% 
resulted in a significant increase in the level of democracy.   
Because there are multiple factors at work, the effect of violence was not a 
constant.  In a small number of cases, the opposite effect occurred; 5% of democracies 
with violence increased in democracy while 15% of autocracies with violence decreased 
in democracy.  For instance, civil disturbances in 1968 were partially responsible for 
France’s return to full democracy.  At the end of the Cold War, after violent clashes 
between protestors and the army, the Romanian military ousted President Ceauşescu, the 
communist dictator.  But, these cases were rare.  In the majority of cases, governments 
showed a surprising resilience to rising violence.  Of 104 cases, 55% had no significant 
change in democracy.  Full democracies and full autocracies survived periods of violence 
unexpectedly well.  In cases of increasing violence, 65% (11 of 17) of full democracies 
and 70% (26 of 37 cases) of full autocracies tolerated a period of violence without a 
significant change in democracy.  Prominent examples include India and the United 
Kingdom, where democracy was maintained democracy despite prolonged periods of 
high-magnitude violence.  Of full democracies, the only two cases that resulted in a 
transition from full democracy to autocracy, Turkey and Thailand, had previous histories 
of political instability.  In comparison, only 30% of partial autocracies and 50% of partial 
democracies endured a period of increased violence without a change (either positive or 
negative) in the level of democracy.   
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b. Decreasing Violence 
During data analysis, an interesting pattern appeared in which several 
countries became democracies immediately upon the cessation of internal violence.  The 
results in Table 5 support the premise that a decrease in violence could lead to an increase 
in democracy.  In 68 cases of countries that demonstrated a decreasing trend in the level 
of violence, 53% resulted in an increase of democracy.  The end of violence was arguably 
a key to democratization in 1969 Venezuela, 1996 Guatemala, and 2004 Algeria.  Yet, it 
is not a green flag for all states.  Decreasing violence appeared to have no immediate 
effect on 1996 Croatia or 1994 Indonesia, two states that were poised for democratic 
transitions.  Surprisingly, 13% of the cases responded to a reduction in violence by 
decreasing their level of democracy.  Greece, for example, transitioned to autocracy in 
1949 after the Greek Civil War came to an end.   
Trend analysis lends additional evidence to the non-linear effect of 
violence.  Based upon the average level of intrastate violence by polity type, full 
democracies are by far the least violent regime type (see Figure 4).  Prior to 1980, the 
majority of violence was within the partially autocratic regimes.  High levels of violence 
in partial democracies are limited to the 1980s.  By the 1990s, fully autocratic regimes 
had actually become more violent than the partial democracies.  This suggests that 
Hegre’s findings of an inverted U-curve relationship between violence and democracy 
are largely based on the 1980s.178 
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Figure 4.   Violence Trends across Regime Types 
Of course, there are cases of intrastate violence within even full 
democracies.  Among countries with high levels of democracy, states with intrastate 
violence consistently had lower democracy scores on average than states without any 
violence (see Figure 5).  Examples of full democracies with periods of intrastate violence 
include Columbia, Israel, Italy, and the United Kingdom.  Countries that were autocratic 
during periods of violence such as Bangladesh, Guatemala, Honduras, and Indonesia 
actually averaged higher levels of democracy than autocracies without violence (see 
Figure 6).  Therefore, the effect of reduced levels of intrastate violence depends upon the 
initial regime type.  There is a contradiction between the regression results and the trend 
chart.  Regression indicated that violence had a negative effect on the level of democracy 
while the trend charts clearly show that autocracies with violence generally tend to have 
higher democracy scores.  This disparity suggests that intrastate violence tends to pull 
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Figure 6.   Effect of Violence on Polity Scores in Autocracies 
Because intrastate violence pulls governments towards the center of the 
polity spectrum, countries that substantially increase democracy during a period of 
violence have a low probability of maintaining a high-level democracy.  Of 35 cases, 
65% of regimes that transitioned during a period of intrastate violence failed while an 
additional 10% suffered a significant decrease in democracy.  Azerbaijan, Burma, 
Guatemala, and Sierra Leone are each examples of failed attempts to democratize during 
periods of insurgency.  Those states that did survive tended to have low levels of violence 
and did not achieve high levels of democracy until the violence was reduced to 
insignificant levels.  Violent transitions in 1957 Columbia, 1986 Guatemala, and 1993 
Peru led to partial democracies.  Full democracy was achieved, but only after the violence 
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dissipated.  There are three notable exceptions: Philippines, Indonesia, and South Africa.  
All three of these countries transitioned during periods of significant violence and 
obtained high levels of democracy.  In the cases of Indonesia and South Africa, a small 
reduction in, but not elimination of, violence preceded the development of full 
democracy.  The peculiarity of the Philippines is explored in Chapter V. 
2. The Economy 
Analysis on the economic effects upon democracy is discussed in three sections: 
industrialization, income, and economic control variables.  Two economic control 
variables are included: economic crisis and oil rents. 
a. Industrialization 
Hypothesis Two stated that changes in the level of industrialization may 
lead to changes in the level of democracy.  The regression results in Table 5 indicate that 
the relationship between changes in industrialization and level of democracy are not 
statistically significant.  Industrialized countries such as Argentina, Jordan, Syria, 
Portugal, North Korea, and Eastern Europe had extensive periods of autocracy.  
However, this does not mean that the factor is irrelevant.  A cursory look at the data 
suggests a linear relationship between industrialization and changes in democracy.  
Transitions to full democracy averaged 12 points less in agricultural labor than transitions 
to partial democracies (Figure 7).  The point spread expands to 18 when colonial 
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Figure 7.   Agricultural Labor and Regime Change 
Countries with higher levels of agriculture are more likely to breakdown.  
Further, their reductions in democracy are likely to be more severe.  The average case of 
a full democracy transitioning to a partial democracy had an agricultural labor rate of 
47%.  Full democracies that transition to autocracy had an average agricultural labor rate 
of 63%.  Surprisingly, there was a rash of low industrialization countries advancing in 
democracy in the 2000s, including Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, Burundi, East Timor, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and Nepal.  Because all nine are new democracies, it is too soon to 
conclude that industrialization is no longer a prerequisite for democracy. 
The distribution of agricultural labor in polities is in the shape of an 
inverted U-curve (see Figure 8).  The comparison between the two figures suggests that 
the shape of the curve has become more pronounced over time.  Instead of being fully 
autocratic, non-industrialized countries dominate the center of the polity spectrum as 
hybrid regimes.  The change shown in Figure 8 suggests that the positive relationship 
between levels of agricultural labor and democracy since 2000 is likely caused by full 
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Figure 8.   Agricultural Labor and Regime Type over time179 
Although industrialization does not cause increased democracy, the data 
indicate that a high level of industrialization is conducive to achieving and maintaining a 
high level of democracy.  Throughout much of the twentieth century, industrialization 
was a necessary, but not sufficient, factor for an increase in democracy.  However, the 
recent trend in low-industrialized countries becoming increasingly democratic suggests 
that industrialization may no longer be a necessary cause of democracy.  This concept 
will be further explored in Chapter VI with the case study on Senegal. 
b. Income 
Hypothesis Three asserts that a change in the level of income may lead to 
a change in the level of democracy.  When the control variables were taken into account, 
income was shown to have a positive effect on the level of democracy (see Table 6). 
However, the results for Model Two suggest that income is not a determining variable in 
level of democracy across the entire polity spectrum as GDP per capita has a negative 
effect on the level of democracy within partially autocratic systems.  Instead of pushing 
countries towards democracy, GDP appears to push countries towards the polity 
extremes.    
Part of the reason that the regression returned such unimpressive results 
for the impact of income on democracy is the changing nature of the relationship over 
                                                 
179 Left chart shows average from 1961–2004; right chart shows 2004. 
2004 
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time.  Table 7 suggests that income had a varying effect over time and across polity type.  
Throughout the post-war period, countries transitioning to full democracy had twice the 
average GDP per capita of those countries that transitioned to autocracy.  However, this 
gap narrowed during the 1970s as relatively wealthy countries such as Argentina, Chile, 
and Uruguay moved towards autocracy.  The income gap almost entirely disappeared in 
the 2000s, as moderately wealthy countries such as Iran, Fiji, and Thailand drastically 
reduced their levels of democracy. 
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Δ Intrastate Violence -0.080*** -0.017 
 (0.023) (0.019) 
Δ Industrialization 0.043 0.022 
 (0.045) (0.040) 
Δ Income 1.600* -1.531** 
 (0.910) (0.679) 
Δ Peer Democracy 0.005** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Economic Crisis 0.102 (0.095) -0.021 (0.081) 
Δ Oil Rent -.000004 (.00002) -.000004 (.000008) 
Bureaucratic Maturity 0.003**(0.001) 0.004**(0.002) 
Interstate War Loss 0.132 (0.267) -0.248 (0.372) 
West Africa 0.179 (0.132) 0.273 (0.183) 
North Africa 0.164 (0.181) 0.174 (0.190) 
East Africa 0.094 (0.157) 0.288 (0.202) 
South Africa 0.144 (0.147) 0.022 (0.254) 
Mid East 0.078 (0.116) 0.276 (0.207) 
South Asia 0.064 (0.132) 0.055 (0.212) 
East Asia 0.053 (0.123) 0.083 (0.222) 
South America 0.075 (0.166) NA 
Central America 0.145 (0.163) NA 
Isolated Islands 0.060 (0.156) NA 
Belgian Colony 0.301 (0.356) NA 
Dutch Colony 0.266 (0.297) NA 
French Colony 0.049 (0.132) 0.205 (0.180) 
Ottoman Colony 0.105 (0.165) -0.061 (0.207) 
Portuguese Colony 0.046 (0.194) -0.172 (0.206) 
Russian Colony 0.047 (0.173) 0.370 (0.232) 
Spanish Colony -0.052 (0.160) NA 
British Colony -0.058 (0.110) 0.090 (0.163) 
Mixed Colony 0.032 (0.145) 0.104 (0.192) 
Japanese Colony 0.204 (0.250) 0.215 (0.195) 
Number of Observations 5174 897 
Note: Table shows coefficient with standard error in parentheses and p-value indicated by: *p=<.10; **p=<.05; ***p=<.001 




 Average GDP Per Capita (in thousands) 
 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Transition to Full Democracy 3.5 2.2 3.9 4.6 5.3 6.8 3.7 
Transition to Partial Democracy 1.7 3.0 1.5 2.7 4.1 3.5 2.1 
Regression from Full Democracy NM NM 1.3 2.2 4.3 3.2 NM 
Transition to Autocracy 1.8 1.3 2.3 3.1 1.9 2.6 3.4 
NM – due to low occurrences during this period, the average is not meaningful 
Table 7. The GDP-democracy relationship over time 
Clearly, income is a discriminator between transitions to full democracy 
versus partial democracy.  Income also was a discriminator in determining regression 
from full democracy.  With the exception of the 1950s, full democratizers averaged 
higher GDPs than any other type of regime transition while partial democratizers had the 
lowest average GDP per capita.  Countries that regressed from full democracy 
consistently had lower GDPs than those achieving full democracy.  Surprisingly, 
transitions to autocracy often had a higher average GDP per capita than transitions to 
partial democracy.  In general then, the relationship between income and level of 
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Figure 9.   Income Level and Regime Type 
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Table 7 suggests that a linear relationship between income change and 
level of democracy is limited to the 1980s and 1990s.  During this period, GDP per capita 
in cases transitioning to full democracy was almost three times that of transitions to 
autocracy.  Even the partial democracies demonstrated a clear economic advantage over 
the autocracies.  With the exception of Argentina, all autocratizers in the 1980s were 
relatively poor countries.  In the 1990s, as countries became independent from the Soviet 
Union, new countries that became full democracies had almost 80% more GDP per capita 
than those that became partial democracies.   
Of course, it is not unheard of for a poor country to attain a high level of 
democracy.  During the period of study, there were 26 cases of a country with less than 
$2,000 GDP per capita attaining full democracy.  However, only three of those cases 
managed to survive over the long term: India, Mongolia, and the Solomon Islands.  Four 
more recent cases (Ghana, Liberia, Moldova, and Senegal) achieved a high level of 
democracy but have not yet withstood the test of time. 
Like industrialization, income does not cause an increase in democracy 
though a high level of income is conducive to achieving and maintaining a high level of 
democracy.  The recent trend of low-income countries becoming increasingly democratic 
suggests that income’s relevance to the level of democracy may be on the wane.  This 
concept will be further explored in Chapter VI on the case study of Senegal. 
c. Economic Control Variables  
The regression results in Table 6 showed that the two economic control 
variables, economic crisis and oil rents, had no statistically significant effect on the level 
of democracy.  Economic crisis as a primary catalyst for regime change is a recent 
development.  Since World War II, the first correlation between economic crisis and 
regime change was Nigeria’s fragile democracy in 1966.  In the 1970s, a handful of 
countries increased democracy, though only temporarily, after an economic crisis.  The 
collapse of cocoa prices, Ghana’s primary trade commodity, led to the downfall of the 
autocratic regime and the birth of Ghana’s first short-lived, partially democratic regime.  
Bangladesh and Nigeria went through similar experiences.  It was no until the 1980s that 
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regional economic crises in Latin America sparked widespread democratization.  Three 
of these transitions, Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay, achieved long-lasting, high levels of 
democracy.  But, economic crisis was responsible for its share of autocratizations as well.  
Triple digit inflation correlated with democratic breakdowns in Ghana, Turkey, and 
Uganda.  Overall, economic crisis as a catalyst for regime change slightly favored 
increases in democracy.  In cases where polity change was associated with an economic 
crisis, 73% of the cases resulted in a significant increase in the level of democracy.  
However, the importance of economic crisis as a catalyst for polity change is largely 
constrained to the 1980s and 1990s,  which accounted for 80% of the cases.  
The explanatory power of oil as an obstacle to democracy appears to have 
lost its luster during the early 1990s.  Although no country has ever transitioned to 
democracy while it received more than $1,000 in annual oil rents per capita, the majority 
of oil-rich autocracies are in regions rife with oil-poor autocracies.  Outside of the Middle 
East and developed countries, countries with significant amounts of oil (oil rents greater 
than 150 per capita) lagged in levels of democracy for significant periods only prior to 





1940 1960 1980 2000
Oil Procuding Non-Oil Producing
year
Average Polity Score
Excluding Middle East, North America, and Europe
Oil-Producing vs. Non-oil Producing Polities
 
 
Figure 10.   Effect of Oil on Level of Democracy in Developing Countries 
Oil is certainly more prominent in full autocracies than any other regime 
type (see Figure 11).  While full autocracies such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE 
dominate oil production business, the oil production in other autocracies is not 
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substantially greater than in the democracies.  Only in a few cases can a decrease in the 
level of democracy be attributed to a rise in oil rents: Indonesia, Syria, and Gabon.180   A 
decrease in oil rents contributed to a delayed increase in Mexico’s democracy.  On the 
other hand, an increase in oil rents during 1979–1980 corresponded to large increases in 
democracy in Ecuador, Nigeria, and Peru.  Finally, Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela had 
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Figure 11.   Oil Rents and Regime Type  
Oil does not appear to be a determinative factor in the level of democracy.  
However, oil can be used to extend a patronage system, which encourages the 
sustainment of autocratic processes.  Therefore, it is not the presence of oil that is 
detrimental to democracy, but the capabilities and preferences of key actors in the 
decision to establish a patronage system using the readily exploitable oil rents.   
3. Diffusion of Norms 
The fourth hypothesis contends that a change in the level of the diffusion of 
norms may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  This hypothesis was tested using 
a proxy of change in the level of democracy for all other countries in the region.  In 
                                                 
180 Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?  A Reappraisal of the 
Resource Curse," 19–22. 
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addition, this section discusses the results of several normative control variables that were 
used including state maturity, colonial legacy, region, and loss of an interstate war. 
a. Changes in Peer Countries’ Level of Democracy 
The regression results of Model One in Table 6 showed that the regional 
diffusion of democratic norms was a significant factor in increasing levels of democracy.  
Interestingly, the results for Model Two suggest that peer country democracy has far less 
influence upon autocratic countries, likely because autocracies tend to exist in autocratic 
neighborhoods.  There are several reasons to suggest that the peer influence of 
neighboring countries has increased over time, which is not identifiable in this 
quantitative research.  First, the end of the Cold War removed ideological restrictions to 
the adoption of democratic ideals.  Second, this period saw a dramatic rise in the ability 
to share democratic ideals across borders due to the introduction of cell phones, the 
internet, and the increasing proliferation of radio.  Third, declining transportation costs 
and increasing economic liberalization provided increased social and economic 
interaction with neighbor countries.   
b. Normative Control Variables 
The regression results in Table 6 indicate that the maturity of the state had 
a significant positive effect on the level of democracy across all polity types, including 
autocracies.  Analyzing countries that have had regime change since World War II, the 
pattern continues to hold.  As Table 8 shows, transitions to full democracy are the most 
mature while transitions to autocracy are the least mature.  Of course, time itself is not the 
explanatory variable.  Several young states achieved high levels of democracy soon after 
independence such as India, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, and Trinidad.  Similarly, old 




Type of Regime Change 
Years since Independence 
(excluding colonial transfers) 
Achieved Full Democracy 70 
Transition resulting in Partial Democracy 59 
Regression from Full Democracy to Partial 
Democracy 
63 
Transition to Autocracy 45 
 
Table 8. Regime Change and Average Maturity 
Although the majority of substantial increases in democracy since World 
War II occurred in British colonies (see Table 9), the British colonies also have more than 
their share of transitions to autocracy in countries like Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, 
and Zimbabwe. Over the long term, the ratio of democratization to autocratization in 
British colonies was no better than the Spanish or French.  Although the Russian and 
Turkish colonies had surprisingly high democratization rates among a small number of 
cases, no colonial power had a statistically significant long-term effect on the level of 
democracy across their colonies (see Table 6). 
 
 None UK ESP FRA Otto NL US RU JP Port GER Belg IT 
Democ 17% 29% 18% 15% 6% 4% 1% 6% 2% 3% 2% 1% 1% 
Autoc 17% 38% 23% 16% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 0% 2% 1% 
Ratio 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.7 1.1 0.2 1.8 0.9 1.1 N/A 0.5 0.5 
 
Table 9. Regime Change and Colonial Legacy181 
Table 6 also shows no statistically significant relationship between region 
and level of democracy.  While some regions have more democracy than others, every 
region has some democracy present.  OECD, Central and South America have especially 
good records with democracy.  However, Latin American democracy only began its 
considerable upward trend in 1980 (see Figure 12).   
                                                 
181 United Kingdom, Spain, France, Ottoman, Netherlands, United States, Russia, Japan, Portugal, 
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Figure 12.   Latin America Democracy Trend 
Upward trends in the level of democracy in Asia and Africa beginning in 
1980 and 1990, respectively, suggest either that region is not a significant determining 
factor or that its influence has waned over time (Figure 13).  Surprisingly, Southwest 
Asia has surpassed South Asia in both number of democracies and average polity score.  
However, this democracy advantage is largely driven by states on the outskirts of the 
region: Armenia, Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey.  But, there were 
significant political liberalizations in Bahrain, Iran, Jordan and Yemen as well.  It is 
interesting to note that the African regions have higher averages of democracy than 
Southwest and South Asia.  Even in highly autocratic North Africa, polity scores have 
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Figure 13.   Asian and African182 
                                                 
182 Note that the trend prior to 1965 is distorted due to the low number of independent countries. 
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Besides above-average successes in South Africa and Central America, 
most developing regions had a similar ratio of democratization to autocratization (Table 
10).  From these results, it is difficult to argue that a specific region is incompatible with 
increased levels of democracy.  
 


















Democ 17% 13% 1% 6% 7% 6% 8% 13% 14% 9% 
Autoc 7% 17% 1% 8% 6% 8% 10% 14% 18% 7% 
Ratio 2.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.4 
 
Table 10. Regime Change and Region 
The loss of an interstate war had no statistically significant impact on the 
level of democracy (Table 6).  Of 25 war losses since 1946, about half resulted in 
significant regime change.  Perhaps one of the most famous examples is the collapse of 
Argentina’s military regime after its defeat in the Falklands War.  A more recent example 
is Serbia’s conversion to democracy after its defeat in the Kosovo Conflict at the hands of 
NATO.  While the loss of war acts as a catalyst for a change in the level of democracy, it 
has no effect on the direction of that change.  For example, defeat in war was also a 
catalyst for breakdown of democracy in Azerbaijan and Syria.   
D. SUMMARY 
There is no single structural factor that will produce democracy.  Almost all of the 
factors reviewed have some type of influence on the level of democracy (see Table 11).  
Increases in security, income, and diffusion are more likely to create increases in the level 
of democracy.  Concomitantly, decreasing levels of security, income, and diffusion are 
more likely to result in a decreased level of democracy.  However, the relationship is not 
linear.  Intrastate violence, poverty, and under-development appear to have a centripetal  
 
 
                                                 
183 Excluding Japan, Australia, Mexico, and New Zealand. 
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effect upon regimes, pulling them towards the middle of the polity spectrum.  High levels 
of income, industrialization, and security are common features of both full democracies 
and full autocracies.   
 
Hypothesis Finding 
ΔSecurity Æ Δ Democracy Although not determinative alone, security is 
positively related to democracy. 
ΔDevelopment Æ Δ Democracy Development does not induce democracy.  Assists 
in achieving and maintaining a high level of 
democracy, but relevance is waning over time. 
Δ Income Æ Δ Democracy Curvilinear relationship; income pushes democracy 
towards the extremes.    
ΔDiffusion Æ Δ Democracy Positive effect overall, though more limited on 
autocracies; most influential in 1980s and following
Table 11. Summary of Hypotheses Results 
 The relationship between the four structural variables and democracy was not 
stable over time.  This variation is the result of actor preferences.  Structural factors do 
not work in a vacuum, they influence the cost benefit calculations of actors who have or 
desire a personal stake in their government.  It is only as the structural factors change to 
modify the costs and benefits of regime types that civil society, the military, or the ruling 
executive takes actions to change the level of democracy.  For example, as a decrease in 
the level of intrastate violence is responsible for both increases and decreases in 
democracy, it is the actors’ response to the change in violence that determines the 
resulting level of democracy.  The results for this chapter indicate that actors are more 
likely to adopt high levels of democracy if there are high levels of security, income, 
industrialization, and diffusion of norms.  Of the four categories, the most important are 
security and diffusion of norms.  The evidence from this study suggests that the 
increasing importance of the diffusion of norms is contributing to the decreasing 
explanatory power of industrialization and income. 
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IV. MEXICO: DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION DESPITE 
VIOLENCE 
Mexico was widely hailed as a democracy in 2000 when the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) finally lost the presidency after more than 70 years of rule.  
But, the processes that allowed this democratic outcome had been in place since 1994, the 
same year as the Chiapas uprising.  Mexico was explored as a case because 
democratization occurred in conjunction with an increase in intrastate violence, a 
theoretical obstacle to democratization.  Further, the quantitative results from Chapter III 
indicate that violence has a negative effect on the level of democracy.  Yet the timing of 
the Chiapas Rebellion and major electoral reforms indicated that a dramatic increase in 
violence may have actually improved Mexico’s level of democracy.  The case of Mexico 
is also interesting because for decades, Mexico defied the democratic theories that argued 
that a moderate GDP and significant industrialization would generate a democratic 
government.  Since 1917, Mexico has been a democracy on paper.  But prior to 1977, 
Mexico’s government was essentially a rotating dictatorship with de facto one party rule.  
When political reform did come, significant increases in Mexico’s level of democracy 
occurred in spite of increasing intrastate (i.e., domestic) violence.   
In this chapter, the analytical model proposed in Chapter II is used to analyze the 
factors that influenced Mexico’s level of democracy since World War II.  Keep in mind 
that the level of democracy is considered a measure of the competitiveness, openness, 
and regulation of a state’s electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability.  The 
model views the level of democracy as the result of the interaction of actors who are 
influenced by structural factors.  The model can be viewed as a supply and demand 
function.  Actors, influenced by structural factors, determine the supply and demand 
components.  The resulting supply-demand equilibrium is the level of democracy.   
As discussed in Chapter II, demand for democracy in a country is a rational 
choice of individuals and groups within a society.  This study examines the effect that the 
economy, the security situation, and the diffusion of democratic norms have on citizens’ 
demand for democracy.  Increasing internal security, economic income, economic 
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industrialization, and the diffusion of norms are expected to increase the demand for 
democracy within a country.  In some cases, this process is delayed by high oil rents or 
accelerated by an economic crisis.  Conversely, we expect high or increasing intrastate 
violence, low-income, and low industrialization to have a deterrent or regressive effect 
upon democratization.  However, this regressive effect may be mitigated by the diffusion 
of democratic norms.   
On the other side of the demand-supply equation, institutions make rational 
choice decisions to dedicate time, resources, and prestige to supplying democracy.  The 
institutions with the most impact on democracy include the military, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling regime.  These institutions are 
affected by the same economic, security, and diffusion factors that shape the citizens’ 
demand for democracy, though not necessarily in the same manner or to the same 
magnitude. 
In this study’s effort to identify the determinants of the levels of democracy, this 
chapter seeks to determine the factors that influenced Mexico’s achievement and two-
term sustainment of a high level of democracy in spite of rising violence.  This chapter 
begins with a brief background on the political history of Mexico.  The citizens’ demand 
for democracy is presented in Section B in three parts: the economy, security, and norms.  
Despite economic success in Mexico through the 1970s, demand for democracy was 
subdued.  The Mexican Revolution had destroyed the national political power of the 
landholders while the dominant PRI made industrial workers and small farmers the 
beneficiaries of the autocratic system.  Mexico warded off widespread citizen demands 
for democracy by distributing benefits in a way that committed the majority of the 
population into backing the one-party system.  Widespread demand for democracy did 
not arrive until the 1980s economic crisis drastically reduced the regime’s distribution of 
benefits.  The dramatic rise in violence in the 1990s, driven by the increasing power of 
the drug cartels in Northern Mexico and rising economic tensions in southern Mexico, 
decreased confidence in the PRI’s ability to govern.  The economic crisis and the social 
turmoil had both drastically increased the costs and reduced the benefits of maintaining 
the autocratic regime.  Meanwhile, the gradual convergence of a free press, high literacy 
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rates, the end of the Cold War, and the pro-democracy stance of the Church highlighted 
the imperfections in Mexico’s democracy.  The economic crises and increasing violence 
of the 1980s and 1990s also appeared to instill an increased demand for democracy.  At a 
minimum, these factors motivated an increased demand for change that required 
democratic processes in order to occur.  Appropriately, Fox’s winning coalition in the 
2000 election was called the Alliance for Change 
The institutions’ supply of democracy is broken into four parts within Section C: 
the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime.  The acquiescence of the 
military, the support of the business community, the pro-democracy activism of NGOs, 
and the decisions of political parties were all-important elements in permitting the growth 
and sustenance of democracy.  The military permitted political reforms due to its 
professionalization and the reduced benefits of maintaining the autocratic regime.  
Unions also felt the decreased benefits of the autocracy while pro-democracy NGOs 
formed alliances to conduct election monitoring.  The most critical element, though, 
appears to be the regime itself as it created the key electoral laws that allowed the 
opposition to legally take power.  The part on the ruling regime is discussed in two 
separate time periods: pre and post 1976. 
A.  BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICAN POLITICS  
In the 16th century, Spain conquered several tribes within modern-day Mexico.  
Colonial ties were essentially severed after the French invasion of Spain in 1808.  After 
more than a decade of war, Mexico became independent in 1821.  Mexico’s first century 
as an independent nation was grueling.  Although there were brief periods of elections, 
changeover was rarely democratic.  Few presidents were allowed to finish their terms.  
Presidential tenure was counted in months, sometimes days, especially during the first 25 
years, which was racked by coups and revolts.  For example, General Santa Anna was 
president, or acting-president, eleven non-consecutive times, though often for only a few 
weeks or months.  His longest two terms were 12 and 28 months.  
In 1846, the United States invaded Mexico over a territorial dispute in Texas.  As 
part of the peace terms, the United States expropriated about half of Mexico’s territory, 
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much of it sparsely inhabited.  The U.S. withdrawal from Mexico left the country in 
political chaos that culminated in the 1858–1861 War of Reform.  The civil war left 
Mexico weak.  In 1864, France invaded and installed Maximilian as emperor.  By 1867, 
the Mexicans evicted the French and executed Maximilian.   
After almost a decade of a semblance of political stability, President Lerdo 
announced his intent to seek re-election in 1876.  Porfirio Díaz, a vehement advocate of 
the no re-election norm, led a successful revolt against Lerdo.  Ironically, Díaz would be 
continuously re-elected over the next 35 years.  Of course, elections during Diaz’s reign 
had predetermined outcomes.  Democracy was curtailed in the name of social stability.   
The reign of Díaz was stable, relatively peaceful, and achieved great advances in modern 
infrastructure.  Yet, a variety of groups tired of the long dictatorship.  Armed revolts 
sprang up in a free-for-all civil war: the Mexican Revolution of 1910.  Rebels were led by 
Emiliano Zapata in the south, Francisco Madero in the center, and Pancho Villa in the 
north.   
The loose alliance quickly fell apart after Madero became President.  Unhappy 
with Madero’s policies, Zapata’s forces returned to armed rebellion.  A coup brought 
Victoriano Huerta to the presidency.  In response to Huerta’s coup, Villa, Carranza, and 
Obregon joined the rebellion. Also opposed to the military coup due to its 
unconstitutionality, Woodrow Wilson sent U.S. forces to occupy Veracruz.  Carranza 
ended up on top, deposing Huerta, but Zapata and Villa continued to rebel.  Amid the 
chaos, the 1917 Constitution created a federal, presidential system with plurality 
representation.  In a dispute over presidential succession, Carranza was assassinated by 
forces loyal to one of Carranza’s own former generals: Obregon.  Within a decade, 
Obregon, Zapata, and Villa were all assassinated.         
In 1929, after almost twenty years of bloodshed, backstabbing, and power 
grabbing, the surviving military and political elites created the National Revolutionary 
Party as a collusive power-sharing arrangement to avoid further bloodshed.  The party 
name was briefly changed in the 1930s to the Party of the Mexican Revolution when 
President Cárdenas reorganized the party into three building blocks: peasants, labor, and 
the popular sector.  The peasants and labor had well-organized unions.  The popular 
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sector was ill defined but arguably represented the unorganized middle class.  The party 
took on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) name in 1946.  The establishment of a 
party of the revolution turned Mexico’s paper democracy into an autocracy with a regular 
schedule of power rotation. 
Mexico’s level of democracy increased incrementally over time, each increment 
motivated by a different factor.  In 1977, intrastate violence drove Mexico to migrate to a 
participatory autocracy; the regime introduced a mixed proportional representation 
system to entice rebel leaders to enter the political system.   A decade later, economic 
crisis ended one-party rule as the PRI super majority ended in 1988.  Disgruntled by the 
widespread fraud of the 1988 presidential election, NGOs flocked into the field to 
monitor elections in 1994.  The electoral code ensuring free elections finally caught up in 
1997 partly in response to rising intrastate violence.  The culmination of the reforms was 
the National Action Party (PAN) presidential victory in 2000.  So far, Mexico’s 
democracy has survived.  
B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY 
This section analyzes the change in demand for democracy in Mexico’s citizens in 
three parts.  The first part addresses various aspects of Mexico’s economy: income, 
industrialization, oil rents, and economic crisis.  The second part addresses the effect of 
intrastate violence, both insurgent and organized crime.  The final part analyzes the 
diffusion of democratic norms.   
1. The Rise and Fall of Clientalism in Mexico: Income, Industrialization, 
Oil and Crisis  
From the discussion in Chapter II, we expect that economic income and economic 
development will have a positive impact on the level of democracy.  A growing 
economic income should lead to the development of a middle class.  As citizens achieve 
middle class status, they have the ability to divert their resources from life sustainment to 
social interactions and political activism.  Economic development leads to demand for 
democracy through increased literacy, industrialization, and the formation of unions and 
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professional organizations.  The findings from this section suggest that while increasing 
levels of income and development spread democratic ideals, those ideals did not lead to 
significant pro-democracy action until combined with a catalyst such as a severe 
economic crisis.  
By any economic measure, Mexico’s increase in democracy should have occurred 
much earlier than 1994.  On the income side, Mexico had a two-decade economic boom 
in the post-war era known as the “Mexico Miracle.”  GDP per capita surpassed $3,000 in 
1954, $4,000 in 1964, and $6,000 in 1975.  Instead of increasing palpable demand for 
democracy, the successful economy under the PRI negated widespread calls for increased 
democracy.   Mexico warded off widespread citizen demands for democracy by 
distributing benefits through patronage that committed the majority of the population into 
backing the one-party system.  As long as the economy was good and services were 
provided, there was no reason to vote out the PRI or demand more democratic processes.  
The patronage model was sustained by oil revenues and debt.   
On the development side, industry was booming.  The Diaz era laid the core of 
the industrial infrastructure prior to the turn of the century: railroads, communications 
(phone/telegraph), and a postal service.  It is possible that the increased literacy and 
education associated with this period of industrialization led to an increased demand for 
democracy among the citizenry, many of whom rallied around the revolutionaries.  The 
revolution brought political change, but democracy only on paper.  The Mexican 
Revolution transformed society.  A small middle class appeared though Mexico was still 
primarily a rural society.  The landed class and their latifundias (estates) were 
dismantled.  The workers and the farmers were given preeminent status as the new power 
brokers in politics.  To an extent, the social changes of the revolution defused demand for 
democracy.  Instead of agitating for increased say against the landed class, the laborers 
had a prominent bargaining position in the new order.  Industrialization brought the 
expected precursors of democracy.  Literacy broached 60%.  Strong unions, supported by 
the government, formed around industrial workers and farmers.  But, as long as the 
regime met the needs of the unions, the masses had little need for democracy.   
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The tempering effect of the revolution upon democracy was temporary.  As 
industrialization continued, economic growth favored industry at the expense of 
agriculture.  World War II turned the tables decidedly in favor of the industrial workers.  
As the U.S. retooled its industry to produce war materials, Mexico developed industry to 
produce substitutes for the former American imports.  Construction flourished; highways, 
dams and airports were built.  After the war, Mexico decided to continue with import 
substitute industrialization (ISI), cultivating industries in steel, chemicals, textiles, rubber, 
construction, and electronics.  In 1966, Mexico’s industrial and services labor force 
overtook the size of the agriculture labor force.  By the 1980s, Mexico seemed overripe 
for democracy via development.  The agricultural community was only 30% of the labor 
force.  Those farmers that remained were no longer unorganized and uneducated.  
Expanded rural education programs delivered a literacy rate of 90%.  Tough economic 
times forced farm laborers to expand into industrial or service jobs during the off-season. 
The diminishment of the agricultural community was an instrumental factor 
towards increasing citizens’ demand for democracy.  As the agricultural community 
shrank and their political power diminished, some farmers turned towards violence as a 
method to influence policy.  The culmination of literacy, education, and the interests of 
the agricultural workers suggests that economic development had some explanatory 
power after all.  Perhaps the effect of economic development upon democracy in Mexico 
was delayed due to the high divergence in income and industrialization across Mexico’s 
regions.  The majority of Mexico’s GDP is concentrated in Mexico City, Mexico State, 
Nuevo Leon, and Jalisco.184  The north and central states have industries such as the auto 
manufacturing plants in Puebla, Aguascalientes, Jalisco, and Nuevo Leon (see Figure 14).  
The southern states have very little industry.  The terrain is primarily jungle and 
mountains with mostly small cities.  The area is not conducive to either large retail outlets 
or a large business presence: there is just not a large enough concentration of people to 
warrant the investment.  This suggests that the regional imbalance in industrialization led 
to regional divergence in the demand for democracy.  Although citizens in the south 
                                                 
184 Monterrey, in the state of Nuevo Leon, is the business center of the north.  Guadalajara, in the state 
of Jalisco, is a hub for information technology.   
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wanted increased political voice due to their economic woes, they initially lacked the 
organization, education, and literacy necessary to foment effective democratic action.  As 
the rural areas developed, the farmers’ marginalized status limited their ability to affect 
politics or political reform causing some to turn to insurgency. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Map of Mexico with State Political Boundaries 
The strong economy and the union clients maintained the urban population as 
stakeholders in the PRI regime.  The PRI’s luck ran out in 1982.  Plummeting oil prices 
limited the government’s ability to dole out subsidies and other patronage. These same 
macroeconomic pressures also crushed the Mexican economy. With inflation 
skyrocketing, defaults of loans in U.S. dollars jumped, further depressing the economy.  
Mexico suffered negative GDP growth for seven consecutive years primarily under 
President Madrid from 1982 to 1988, culminating in a cumulative GDP loss of 12%.  In 
1985, Madrid made the difficult decision to abandon ISI and adopt free market policies in 
an effort to correct Mexico’s economic ills.  Madrid began by privatizing several state 
companies and by joining GATT.  Many companies were not ready for the competition. 
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ISI businesses were soundly crushed by inflation and an end to cheap government credit 
resulting in significant job losses.  The economy would improve only marginally over the 
next decade.  Inflation would eventually be reigned in, but GDP remained weak and 
would only fully recover in 1999. 
The economic crisis turned the business community into pro-democracy 
advocates.  The business community benefited from the autocratic regime only as long as 
the economy was growing as it did from the 1940s through the 1970s.  But as the 
economy soured, so too did the business community’s opinion of the PRI.  Small and 
medium size entrepreneurs were dismayed by the government’s decision to nationalize 
the banks in 1982.  This event, combined with the economic crisis of the 1980s, drove the 
business community to the PAN.185  As the economic crisis worsened during the 1994 
peso crisis, small business and middle class debtors formed a loose coalition known as El 
Barzón to protest against the government’s economic policies.  Big companies also 
favored democracy.  At the end of the Cold War, the importance of politics as an 
investment consideration took on new emphasis.  Leaders of Mexico’s powerful 
monopolies and duopolies (e.g., TELMEX and PEMEX) became pro-democracy because 
democracy was good for business.  Democracy held little threat to corporations since the 
lack of competition enabled businesses to negotiate with bureaucrats over regulation 
enforcement and budget appropriations with little fear of reprisal.   
 The economic malaise of the 1980s polarized Mexican political opinions going 
into the 1988 elections.186  Further, the poor government response to the 1985 Mexico 
City earthquake made the government appear inept.  Many citizens had lost faith in the 
PRI’s ability to govern.  However, massive electoral fraud managed to keep the PRI in 
power for another six years.  The 1982 economic crisis did not directly bring about 
regime change.  The public lost faith in the PRI’s ability to manage the economy.  
                                                 
185 Roderic Ai Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 136–8; Rogelio Hernandez-Rodriguez, "The Renovation of Old Institutions: State 
Governors and the Political Transition in Mexico " Latin American Politics & Society 45, no. 4 (2003): 
100–1. 
186 Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral 
Choices (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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However, other parties were not seen as more adept at handling the economy.187  The 
prolonged crisis brought about an increased demand for change among the citizens, 
which began a sequence of events that culminated in political reforms.  The immediate 
effect of the crisis was the implementation of a minor reform that changed the structure 
for calculating the makeup of the legislature.  Through this reform, the voters were able 
to end the super majority of the PRI during the 1988 elections.  Although the PRI 
managed to win the presidency, the widespread fraud associated with the election 
mobilized citizens to support election monitoring during the 1994 elections.      
2. Intrastate Violence 
As discussed in Chapter II, an outbreak in violence is expected to deter 
democratization or encourage a regime to move towards autocracy.  Further, a transition 
to democracy during a period of intrastate violence is unlikely to sustain democracy as a 
significant segment of the population was not involved in the design of the democratic 
processes.  Contrary to expectation, intrastate violence appeared to have little negative 
effect on demand in Mexico.  Instead, insurgency violence served as a vehicle to 
highlight the plight of the oppressed to the general public while increasing organized 
criminal violence helped fuel demands for a change in political leadership. 
For much of the 19th century, Mexico was an unstable hybrid regime with 
frequent armed rebellions and political change through the use of force.  The dictatorship 
of Porfirio Diaz brought a thirty-year respite to the violence.  Over time, Diaz’s policies 
and tenacious hold on power ostracized some of his powerful compatriots.  Civil war 
erupted and culminated in the Mexican Revolution.  Even after the revolution, the 
violence continued until the end of the Cristero Rebellion.  In an effort to end the 
violence, a coalition was built to support a one-party system, ending the brief hybrid 
democracy established under the 1917 Constitution.  The one-party system ended the 
                                                 
187 James McCann, "The Changing Mexican Electorate: Political Interest, Expertise and Party Support 
in the 1980s and 1990s," in Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections, ed. Mónica Serrano 
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rebellions.  Not only did the violence cause a desire for autocratization, but 
autocratization led to a decrease in violence.  In Mexico’s case, it was not autocratic 
repression that led to decreased violence, but the creation of a coalition that would ensure 
that the powerful members of society received the benefits of the new regime.  As the 
system was designed to placate the interests of the elites, eventually segments of society 
came to believe that they were not receiving the benefits of the revolution.  
A wave of demonstrations for increased pay and benefits erupted in the 1950s.  It 
began with the teacher’s union. Requesting a salary increase, the teacher’s union 
withdrew from the government-client umbrella union, the Confederation of Mexican 
Workers (CTM).  Demonstrations were violently dispersed by the special police unit 
known as the granaderos (grenadiers, known for using clubs, tear gas, and occasionally 
bayonets).  The teachers were merely the first.  Later demonstrations by students and 
various unions such as electricians, telegraphers, doctors, oil workers, and railroad 
workers would receive similar treatment.  The government used a combination of 
coercion (i.e., brute force, arrests of leaders, government-orchestrated protests and media 
stories, and mass firings) and incentives (e.g., increased salaries) to break strikes. To 
justify its brutal action, the government claimed that the protests were a communist 
conspiracy instigated by foreigners.  The government’s control of the media and its 
skillful isolation of each protesting union initially constrained demands for political 
change. 
Eventually, though, the protest spirit migrated to the universities.  While the 
universities had long sympathized with the demonstrators, students were catalyzed into 
action after the police brutally dispersed a brawling crowd during a high school football 
game.  But instead of intimidating the students into line, the event sparked a cycle of 
demonstrations and repressions: the students would protest the brutality of the police only 
to be brutally repressed again.  The government attempted to break the cycle in 1968.  
The military occupation of several of the largest universities in Mexico failed to curtail 
the students who continued to hold mass rallies.  One such rally was held in the square at 
Tlatelolco.  A large student rally with a heavy military presence was an ordinary 
occurrence.  But in this case, shots rang out.  The military opened fire.  It went poorly for 
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the students.  The death toll was never released.  Afterwards, the military claimed student 
snipers started the shooting.  More plausibly, critics suggest that it was a government 
setup.  Although the media did not cover the event, word spread.  The event shook both 
the public and the military.    
The brutal repression of the unions and the students sparked several small-scale 
revolts in the 1960s and 70s: Mexico’s “Dirty War.”  Few of these revolts had any 
serious capabilities or major operations.  For example, one such group that managed a 
single major operation was the Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo.  The 
group’s primary activity was conducting bank robberies but they did manage to kidnap 
the American Consul at Guadalajara and demand the release of political prisoners.  Other 
armed groups were similar.  They predominantly carried out criminal activities in 
something of a Robin Hood fashion to counter the perceived injustices of the system. The 
list of armed revolutionary organizations is long: Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario, 
National Revolutionary Civic Association, and the Army of the Poor and the Peasant’s 
Brigade Against Injustice, the Mexican Insurgent Army, Forces of National Liberation, 
and the Clandestine Workers and Campesinos Popular Union were some of the more 
prominent names.  These organizations were principally local with little coordination 
across groups.     
The oil crisis of the 1970s gave Mexico the opportunity to spend its way out of 
social dissent.  The 1973 OPEC Oil Embargo exacerbated by the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
created skyrocketing oil prices.  Mexican government spending doubled in 1972 and 
doubled again in 1973.188  Relying partly on oil revenues and partly on debt, Mexico 
embarked upon a giant ponzi scheme of government spending that could be sustained 
only as long as oil prices remained high and foreign credit remained easy.  Despite the 
increased spending, the insurgent crisis escalated.  In response, the army occupied the 
state of Guerrero in 1974.  The military intervened in Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Sonora to  
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evict agricultural squatters.  In the case of Sonora, the intervention resulted in the death 
of several agricultural workers in what some refer to as the San Ignacio Río Muerto 
massacre.189    
The electoral reforms of 1977 drew senior rebel leaders into the political realm 
with the inclusion of small, leftist parties including the Mexican Communist Party. The 
next year, President Portillo granted amnesty to the rebels.  With the rebels forgiven and 
incorporated into the political game, social instability appeared to be over. However, the 
stability was short-lived.    
The oil crisis arrived in 1982.  The economy was only beginning to recover in 
1994 when the peso crisis hit.  The economic pain was not burdened evenly.  Wealth 
generation in Mexico is concentrated in Mexico City, the seven northern states 
(manufacturing, services, trade), and the Yucatan (oil and tourism).  Four of the six 
poorest Mexican states are in the volatile south: Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacán, and 
Oaxaca.  Chiapas is by far the poorest.  The economic crises hit these poor states the 
hardest.  Poverty is often blamed for the rise of the southern Mexican guerrilla groups of 
the 1990s.190  Yet, this is an incomplete answer.  Chiapas had suffered from rural poverty 
long before 1994.  In fact, it is likely that the surviving elements of the guerrilla groups in 
the 1960s and 70s fomented the seeds of the 1990s revolts of the Zapatistas and the 
Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP). 
Although Chiapas had long been poor, tensions within Chiapas and between 
Chiapas and the central government were increasing throughout the 1980s.  In an attempt 
to fix the economy, the government’s economic liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s hit 
the southern states’ primary source of income: agriculture.  Meanwhile, Chiapas was 
suffering from land conflicts.  Chiapas had a growing population from both natural 
growth and an influx of Guatemalan refugees.  Combined with a reduction in arable land 
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due to erosion and attempts to expand by large landholders, a powder keg was created.191  
Of course, some argue that land and poverty were merely catalysts to mobilize the 
population.  In their mind, the real dispute was for indigenous rights and autonomy.192   
Unlike prior revolts, Chiapas received significant national and international 
attention.  The localized nature of previous insurgencies combined with tight government 
control on the media prevented widespread demands for political reform as a result of the 
violence in the 1960s and 1970s.  Although Chiapas was still a localized conflict, the rise 
of an independent Mexican media in the late 1980s suddenly brought the issue to national 
attention.  Although the Chiapas rebellion was not particularly violent, the Zapatistas 
garnered broad national and international support through their adept use of the internet 
in a portrayal of the Zapatistas as the champions of the indigenous poor.   
The Zapatista Rebellion was only one incident that contributed to a growing sense 
that Mexico was sinking into chaos.  Only three days prior to the 1988 presidential 
election, two aides to the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate were 
assassinated.  Shortly after the Zapatista uprising in January 1994, PRI presidential 
candidate Colosio was assassinated in March.  In September, José Ruiz Massieu, the 
secretary-general of the PRI, was assassinated.  Evidence in the Massieu murder 
implicated Raul Salinas, brother of sitting President Carlos Salinas, in the murder.  The 
chaos of 1994 created an unfavorable investment climate for Mexico.  Temporary, but 
consequential, drops in foreign direct investment and portfolio investment put pressure on 
the peso, forcing a devaluation.  The devaluation had a ripple effect as many Mexican 
bonds were payable in dollars, drastically increasing the cost of interest payments.  By 
December, the Mexican government was in crisis and looked to the U.S. government for 
a bailout.  
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Social instability continued.  In Aguas Blancas, police ambushed farmers on their 
way to a protest in Guerrero in 1995.  The next year, the People’s Revolutionary Army 
(ERP) began conducting small attacks against police and military in Oaxaca, Puebla, and 
the state of Mexico.  Small guerrilla groups, such as the Insurgent Popular Revolutionary 
Army (ERPI) in Guerrero, began to form.  Within a decade, declared guerrilla groups 
existed in 20 of 31 Mexican states though primarily in isolated areas.193  In Chaipas, the 
government quickly abandoned military force as a means to resolve the conflict, giving 
the Zapatistas a wide berth within its home territory of Chiapas.  However, the violence 
continued as landholder-backed paramilitary groups began targeting Zapatista 
sympathizers.  Several were killed in what some call the Acteal massacre in 1997.  The 
violence showed in the high murder rates throughout the southern states of Mexico: 
Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán.194  The small insurgencies spreading across 
Mexico were a clear sign for an increased demand for political change.   
However, the threat of the insurgencies to urban areas was remote.  The three 
major centers of economic growth—Mexico City, Monterrey, and Guadalajara—were far 
from the rebels.  Organized crime, on the other hand, appeared to be an increasingly 
serious threat, partly instigated by the poor economy.  Overall crime statistics rose 20% 
from 1983 to 1985.  Crime would continue to rise throughout the decade.  By 1991, crime 
was 50% higher than prior to the crisis (1980).195  From 1974–1990, the number of 
homicides in Mexico doubled.  Despite the perception that crime continued to increase in 
the 1990s, homicides per capita were down more than 40% from 1990 to 2006.196  
However, in the late 1990s, crime became high profile; kidnappings in Mexico City, 
organized crime turf-war shoot-outs in the northern cities, and the occasional  
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assassination of a police chief or journalist.  The overwhelming brutality and brazenness 
of the violence (and the corresponding increase in media coverage) overshadowed the 
reality of the statistics. 
Paradoxically, while the perception was that violence in Mexico was increasing, 
the violence was also fairly remote.  Violence was low (per capita) in Mexico City, 
Guadajara, and Monterrey, the three largest cities in Mexico, the seats of power and 
industry.  The majority of the violence in the north was between organized criminal 
groups.  One expert estimated that 80% of deaths related to the drug war are intra-
criminal turf wars fighting over the routes not yet controlled by the military.  The 
remaining casualties come from military operations and assassinations of police chiefs 
and journalists.197 
In the not so distant past, organized crime was a client of the PRI.  Drug 
trafficking had been occurring for almost a century.  Opium smuggling from Mexico into 
the United States became rampant in the 1920s after the United States banned the 
substance.  By the time that Mexico made opium illegal in 1926, opium traffickers had 
already developed close relationships with state governors and military leaders.198  Drug 
smugglers incorporated themselves into the patron-client system at the local level.  The 
relationship provided tax revenue and campaign contributions to the local government 
while providing government and military protection to the traffickers.  This somewhat 
symbiotic relationship broke down in 1977 as the Mexican government attempted to 
crack down on organized crime and corruption.199  As part of its anti-drug and anti-
corruption stance, the government began to prosecute government employees involved in 
trafficking, gradually pushing control of trafficking activities to those outside of the 
government’s influence into the domains of organized crime.   
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The privatization of the Mexican organized criminal groups occurred while the 
U.S. drug war was picking up steam under Ronald Reagan.  As cocaine became popular 
in the United States, Mexico became the major transportation route for cocaine as the 
U.S. counterdrug operations increased the risk of Caribbean routes into Florida.  As the 
transportation route was shifting, the United States put pressure on the Columbian cartels.  
The Medellin Cartel was largely destroyed by the death of its leader, Pablo Escobar, in 
1993.  Police and military operations dismantled the Cali Cartel leadership in 1995.  The 
demise of the Columbian cartels raised the rewards considerably for the risks of 
trafficking.  The existing Mexican organized criminal groups grew to fill the vacuum, 
partly assisted by the efforts of Raul Salinas, brother of the President.  Organized crime 
became dominant on the west and east coast (Sinaloa and Quintana Roo act as 
transshipment points) and along the U.S.-Mexico border (especially Tijuana and Juarez).  
Over time, the organizations extended their power through almost every state in Mexico 
corrupting many local police, judges, and elected officials.  While corruption may have 
fueled an increased demand for democracy, increased democracy had a limited effect on 
decreasing corruption. 
Numerous government reorganizations have been undertaken in efforts to fight 
corruption.  In 2001, President Fox disbanded the Federal Judicial Police and replaced it 
with the Agencia Federal de Investigación (AFI) in the Mexican Attorney General’s 
Office.  The Attorney General’s Office itself had previously undergone its own 
reorganization in 1996.  However, after all of these reorganizations, the AFI was still 
considered heavily corrupt.200  More recently, President Calderón placed the Policía 
Federal Preventiva (PFP) and the AFI under one command in a Federal Police Corps.  
Perhaps more important was Calderon’s introduction of the Oficina de Confidencia, an 
organization for conducting background investigations and polygraphs for officers.  
However, ridding the local police and judicial institutions of corruption is an immensely 
more difficult task.  The federal police make up only 5% of Mexico’s 400,000 police.  
Initial steps were taken to reduce corruption at the local level.  Federal police conduct 
ballistics checks of local police weapons to check for connections with local crimes.  The 
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government deployed federal police and federal troops against organized crime in an 
attempt to circumvent local corruption.  In some extreme cases such as Nuevo Laredo 
and Nuevo Leon, the federal government conducted mass suspensions and mass firings of 
suspected corrupt police officers.   
Unfortunately for Mexico, the crack down on corruption has not resulted in a 
strengthening of the rule of law in Mexico.  In fact, it is difficult to tell if serious progress 
has been made as many “Mexicans will tell you they fear the police more than the 
criminals.”201  To make the security situation worse, after mass firings of corrupt police 
in the 1990s, many unemployed police went to work for organized crime and their 
enforcer gangs (e.g., the Zetas).   
The study of intrastate violence in Mexico is a complex topic.  Organized crime is 
not a traditional insurgency.  They do not seek to overthrow the government.  Their aims 
are financial.  Yet, they are not apolitical.  Organized crime seeks to influence the local 
government through corruption and coercion to enact policies that benefit their interests.  
In Mexico, Organized crime seems to have more similarities to the insurgents than they 
have differences.  Both tend to avoid violence against civilians, instead concentrating on 
police forces.  Both have no interest in creating a new political regime, but instead want 
to advance their interests within the current political system.202   
Despite the wide publicity, the level of violence in Mexico was relatively low 
over the past sixty years.  Even the Chiapas Rebellion involved few casualties.  Yet, the 
demonstrative effect of the ongoing violence between paramilitaries and Zapatistas, the 
military and insurgents, and the turf battles among organized crime syndicates is far 
greater than the low numbers would suggest.  In a sense, Mexico has been inundated with 
wars between organizations since the early 1990s.  Although there is much concern about 
the level of violence in Mexico, the majority of the violence is remote.  While social 
violence did not appear to effect political participation at the national level, the states 
with the lowest voter turnout in 2006 were the states with the highest level of homicides 
                                                 
201 Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, On the Rim of Mexico: Encounters of the Rich and Poor (Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press, 2000), 97. 
202 Personal communication with Jorge Chabat, 27 Aug 2009. 
 135
per capita: Baja California Norte, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Guerrero, and Michoacán.203  The 
perception of increasing criminal violence with corrupt government compliance and the 
eruption of small-scale revolts in southern Mexico reinforced a growing assessment that 
the PRI had lost its ability to govern effectively.  But, in order to replace the PRI, an 
increase in the level of democracy was necessary. 
3. The Diffusion of Norms: The Emperor Has No Clothes 
As discussed in Chapter II, the spread of democratic ideas provides citizens 
increased awareness of the benefits of democracy relative to autocracy and an improved 
ability to analyze the existing level of democracy.  These norms highlight the inadequacy 
of democratic processes in hybrid regimes and underscore democracy as the rational 
choice.  Norms have a wide variety of inputs including colonial legacy, ethno-religious 
identity, access to information, international influence, and religious organizations.  
While Spanish autocratic traditions and ethnic divergence initially constrained 
democratic norms in Mexico, the gradual convergence of a free press, high literacy rates, 
the end of the Cold War, and the pro-democracy stance of the Church highlighted the 
imperfections in Mexico’s political regime.   
The specific long-term effect of the Spanish colonial legacy on Mexico’s 
democratic norms is somewhat ambiguous.  The colonial period emphasized a central 
autocratic figure with decentralized autocratic execution.  As one of only two Spanish 
viceroys (vice-king), the viceroy in Mexico had absolute authority over the northern 
portion of the Spanish New World.  But the government had only a tenuous hold over 
much of the rural territory.  While the authority to create law was centralized, real 
authority was executed through the distributed branches of the Catholic Church.  As 
Spain entered a debt crisis, King Philip II depleted the power of the viceroy by selling 
political offices in Mexico, allowing local caudillos (strongmen) to secure their power.204   
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The Spanish colonial legacy could be blamed for many of Mexico’s ills, real or 
perceived: over-centralization of resources, the establishment of patron-client networks, 
the use of political office for personal gain, and a weak rule of law.  However, the 
Spanish experience alone does not explain the resilience of these traits as several former 
Spanish colonies managed to work through these challenges far earlier in their political 
development.  Lorenzo Meyer argues that the colonial legacy is more likely to have a 
long-term detrimental effect upon development when imposed upon a large indigenous 
population.  “It is a long process to develop the idea of citizenship after centuries of 
repressing indigenous peoples.” 205  Mexico certainly qualified as a colony with a large 
indigenous population.  Even a century after independence, in 1910, 30% of the 
population identified themselves as Indian from one of twenty-three different major 
tribes, primarily concentrated in south central Mexico.  By the late 1990s, the population 
was only 7% Indian.206  Although issues of discrimination, egalitarianism, indigenous 
rights, and autonomy persisted, it is plausible that the decrease in ethnic divergence 
reduced the perceived costs of switching to democracy. 
While the colonial legacy had a lasting impact on society, the Mexican 
Revolution changed the course of political development.  The Mexican Revolution 
ushered in an important procedure of democracy: peaceful transfer of power through 
regular elections.  While the results were pre-determined, the process established two 
societal norms in Mexico, reinforced over 80 years.  First, leaders should be elected.  
Second, elected officials should not be able to stay past their term or run for re-election.  
The no re-election norm not only prevented a one-man dictatorship, but it kept opposition 
groups involved in politics with the elusive hope of future victory.  Over time, many 
Mexicans would come to realize that their democracy had no clothes and it was 
embarrassing.  Internal and external factors would culminate in the early 1990s to provide 
insights into the imperfections of Mexico’s democracy. 
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For much of the 20th century, hiding the imperfections of Mexico’s democracy 
was easy.  There was little free press in Mexico until the mid 1980s.  The PRI controlled 
the media through distribution and revocation of broadcasting licenses, subsidies, cheap 
credit, tax policies, and large purchases by government agencies. Although print media 
required no licenses, government agencies were the primary advertisers and, in many 
cases, paid the bulk of a journalist’s income.207  Perhaps the best evidence of the PRI’s 
control was the lack of media coverage of the 1968 Tlatelolco Massacre.  Into the 1980s, 
academics and journalists received threatening phone calls in response to articles that 
portrayed the government in a negative light.208 
The turning point for Mexican media was the 1985 Mexico City earthquake.  
Over the previous decade, successful media outlets developed their own financial 
resources, providing them the flexibility to survive the loss of government funding.  
Independent radio and print media outlets capitalized on citizens’ outrage over the 
government’s inept disaster response after the earthquake.  The competition forced other 
media to respond in kind, eventually leading to increased coverage of government 
scandals and the government’s economic failures.209 
The increasingly independent media also highlighted the growing support of the 
opposition.  Non-PRI parties were on the rise in local elections since the early 1980s.  
The first non-PRI governor was elected in 1989.  Over the next decade, ten more 
governorships fell into non-PRI hands.  A similar pattern was emulated at the municipal 
level. These victories by the opposition parties may have convinced voters of the fairness 
of the national elections and encouraged citizen engagement in the political process.210 
The free press received another boost in 1994.  The fraud of the 1988 elections 
had tainted the public’s view of elections.  Disgruntled that this tarnished his own 
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legitimacy, President Zedillo encouraged a free press.211  Independence for television 
media finally arrived in 1997 when Televisa’s President Emilio Azcárraga, a long-time 
PRI supporter, died and was replaced by his all-business son. 
The free press was an important factor in the 2000 election.  The media coverage 
of Fox’s 2000 landslide victory based upon exit polls and verified by the Federal 
Electoral Institute (IFE) made it nearly impossible for the PRI to stay in power without a 
dramatic shift towards autocracy.  However, saying that Mexico has a free press is 
somewhat misleading.  While the government no longer represses the press, organized 
criminal groups do.  Organized criminal intimidation and violence against journalists is a 
major problem, especially in the northern border states.  Despite a lack of investigative 
journalism into organized crime, the media played a key role in highlighting the flaws in 
Mexico’s paper democracy and increased the accountability for regime policies.  The 
increased freedom of the media permitted the spread of information such as the increase 
in criminal violence, the details of the peso crisis, failings in government services such as 
disaster response, and election fraud.   
The introduction of the free press also improved citizens’ capabilities to learn 
about other democracies and how those democracies perceived Mexican politics.  As 
Mexico’s economic crisis dragged on in the 1980s, the regime turned to international 
trade in an effort to correct its economic woes.  In so doing, Mexico both increased the 
interaction of Mexicans with democratic countries and increased foreign scrutiny of 
Mexico’s politics. Although Mexico had ignored international complaints about human 
rights abuses for decades, Mexico’s entry into GATT in 1986 and the loosening of 
international investment rules brought an increased interest in politics as an element of 
assessing the risks of investing in Mexico.  Initially, there was limited international 
concern about democracy.  For instance, opposition complaints to the Organization of 
American States and the United Nations about electoral fraud during the 1988 election 
went nowhere. But, the collapse of communism led to a self-conscious concern of 
Mexico’s image as a developed country.  As Mexico began to join trade agreements with 
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other developed countries, the disparity in democracy was often highlighted as a concern 
by their democratic partner.  For example, several U.S. Congressmen were critical of 
Mexico’s record on human rights and electoral fraud.  U.S. officials informally 
recommended that Salinas establish a Human Rights Commission and invite foreign 
election observers in order to increase the prospects for the approval of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the U.S. Congress. 
Throughout the 1990s, Mexico strengthened ties with democratic countries, 
signing free trade agreements with Chile, Canada, the United States, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Columbia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.  In 1994, Mexico joined the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, an organization dominated by democracies.  
While the United States has long had close ties to Mexico’s northern border states, 
NAFTA brought deeper penetration into Mexico.  Meanwhile, the growing Mexican 
migrant community within the United States maintained ties with their hometowns often 
sending remittances and information.  All of these inter-connections provided ample 
opportunity for the diffusion of democratic norms into Mexican society. 
The final building block to consider for democratic norms in Mexico is the 
Catholic Church.  Originally used as a tool by the Spanish to subjugate the indigenous 
population, the Catholic Church’s influence was constrained by anti-Church laws in the 
1917 Constitution, the defeat of the subsequent pro-Church Cristero Rebellion in the 
1920s, and anti-church teachings in public school.212  While stripped of political power, 
the Church continued to have great moral influence over a society that was 
predominantly Catholic, very religious, and often superstitious.  In a delayed response to 
the pronouncements of the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church in Mexico built 
several socio-economic based NGOs and began publicly endorsing democracy in the late 
1980s.  In one particular incident, in July, 1986, the bishops of Chihuahua threatened to 
suspend Mass in protest of local election fraud.  Although the Vatican convinced the 
bishops that such a move was too extreme, the incident encouraged the Conference of 
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Mexican Bishops to declare their support for free elections.213  Since the Catholic Church 
is one of the most trusted institutions in the country, it seems fair to conclude that the 
Church’s pro-democracy stance had an important impact on increasing the demand for 
democracy in Mexico.214  In recognition of the growing influence of the Church, 
President Salinas removed the anti-clerical laws from the constitution, established 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and legalized Catholic schools.      
In sum, the timing of significant changes in the diffusion of democratic norms 
suggests that they were an important element to increasing demand for democracy in 
Mexico.  For much of the twentieth century, the citizens had low expectations for 
democracy: regular presidential elections without the option for reelection.  While 
Mexico’s historical legacy can be blamed for many of its social ills, colonization does not 
fully answer why Mexico’s autocratic regime lasted while the rest of Latin America 
democratized.  But, the late 1980s brought the convergence of a rising independent 
media, increasing economic interaction with democracies, and advocation of democracy 
by the Catholic Church.  These three conditions delivered tremendous opportunity for the 
diffusion of norms.  The timing of these three conditions preceded indicators of 
increasing anti-government activity from the shift away from the PRI during the 1988 
elections to the outpouring of support for independent election monitoring during the 
1994 election.  Even as the economic, security, and diffusion factors converged to create 
an upsurge in the demand for democracy, demand alone had little influence on the actual 
level of democracy.  While the citizens were able to mobilize in order to monitor the 
1994 elections, it was the change in preferences of the suppliers of democracy that truly 
changed the nature of Mexico’s democracy.  
C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY 
As mentioned in Chapter II, supply of democracy is a measure of the action, or 
inaction, taken by political institutions in support of or against the implementation, 
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maintenance, or removal of democratic processes.  The suppliers of democracy are 
largely influenced by the same economic, security, and informational factors that 
influence demand.  At times, suppliers may be influenced directly by changes in demand 
though a change in demand does not dictate a change in supply.  The factors that 
influenced demand do not have the same magnitude or even the same direction of 
influence upon supply. 
A variety of political institutions were responsible for delivering democracy to 
Mexico.  The acquiescence of the military, the support of the business community, the 
activism of NGOs, and the decisions of political parties were all-important elements in 
permitting the growth and sustenance of democracy.  The most critical element, though, 
appears to be the regime itself.  The ruling party made the key electoral laws that allowed 
the opposition to legally take power. 
1. Mexico’s Military 
As discussed in Chapter II, the factors discussed above which influence civil 
society also influences the military’s decision to remain apolitical or to allow civilian 
control of the military.  Mexico does not have civilian control of the military which 
makes the apolitical nature of the Mexican military in the latter twentieth century seem 
too good to be true.  Seemingly, the military acknowledged the importance of the ideals 
of the revolution and willingly initiated its own withdrawal from politics.  It drastically 
cut its own budget and later extricated itself from the executive for the sake of the people.   
As the Mexican Revolution came to a close and the new government took control 
in 1917, more than half of the country’s paltry budget was dedicated to the new army.  
Within fifteen years (1933), the military budget was reduced to a quarter of government 
expenses.  By the 1950s, it was consistently in the single digits.  Yet, the reduction was 
less from funding cuts to the military than it was from an expansion of the overall budget.  
The military expenditures in 1963 were essentially the same as those in 1933.215  
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Nearly all Mexican presidents prior to 1946 were generals or former generals.  
But, it was not a traditional military regime.  The military-presidents of the early 20th 
century were not professional soldiers.  The conservative Mexican Army of the 19th 
century was dissolved with the Teoloyucan Treaties of 1914 after Huerta’s counter-
revolutionary regime fizzled.  Post-revolutionary presidents were revolutionary generals.  
They were not 30-year veterans.  They had risen to rank during combat in the Mexican 
Revolution or the Cristero Rebellion.   
During his term in the 1940s, President Ávila Camacho, the last military 
president, eased the transition to civilian rule by securing several benefits for the military: 
national headquarters and hospital, military engineering and medical schools, and schools 
for military children.  His successor, President Alemán, founded the Bank of the Army 
and Navy and created large military housing areas.  Having provided the military 
benefits, Alemán and his successor, President Ruiz Cortines, began limiting the military’s 
political power by naming fewer military personnel to their cabinet.216  Even so, the 
Mexican military did not go quietly.  A coup against President Alemán in the 1940s was 
averted by the intercession of former military-president Cardenas.  A general ran as an 
opposition candidate during the 1952 presidential elections.  After the civilian Ruiz 
Cortines won, coup worries convinced him to eject several old generals out of the PRI 
and force some generals to retire.217   
While the military gave up regulatory authority, it retained its core benefits: a 
stable military budget and de facto autonomy.  The Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of the Navy continued to be military officers that answered only to the 
President.  The military had its own bank and operated its own military-industrial 
complex.  The congressional committee that put together the military budget was stacked 
with former military.218  There was little oversight of army spending.  Out-sourced 
services were sometimes paid for in cash or with personal checks. In a sense, there was 
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an unwritten civil-military agreement: military will not get involved in political life and 
in return the civil authorities will allow the military to do whatever it wants.219  
One of the most interesting aspects of the military is its apolitical nature: a rare 
commodity in Latin America.  The military received many benefits from the PRI ruling 
regime.  But, as the PRI patron lost power, the military took no action to restore it.  There 
are a variety of reasons why.  The Mexican Army was not a traditional client of the PRI.  
The army controlled most of the government oversight mechanisms giving it substantial 
independence from the PRI and the President.  This independent power provided a lack 
of need to intervene in politics.  Over 80 years, a tradition of non-intervention evolved.  It 
was reinforced by Mexico’s professional military education emphasis on the defense of 
the constitution and submission to authority.220 
In addition to the military’s independence, tensions between the military and PRI 
policies had been growing for over a decade.  During the 1988 presidential elections, 
many senior military officials supported Cardenas’ nationalist revolutionary ideals over 
Salinas, the technocrat.  Allegedly, Salinas bought back the military dissenters with pay 
raises.221  At the end of his sesenio, Salinas would put the Mexican Army into a situation 
that tarnished the Army’s image: Chiapas.  The Army was still sensitive about its image 
after the 1968 student massacre.  Salinas, under informal pressure from the United States, 
established a Human Rights Commission in 1990.  Human rights violations in Chiapas 
were widely publicized as part of the 25-year anniversary of the 1969 student massacre.  
At one point, the army was on the verge of capturing sub-commander Marcos, the leader 
of the Zapatistas, when President Salinas scrubbed the mission in order to increase the 
potential for peace negotiations.  The army was angry that it lost face for the failure to 
capture Marcos.222   
Relations between the military and the PRI further deteriorated under Zedillo.  
The military prized their ability to police their own; civilian courts do not have 
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jurisdiction over military members.  The military was dismayed by the very public arrests 
in the late 1990s of Drug czar General Jesus Gutierrez-Rebollo and three other generals 
for links to drug traffickers.  The broad publicity made it akin to an attack on the Army’s 
honor.  Additionally, it raised suspicions that the arrests were selective and politically 
motivated.223  An attempt by the administration, though denied by the Supreme Court, to 
move human rights violations to civilian court further chafed the military. 
Surprisingly, increasing social violence in the early 1990s did not appear to 
encourage a preference for autocratization in the Army.  While Chiapas and the rise of 
organized crime were considered threats to national security, the level of violence did not 
pose a direct threat to overthrow of the state.  The military partly blamed the PRI regime 
for its failure to secure victory in Chiapas and may have reduced the military’s opposition 
to regime change.  Arguably, the evolution of professional norms was also an important 
contributor to the military’s non-intervention.   
2. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) 
As discussed in Chapter II, NGOs have neither the force of the military to 
implement democracy nor the authority to adopt changes to the constitution.  However, 
NGOs do have the ability to monitor the freeness of elections and provide increased 
accountability of the other suppliers of democracy.  For much of the twentieth century, 
union-based NGOs in Mexico were incentivized to maintain the autocratic system.  The 
1980s brought the rise of non-union NGOs and the organization of the business 
community; both interested in political reform. 
For decades, the patron-client system kept power away from business leaders and 
in the hands of labor unions and farmer organizations.  Instead of being champions of 
democracy, the unions were tools of the state.  The government co-opted two national 
unions, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and the National Confederation of 
Peasants (CNC), into supporting the government.  The PRI rewarded the support of the 
CTM with labor reforms and wage increases while the CNC received land redistributions, 
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ejidos (communal lands), debt forgiveness, electricity, crop subsidies and price supports.  
In exchange for these perks, the unions granted votes and provided workers to be driven 
to political rallies, hold up issued banners and yell instructed cheers.224  Defections from 
the national unions were dealt with a combination of repression and incentives to counter 
strikes and coerce reintegration. 
Keeping the unions happy was easy during and after World War II.  As U.S. 
factories converted to producing war materials, Mexico began an Import-Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) program that provided ample support to the labor market.  Mexican 
agricultural workers flooded the U.S. market as U.S. laborers were pulled from the fields 
to fill the military ranks.  As the U.S. economy recovered post-war, the agricultural labor 
market tightened and the ISI companies were suddenly less competitive.  But, subsidies 
from oil revenues were able to protect Mexican businesses temporarily.  However, high 
oil prices encouraged overspending and an overextension of debt that could not be 
sustained.  The economy had become a house of cards that relied upon high oil prices to 
stay upright.   
A combination of economic crisis, trade liberalization, and inflation led to the 
demise of state-labor patronage.  Much of the patronage desired by the CTM and the 
CNC was contrary to the free-market principles adopted by Presidents de la Madrid and 
Salinas.225  The union’s reliability as a vote-provider was weakened by the bad economy.  
The combination of wage controls and inflation was especially painful for workers, 
straining their confidence in the CTM’s ability to defend their interests.  On the flipside, 
the reduction in the CTM’s ability to guarantee votes made them a less attractive client 
for the state’s shrinking resources. 
Trade liberalization had an equally devastating effect on the CNC.  The economic 
importance of the agricultural community was marginalized.  The turmoil of the 1980s 
caused a dramatic restructuring of the Mexican economy.  Oil and agriculture were 
replaced with the manufacturing of goods such as cars, chemicals, and electronics.  As its 
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economic contribution was waning, the farming community was facing disaster.  Coffee 
prices collapsed 50% in 1989, crushing the already poor states of Chiapas and Guerrero.  
Prices remained low through May 1994.226  In preparation for NAFTA, price supports for 
most agricultural products were removed in 1990.  In the midst of these shocks, Salinas 
announced the end of land distribution and the privatization of the communal ejidos.  As 
NAFTA officially took effect in January 1994, price supports were removed for corn and 
beans, Mexico’s top two crops.  The CNC’s benefits for sustaining the autocracy 
evaporated.   
The non-union NGO movement grew dramatically in the 1980s.  With the 
attention of the Catholic Church and increasing interest of international NGOs, a local 
NGO community materialized primarily around the issue of human rights, forming NGO 
alliances such as the Forum for Mutual Support, Convergence of Civic Organizations for 
Democracy, and the Mexican Action Network Against Free Trade.227  NGOs became 
alternative channels for voicing dissent outside of the traditional closed political system.  
The local reputation of many NGOs got a boost from their performance in the 1985 
Mexico City earthquake.  NGO funding and manpower jumped after the 1994 Chiapas 
uprising.  During the same year, NGOs formed election-monitoring groups into a loose 
coalition called the Civic Alliance to observe the presidential elections.   
3. Political Parties 
Political parties are important to democracy for two reasons.  First, the opposition 
provides a limited constraining effect upon the ruling regime’s policy options.  Second, 
political parties act as the pinnacles of group interests.  Issues of security, economy, and 
norms are important drivers for shaping mobilization and policy preferences of the 
incumbent and opposition parties.  
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Although much power in Mexico was centralized, the President was not all-
powerful.  The PRI had some influence over presidential decisions: selection of the next 
president, hiring and firing of governors, party president, and cabinet members.  The PRI 
portrayed itself as the embodiment of the ideals of the Revolution and the 1917 
Constitution.  The PRI made itself appear one with the state, choosing the colors of the 
Mexican flag as its logo.  References to the “Revolution” were an important part of 
political rhetoric, providing a sense of legitimacy to the party.  The implication being that 
a vote against the PRI was an abandonment of Revolutionary ideals.  But by the 1980s, 
the term began to hold little tangible meaning for younger voters and fell into disuse 
among the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations.228   
For many decades, opposition to the PRI was limited.  During the 1940s, Mexico, 
like many other countries of the era, banned fascist and communist parties.  However, 
Mexico also used the reform as a pretext to raise party registration thresholds, effectively 
limiting significant national political participation for the next 30 years to two parties: the 
PRI and the PAN.   The National Action Party (PAN), a conservative party, formed in 
1939 but had little serious political power until 1989.  Support for the PAN started to 
grow, especially in the industrialized northern states, in 1978 when the PAN decided to 
be more inclusive and less ideologically bound in order to win more votes.229  The rise of 
the PAN was less about the PAN than it was about frustration with the PRI.  The 
industrial north flocked to the PAN during the economic disaster of the 1980s.  By the 
1990s, the PRI was losing control.  It was helpless to prevent rising crime, economic 
crisis and was losing its ability to reward and punish its clients.   
The year 1988 marked the beginning of the end for the PRI.  The PRI had 
experienced party splits before.  Presidential hopefuls in 1940, 1946, and 1952, frustrated 
after being passed over as the PRI presidential nominee, defected to create their own 
party.  But, 1988 was different.  There was a deep ideological split.  The PRI was no 
longer the democratic socialism party of the left, but had become a moderate party 
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adopting the free market principles of the PAN.  The left wing of the PRI defected and 
created the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), drawing support from the rural 
south, the far left, and intellectuals in Mexico City.  The PRI was intact and still 
competitive, but suffering from internal disarray and a loss of party identity without a 
distinctive ideology.230  The development of a third major party made coalition politics 
the de facto method for electoral victory.  In 2000, PRD voters crossed over to vote for 
the PAN as polls suggested that Fox had the best chance for victory against the PRI.  The 
fracture of the PRI was an important factor in the PAN 2000 victory.   
Today, the PAN, PRD, and PRI are very powerful organizations.  The parties 
determine the presidential candidates and have a significant hand in the design of 
electoral reforms.  Party power is heavily concentrated.  Since Mexico has no primary 
system and few ideological differentiations between the PRI and its two opponents, there 
is a significant lack of party loyalty and little incentive to register with a particular party.  
For instance, the PRD candidate almost won the 2006 presidential election.  Yet, the 
voting in 2009 showed that the PRD had essentially been deserted.  Even so, each of the 
three major parties has a significant stake in maintaining the current political system in 
order to receive substantial subsidies from the government.   
4. The Ruling Regime: Gradually Increasing the Degrees of Democracy 
From Chapter II, the ruling regime is anticipated to adopt electoral changes when 
it is in its best interests and the interests of the regime’s key supporters.  Mexico had six 
periods of major political reform.  The first period is the establishment of the 1917 
Constitution during the Mexican Revolution.  Five major revisions to the constitution 
began in 1977 with the modification of the legislature from a pure majoritarian system 
into a hybrid majoritarian-proportional representation system.  Reforms in the 1980s 
revised the method of calculating seats within the hybrid system, enabling the opposition 
to finally dislodge the super majority of the PRI.  In the early 1990s, the IFE was created 
to minimize fraud.  However, the IFE was not independent of the executive branch until 
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the reforms of 1996.  The PAN victory in 2000 was not a change in the level of 
democracy.  But, because the PAN’s victory indicated that the previous electoral reforms 
finally created a democratic election, 2000 is widely hailed as an important milestone in 
Mexico’s democratic history.     
a. A Rotating Dictatorship: Autocratic Mexico 1917–1976 
The Revolution installed what appeared to be democratic processes into 
Mexican politics.  But, democracy was limited.  Elections existed, but they had little 
competition.  Presidential succession was determined largely by the outgoing President.  
Though Mexico excluded few groups from political participation, elections were not 
really free.  As the holder of executive and legislative power, the PRI coerced and 
incentivized loyalty to the party through the distribution of benefits and resources.  The 
PRI created what some call a hegemonic party: “collusive pacts among ruling party 
politicians to divide the spoils of office among themselves.”231  The very purpose of 
creating the PRI was collusion to prevent personal power grabs.   
Few limits existed on Presidential authority beyond the no-reelection 
clause.  Commitment to the clause was strongly reinforced by President Obregón’s 
assassination when he attempted to serve a second term in 1928.  The President’s power 
was constrained neither by the legislature nor the Constitution.  As one president 
explained, “The Constitution is not our law but our shield and our flag.”232  However, the 
Presidency was constrained by the PRI senior leaders.  Within this constraint, the 
President could fire elected officials at will and name his replacement through the dedazo 
(the fingering) process.233  Each president benefitted from the continuation of autocracy.  
Even though they would have to end their term after six years, each president named his  
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successor.  Because of this process, the next president was beholden to the previous one 
and would ensure that his predecessor was treated properly or, at least, not prosecuted for 
his corrupt practices.   
Arguably, the later major political reforms were made possible by the 
foundational reforms of 1946 and 1964.  In reaction to the electoral violence of the 1940 
presidential election between two generals, President Manuel Ávila Camacho centralized 
the management of elections and polling places under government control in 1946.  Prior 
to this, citizens literally fought to control polling places.  The change reduced election 
violence and set the foundation for other reforms to build upon.234  However, Ávila is 
perhaps more famous for his designation of the first civilian President as his successor.  
Two factors appear to have influenced Ávila’s tradeoff between democratic and 
autocratic practices.  First, Ávila had taken measures to secure the future needs of the 
military with the provision of facilities, housing, and military bank.  The military was 
essentially autonomous and had limited future benefit for controlling the presidency.  
Secondly, a world war had ended.  Fascist military regimes across the world were being 
dismantled. Mexico was initially pro-German.  But, after U-boats sank two Mexican oil 
tankers, Mexico declared war on Germany and banned the fascist party.  It is possible 
that improving the country’s image was a factor in determining Ávila’s decision to select 
a civilian.  Although the extreme fascist elements within Mexico were not in positions of 
power, Mexico’s government did have some similar traits to fascist regimes: one-party 
rule, a nationalist ideology, a military dictator (although rotating), partially anti-clerical, 
and tight control of the economy. 
The reform of 1964 introduced the concept of proportional representation 
to Mexico. It was the first of several iterations.  The reforms were approved by President 
Adolfo López Mateos to avert political crisis.  Upset by evidence of fraud during the 
1958 presidential election, the PAN threatened to walk out of the government and 
transform Mexican politics from a de facto to an actual one-party state.  In a conciliatory  
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measure, the regime introduced limited proportional representation with low thresholds 
(two and a half percent of the national vote).  The law guaranteed the PAN seats without 
the need to win a contested election. 
b. Political Reform 
The first political reform to significantly affect the level of democracy was 
motivated by political crisis.  The PAN decided not to (or failed to decide to) nominate a 
candidate for the 1976 presidential elections.  The result was an unopposed election for 
the sole PRI candidate.  With only one candidate running, it looked like a Soviet election.  
In an effort to avoid a similar embarrassment in the future, the threshold for party 
registration was significantly reduced, permitting the development of several new small 
opposition parties.  The regime also took the opportunity to entice rebel leaders out of the 
field.235  By 1977, armed revolt had dragged on for more than a decade.  Domestic and 
international criticisms of Mexico’s repression were increasing.  The Army, worried 
about its tarnished image after the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, wanted out of the repression 
business.  For the regime, the costs of maintaining one party rule were beginning to 
outweigh the benefits.  The regime specifically designed the reform to appeal to the 
rebels, including the lifting of the ban on communist parties and the revision to the 
calculation of proportional representation which would guarantee that even small parties 
would have seats in the legislature. 
Despite this modification, the PRI maintained a super-majority in the 
legislature which allowed them to modify the constitution at will.  They did. One expert 
estimated the number of constitutional changes at 400.236  A combination of political 
reforms in the 1980s ended the PRI’s super majority status, largely driven by the 
economic crisis.  The PRI, worried about social unrest and fraud protests, relaxed 
controls on local elections.237  Since the economic crisis had created widespread 
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disenchantment with the PRI, the new local election rules permitted increasing local PAN 
victories in the 1980s.  Worried about opposition gains in the local and regional elections, 
Madrid enacted a new electoral law that toughened party registration requirements and 
ensured that the leading party had dominating control of Congress—ensuring that the 
leading party had at least 50%, but no more than 70% of the seats.238  The reform had 
changed the rules just enough to end the PRI’s super majority during the 1988 elections 
and gave the PAN its first governorship in 1989.    
While the PRI lost the super majority in 1988, they retained the 
Presidency.  However, widespread fraud, a little too obvious, was used to elect Salinas.  
The Salinas presidency was a time of growing uncertainty of the future.  The potential 
consequences of another major fraud were potentially dire.  People perceived that 
“Chiapas was an example of what might happen if the government did not change.”239 
The Colosio assassination only increased the uncertainty, providing a sense that 
“anything could happen.”240  In response, Salinas created the IFE to oversee elections.  
Like its predecessor, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), the IFE was placed under 
the authority of the executive branch’s Ministry of the Interior.  The Ministry had 
complete authority over party registration and chairmanship of the electoral oversight 
body (FEC/IFE).  Reforms to the FEC/IFE were a façade that left control with the PRI. 
The introduction of independent Votes Councillors into the IFE was also suspect since 
they were executive appointees.241  Despite the imperfections of the IFE, the active 
involvement of the Civic Alliance to monitor the 1994 elections appeared to result in an 
election that was largely free, though not truly competitive since Salinas had chosen 
Zedillo as his successor.   
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Truly free and competitive elections were crafted by a group of academics 
and politicians and signed by President Zedillo in 1996.  In a twist of fate, Zedillo’s 
selection as the PRI candidate was an accident.  Electoral rules prevented presidential 
candidates from holding government office within 6 months of the election.  Colosio was 
assassinated with less than six months prior to the election, limiting the PRI’s pool of 
potential replacements.  The only person available within Salinas’ inner circle was 
Ernesto Zedillo; an economist that had left the Secretary of Education in order to be 
Colosio’s campaign manager.  Zedillo was a professional technocrat that rose through the 
ranks of the central bank.  Some suggest that democratic reforms were a key part of 
Zedillo’s agenda.242  For example, his first law granted the independence of the Supreme 
Court.  Zedillo selected a PRI party leader, Santiago Oñate, who was conducive to 
political reform negotiations with the PRD and PAN.243  In 1996, he implemented the 
recommendations of the Chapultepec Negotiations and made the IFE autonomous from 
both the executive branch and the PRI.  The 1997 loss of the PRI majority in the Senate 
and the mayor’s seat in Mexico City indicated that the elections had become truly free 
and competitive.  In the run-up to the 2000 election, Zedillo removed himself from the 
presidential nomination process, moving the responsibility to the party.   
By 2000, the dice had already been thrown.  There were no significant 
electoral reforms between 1996 and the 2000 election.  Within this study’s definition of 
democracy, a second order transfer in power is not a required threshold for a country to 
become a democracy.  However, in Mexico’s case, the transfer of power was necessary to 
bring about freer elections.  The election of PAN’s Vincente Fox was a clear indicator of 
the monumental changes in Mexico’s electoral laws.  Although the electoral groundwork 
had been laid down for several years, the election of the opposition was necessary in this 
case in order to sever the coercive hold that the PRI had over several labor and peasant 
organizations.  Fox’s election dispelled most doubts that Mexico had finally achieved a 
democratic, though imperfect, government.   
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D. SUMMARY 
Mexico was a partial autocracy throughout much of the 19th century.  The 
recurring violence combined with an economic crisis drove the country into full 
dictatorship in 1880.  After thirty years, the benefits of maintaining Diaz’s dictatorship 
decreased, leading to a power struggle.  The initial revolutionary government was another 
partial autocracy.  But, an additional decade of rebellion pushed the government to adopt 
an autocracy with minimal democratic processes.  Election violence in 1940 led to federal 
control of the electoral system in 1946.  The 1970s guerrilla wars and the 1980s 
economic crisis pushed Mexico to incrementally adopt more democratic processes. 
Demand for democracy in Mexico exploded as a perfect storm of three powerful 
forces hit during the 1980s.  First, Mexico suffered two economic crises within a dozen 
years.  The crises and the state’s response severed the traditional PRI patron-client 
relationships shifting economic power from the unions to business leaders.  Second, 
rising crime, the Zapatista uprising and political assassinations fueled the perception that 
social upheaval was imminent.  As it did in 1977, the PRI allowed political reform in 
order to avert the spread of uprisings.  Third, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of 
autocracies across the globe, increased literacy, and foreign pressure from new free trade 
partners encouraged the adoption of democratic norms and highlighted the lack of 
democratic processes in Mexico.  Demand for democracy in the 1980s was frustrated by 
widespread electoral fraud during the 1988 presidential election that, in turn, resulted in 
the pivotal 1993-1996 electoral reforms.   The effects of these reforms were proven in the 
1997 legislative elections and the 2000 presidential election with major victories for the 
opposition.     
Demand for democracy in Mexico was driven by economic crisis and the 
diffusion of democratic norms.  The suppliers of democracy responded to different 
mechanisms.  The regime and the PRI adopted electoral reforms in response to violence 
in 1946, 1977, 1994, and 1997.  Outrage to the obvious 1988 election fraud sparked 
NGOs to monitor the 1994 elections and the regime and the PRI to adopt the 1993 
electoral reforms.  
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A return to the autocratic regime of 1976 or even the electoral autocracy of 1993 
seems unlikely.  Democratic norms have spread deep roots in Mexico, slowly cultivated 
over 30 years.  The political parties, NGOs, and business community have a stake in 
maintaining a democratic system.  Currently, the military has little to benefit from a 
return to autocracy.  However, Mexico’s democracy is far from perfect.  The Mexican 
Constitution, as designed, does not optimize the democratic process.  The limited 
proportional representation keeps small parties in the political system without providing 
them any serious influence.  The presidential system is not well constrained by the 
legislature.  Although a federal system, the centralized nature of tax revenue, services and 
resource distribution provides only limited autonomy to state and local governments.  
The return of clientalism or a turn towards populism is a concern.  Although most 
Mexicans belief that democracy is the best form of government, they are not satisfied 
with the performance of democracy, likely because many Mexicans view equality as a 
critical part of democracy.244   
At the sub-national level, many states under PRI control (notably in the south) 
continue to be “authoritarian enclaves” with episodes of fraud, intimidation, and 
bossism.245  Although many of the northern states have improved their electoral systems 
through voter registries and electoral oversight, several of the local governments are 
influenced by organized crime.  In some rare cases, individuals with family connections 
to organized crime are in local office: Michoacan (La Familia Michoacan), Nuevo Leon, 
and San Fernando in Chihauhau.  But most criminal groups exercise less direct influence.  
Organized crime’s money and influence give them significant de facto control at the local 
level, especially in regards to nominations of police chiefs.  While there are certainly 
clusters of good governance, many local governments are either small town dictatorships 
or a mafia-dominated democracy. 
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V.  PHILIPPINES: A RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 
OVERCOMES INSURGENCY AND POVERTY 
In late February 1986, the Philippines became a democracy overnight as dictator 
Ferdinand Marcos stepped down in the face of the People Power Revolution; handing 
power over to a democratic government.  The Philippines case is explored because this 
substantial increase in the level of democracy occurred during a period of high levels of 
intrastate violence and a relatively low level of income and industrialization; all 
theoretical obstacles to democratization.  The Philippines case is also interesting in that 
democracy was not a return to the status quo ante; the post-Marcos regime had a 
significantly higher level of democracy than the pre-Marcos regime. 
In this chapter, the analytical model from Chapter II is used to analyze the 
determinants of the Philippines’ level of democracy since independence in 1946. 
Specifically, this chapter seeks to identify those factors that enabled the Philippines, 
despite significant barriers, to achieve a high level of democracy.  The existing literature 
and the quantitative results from Chapter III both indicate that below average income 
combined with two major insurgencies should have been considerable obstacles to the 
achievement of a high level of democracy.   
As discussed in Chapter II, the analytical model views the level of democracy as 
the result of the interaction of actors.  The model can be viewed as a supply and demand 
function.  Actors, influenced by structural factors, determine the supply and demand 
components.  The resulting supply-demand equilibrium is the level of democracy.  In the 
context of this study, the level of democracy is a measure of the process to select 
representatives through free, competitive elections, with open participation, and within 
the un-manipulated constraints of electoral rules.  Demand for democracy in a country is 
a rational choice of individuals and groups within a society.  This study examines the 
effect that the economy, the security situation, and the diffusion of democratic norms 
have on citizens’ demand for democracy.  We expect increasing internal security, 
economic income, economic industrialization, and the diffusion of norms to increase the  
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demand for democracy within a country.  Conversely, we expect high or increasing 
intrastate violence, low-income, and low industrialization to have a deterrent or 
regressive effect upon democratization.   
On the other side of the demand-supply equation, institutions make rational 
choice decisions to dedicate time, resources, and prestige to supplying (or limiting the 
supply of) democracy.  The institutions with the most impact on democracy include the 
military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling 
regime.  These institutions are affected by the same economic, security, and diffusion 
factors that shape the citizens’ demand for democracy, though not necessarily in the same 
manner or to the same magnitude. 
This chapter begins with a brief background on the political history of the 
Philippines.  The citizens’ demand for democracy is presented in three parts: the 
economy, security, and norms.  The institution’s supply of democracy is broken into four 
sections: the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime.  The section on the 
ruling regime is discussed in three separate time periods: pre-martial law, martial law, 
and post-People Power. 
The Philippines democratized despite relatively low levels of national income and 
industrialization.  Significant regional variations in income and industrialization enabled 
the development of democratic ideals in urban areas as modern technology and 
government policy changed the structure of agricultural society making the country more 
conducive to democracy.  Industry and income boomed in the major metropolitan areas, 
especially in Manila, Cebu, and Davao.  These cities created regional industrial hubs 
ensuring that the democratic effects of industrialization and income were spread to each 
of the three major island chains.  Industrialization led to reduced land dependence for the 
wealthy, increased size of the middle-income tier, and high levels of literacy.  The 
industrialization of the 1970s and 1980s, combined with the 1980s economic crisis, is a 
plausible explanatory cause for the increase in demand for democracy in the Philippines, 
encapsulated by the People Power Revolution of 1986.   
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Increasing intrastate violence from 1969 to 1971 led to an increasing acceptance 
among citizens of a reduction in the level of democracy as a tradeoff for increased 
security.  Since then, violence had little effect on changes in democracy.  Philippine 
democracy survived prolonged insurgency with little support for a reduction in 
democracy as a method of resolving the conflict.  This stance is likely due to the lack of 
insurgent targeting of civilians combined with the geographical remoteness of the 
insurgencies.  Further, the development of democratic norms also played a role.  While 
pre-colonial and colonial autocratic traditions and ethnic divergence may have initially 
constrained democratic norms, the early establishment of electoral norms, increasing 
education, and the significant influence of information technology played key roles in 
building, mobilizing, and sustaining interest in democracy.  The capability for the 
diffusion of norms developed through increasing social interconnectedness, higher 
university education rates, increasing interconnectedness with foreign democracies, and 
the rise of an independent media.  While increasing democratic norms may explain the 
increased demand for democracy in the Philippines, it is not a sufficient explanation for 
the timing of the People Power revolt.   
The dramatic increase in the level of democracy in 1986 was the result of key 
actors.  The economic crisis and the government assassination of Benigno Aquino 
mobilized the masses, the business community, and the Catholic Church to protest 
against Marcos.  A split in the military comprised Marcos’ ability to use repression to 
maintain the autocracy.  Finally, the notification that the United States would no longer 
support his rule left Marcos little choice but to abdicate his position. 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS 
Spain added the Philippines to its colonial empire in 1565.  The colonization of 
the Philippines was not as thorough as other colonies.  The Spanish did not have enough 
presence to dominate the entire 7,000-island archipelago.  Of the eleven largest islands 
where the majority of the population resided, Spanish forces were concentrated in the 
northern islands (Luzon) with some influence on the central islands (Visayas) and little 
influence in the southern islands (Mindanao) (see Figure 15).  An insurgency against 
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Spanish rule erupted in 1896.  But, Spanish rule was not toppled until U.S. naval forces 
under Commodore Dewey annihilated the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor in May 1898.  
Although U.S. forces would not capture Manila from the Spanish until 13 August, on 12 
June 1898, Emilio Aguinaldo led a declaration of Philippine independence from Spain.  




Figure 15.   Map of Philippines with Region Political Boundaries 
As part of the December 10, 1898 Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-
American War, Spain ceded control of the Philippines to the United States.  Disillusioned 
by the lack of independence, the insurgency that began under Spanish rule revived in 
February 1989.  The rebellion was not a mass nationalist uprising, but an attempt by 
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economic elites to extend their political status to rule the country.246 The rebellion was 
largely a Luzon affair.  U.S. forces quickly subdued most of the Visayas and signed a 
treaty, though fleeting, with Mindanao.   
Aguinaldo’s vision and even the structure of the insurgent army provided insights 
into the future of Philippine politics.  The framework of Aguinaldo’s new government 
was designed to perpetuate the power of the landowner elites who had dominated the 
economy under later Spanish rule.  The staff for the insurgent army was not selected 
based on merit, but upon personalities and social relationships.247  As the chances for 
rebel victory faded, many elites found it more advantageous to support the U.S. in order 
to ensure their prominent status post-conflict.248  By collaborating with the Americans, 
the elites were rewarded with political power.  Ironically, the resulting civilian 
government under the Americans looked very similar to the 1898 Aguinaldo government. 
The Americans introduced an independent judiciary, political elections, and a 
professional civil service.  The Americans were quick to involve Filipinos into the 
government, hiring them into the civil service and permitting them to hold political office 
including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  The first elections (for municipal 
office) were held in 1901.  The United States gradually handed over increased control of 
the government, culminating in the Philippines’ status as a commonwealth in 1935 and 
independence in 1946. 
Upon independence, the Philippines became a partial democracy with a two-party 
system that acted like one-party rule.  Elections were neither free nor competitive, marred 
by mafia-style coercion and violence.  In order to save the Philippines from itself, 
President Marcos turned the Philippines into a dictatorship through the declaration of 
martial law in 1971.  Marcos’ rule was accompanied by two insurgencies and an 
economic crisis, which led to Marcos’ downfall and the return of democracy through the 
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People Power Revolution of 1986.  The factors that led to the rise of People Power and an 
increased demand for democracy are discussed in the next section. 
B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY 
This section analyzes the change in demand for democracy in the Philippine 
citizens in three parts.  The first part addresses various aspects of the Philippine 
economy: income, industrialization, and economic crisis.  The second part addresses the 
effect of insurgency violence.  The final part analyzes the diffusion of democratic norms.   
1. The Rise and Fall of Clientalism in the Philippines: Income, 
Industrialization, and Crisis  
From the discussion in Chapter II, we expect that economic income and economic 
development will have a positive impact on the level of democracy.  Growing income 
should lead to the development of a middle class.  As citizens achieve middle class status, 
they have the ability to divert their resources from life sustainment to social interactions 
and political activism.  Economic development leads to demand for democracy through 
increased literacy, industrialization, and the formation of unions and professional 
organizations, which can be critical elements to the growth of democracy.  Surprisingly, 
the Philippines had significant levels of development and income, though highly 
concentrated in a few locations.  The findings from this section suggest that while 
increasing levels of localized income and development, especially in the capital region, 
may have spread democratic ideals, those ideals did not lead to significant pro-democracy 
action until combined with a severe economic crisis. 
Over the past fifty years, Philippines gradually migrated from a low-income to a 
lower-middle income economy.  The economy crested over $2000 GDP per capita in 
1959 and $3000 in 1976 (and again in 1988 after recovering from the economic crisis of 
the 1980s).  Since then, the economy slowly inched its way towards $4000.  But as of 
2008, 30% of the population continued to live below the poverty line (a ten point 
improvement from 1987).  By 1960, 30% of the population was classified as living in the 
middle-income tier.  Of course, this varied greatly by region with a high of 47% in the 
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NCR to a low of 11% in the Cagayan Valley.249  By 1985, the middle-tier income earners 
rose to about 46% of the national population.250  This substantial increase in the middle-
income tier during a time of great population growth suggests that the development of a 
large middle class is a plausible explanation for increased demand for democracy in the 
Philippines.  Within the National Capital Region (NCR), the bristling mega-malls suggest 
that there is an ample middle class.  But, the experience in the NCR is misleading as the 
poverty rate there is only five percent.  With the exception of the Bicol Region, Luzon’s 
regions are the country’s leaders in the least amount of poverty.  About 40% of GDP 
comes from a hub of services and industry concentrated in the NCR and the surrounding 
region in southwest Luzon.  The majority of people under the poverty line live in the 
rural areas, working in agriculture.251  The disparity in income and poverty levels in the 
Philippines suggests that income has contributed to the growth of democracy in the large 
metropolitan areas, but would imply a lack of democratic ideals in the rural areas.  To get 
more insight, we next analyze the economic development of the Philippines.  
The Spanish did little to develop the Philippines economically, using only Manila 
as a transit point for goods between New Spain and China.  Manila’s status as a trading 
port boomed during the 19th century as Britain and the United States became major 
purchasers of Philippine sugar.  The boom brought the Philippines its first taste of 
industry through the development of sugar mills while creating an increased demand for 
land and a significant transition to cash crops.  The adoption of cash crops led to the rise 
of a moderately wealthy class of non-Spaniards that became literate and well educated.  
As the country transitioned to U.S. colonial rule, the landowners gained political power.  
As the U.S. governor expropriated the church’s lands (90% of all land in the Philippines), 
he delegated authority for redistribution to the Bureau of Lands.  Legislators used their 
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influence with the Bureau to acquire additional acreage.252  In this manner, the 
landowners were able to secure their position as the economic and political elite of the 
Philippines, creating a patron-client system with the landowners as patron and the farm 
workers as clients.  Within this framework, there was little demand for democracy as the 
patron would demand complete loyalty from his workers and squash any attempts to 
organize.     
The first signs of significant industrialization arrived in the late 1940s.  Dropping 
agriculture prices, cuts in U.S. post-war reconstruction spending, and increasing goods 
imports led to the adoption of trade barriers, import-substitution industrialization (ISI) 
and modern agricultural techniques.  As profits on cash crops declined, large landowners 
diversified into mills, import-export, banking, and light manufacturing.  In order to 
remain competitive and improve margins, landowners turned to increasing mechanization 
and transient workers, decreasing reliance on personal relations.  As farm workers 
became more transient, they became less dependent upon a single landlord, shifting their 
loyalties from the landowner to rural organizations working against exploitation.253   
The closure of the Cuban sugar market to the United States after the 1959 
revolution was a boon to the Philippine sugar industry.  Yet, it was only a boon to the 
wealthy farmers.  Farming had become capital intensive with the adoption of high-yield 
seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, and mechanized equipment.254  The capital requirement 
made large farms more efficient; small farmers did not have the necessary capital, often 
defaulting on their loans. 255  Large landowners expanded their holdings by taking over 
the defaulted lands as well as untitled lands of farmers who had neither the political 
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connections nor the resources to protect their claim.256  As the agriculture economy 
struggled, most small farmers obtained secondary sources of income in the off-season, 
often in the services sector.257  As the overseas Filipino worker program grew, 
remittances (which make up 10% of GDP) gave the poor some leeway to ignore financial 
intimidation from the landlords.  The political power of landlords diminished as the cost 
of election campaigns grew, the independence of the workers increased, and the number 
of tenants declined.258   
The power of the landowners was drastically reduced by the rise of Ferdinand 
Marcos to the Presidency.  Several segments of the population supported the move to 
autocracy as Marcos promised banking and land reforms in order to reduce the power of 
the landed oligarchy.  Support for Marcos grew thin over the decade as Marcos failed to 
deliver the promised reforms.  But, Marcos did manage to defuse the power of the 
landlords.  At the height of sugar prices in the mid-1970s, Marcos created government 
corporations with monopolies on the trading of sugar and coconuts.  This economic 
intervention gave Marcos control of prices, subsidies, and loans for farmers.  Economic 
power was transferred from the landowners (Marcos’ potential rivals) to a handful of 
Marcos’ cronies that ran the government monopolies.  Marcos’ policies drove large 
landowners, small farmers, and the business community towards the opposition while 
increasing the independence of farm workers.259   
The dominance of agriculture waned under the Marcos regime.  In 1985, the 
manufacturing sector gained parity with the agricultural sector for contribution to GDP 
while the non-agriculture labor force surpassed the agriculture labor force.  From 1960 to 
1985, agriculture’s share of exports dropped from 64% to 26%.260  GDP from services 
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such as transportation and trade doubled.  Despite the movement towards industry and 
services, economic development did little to build workers’ organizations.  Prior to 1987, 
worker organizations were weak; they were either tainted by links to communism or 
collaborated with the Marcos regime in order to survive.   
The potential for democratic ideals was instead spread through the development 
of education and literacy.  Early investments in the 1950s and 1960s in education and the 
proliferation of universities provided the necessary skilled workers for the growing 
industry and service sectors.  The national literacy rate surpassed 84% in 1985, slightly 
exceeding the rates of other developing democracies of the time in Brazil, Columbia, 
Peru, and Venezuela.261  Education rates were high, at least in Luzon.262  Marcos’ control 
of the teaching curriculum was somewhat limited, especially in the universities he 
regularly repressed.  Small farmers became increasingly educated and interconnected 
through the development of rural education and cheap cell phones.  As the Philippines’ 
population grew 50% from 1972 to 1985, the country was flooded with young, well-
educated, socially connected, and technologically savvy demographics.  Economic 
development, then, did appear to provide some impetus towards demand for democracy.  
Post-Marcos development continued to support this trend as literacy surpassed 93% in 
2000 as the Philippines turned to electronics and clothing as the driver of the economy.263      
While economic development increased the potential for spreading democratic 
ideals, economic crisis spurred demands for regime change.  Initially, Marcos insulated 
the citizens from the shocks of economic crisis.  Marcos softened the economic blow of 
the 1969 foreign exchange and balance-of-payments crisis, instigated by Marcos’ 
overspending of state funds on his reelection, through IMF loans.264  In 1975–6, sugar 
prices collapsed.  Marcos kept the economy going through debt borrowings, which were 
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mostly squandered among his cronies.  Meanwhile, Marcos tripled the size of the 
bureaucracy.265  The Philippine revenue system was a giant, unsustainable ponzi scheme 
that began to break down in 1981 as a local banking crisis led to a general economic 
collapse. 
The Philippine banking sector was always unstable.  There were numerous small 
family-owned banks created not to build profits, but to serve as a loan machine for 
kinship businesses.  Banking regulation was weak and typically only enforced on those 
without political connections.266  This arrangement resulted in occasional bank runs, but 
in 1981, it led to a serious crisis.  A combination of macro-economic variables influence 
by the 1979 oil crisis including rising oil prices, rising interest rates, and increased 
competition created liquidity problems for Philippine industry, prominently led by the 
textile sector.  One prominent owner, Dewey Dee, fled the country, defaulting on a huge 
loan. His flight initiated a credit crunch as local banks and international investors 
suspected that Dee’s default was the first of more to come.  A combination of short-term 
money tightening and bank runs forced several small banks and businesses into 
bankruptcy.  The subsequent wave of layoffs the following year sparked a general strike 
by the textile workers. 
The government initiated a second crisis when the military assassinated Benigno 
Aquino, Jr. in August of 1983.  The assassination “unleashed outrage across 
socioeconomic lines against the Marcoses’ material accumulation, arbitrary repression, 
and dynastic ambitions.”267  The assassination turned the economic recession into a crisis 
as international banks and investors lost confidence in the country’s stability, refusing to 
lend short-term financing necessary to meet debt payments.268  The Philippines endured 
several economic recessions in the post-war period, but the 1981–1985 recession was 
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different.  The mid-1980s economic contraction was the largest in post-independence 
history: almost a 20% drop in GDP per capita.  Industry carried the brunt of the loss 
(~15% loss compared to a 6% loss in agriculture and a 3% loss in services).269  The 
economic landscape was scattered with massive layoffs and bankrupt businesses.  The 
Philippines hit rock bottom in 1985.  Inflation hit 55%, high by Philippine standards.  
Government expenditures dropped over 30%.270  A combination of drought and typhoons 
ruined local crops while a global glut led to a severe drop in the price of sugar.  Poverty 
was crushing; 44% of the population in the NCR was under the poverty line.  They were 
the best off.  Several regions had up to three quarters of their population living in 
poverty.271 
Lacking international investors, Marcos turned to the IMF.  As a condition of its 
assistance, the IMF required the dissolution of government corporations including those 
running the sugar and coconut trade.  Marcos had already cut most of society out of the 
patronage system.  Now, the IMF forced Marcos to cut out his cronies.  Further, free 
market technocrats led by Prime Minister Virata carried out structural adjustment in 
coordination with the IMF, depreciating the Philippine peso 40%.   
Marcos’ economic policies had already alienated the business community.  But, 
the prolonged economic crisis convinced many citizens that it was time for a change in 
leadership.  However, it is impossible to isolate the economic crisis as the single variable 
that led to a change in democracy.  As the 1986 snap election approached, mass protests 
erupted over the acquittal of General Ver and the expected sham election.  The anti-
Marcos protests continued after the election resulted in accusations of widespread fraud.  
Only after the defection of senior military leaders and the call to protest by Church 
leaders did the massive People Power Revolt take form.  The culmination of protest 
issues makes it impossible to isolate the effect of a single variable.   
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Only the most severe economic crisis had a significant effect on the level of 
democracy in the Philippines.  Economic crisis was not the causal factor for People 
Power.  However, the economic crisis did provide a mobilization base that was catalyzed 
into People Power.  The crises of the 1990s such as the electricity shortage, the 
bankruptcy of the Central Bank, and the Asian Financial Crisis were all significant, but 
none of the crises compared to that of the 1980s.  The fact that there was little public 
support for the coups against Aquino suggests that the 1990s economic crisis in the 
Philippines did not substantially decrease citizens’ demand for democracy.   
2. Intrastate Violence 
As discussed in Chapter II, an outbreak in violence should deter democratization 
or encourage a regime to move towards autocracy.  Further, a transition to democracy 
during a period of intrastate violence is unlikely to sustain democracy as a significant 
segment of the population was not involved in the design of the democratic processes.  
As expected by the hypothesis, this section finds that increasing intrastate violence from 
1969 to 1971 led to an increasing acceptance among citizens of a reduction in the level of 
democracy as a tradeoff for increased security.  However, contrary to the hypothesis, 
Philippine democracy increased during a period of high violence and for more than 20 
years survived prolonged insurgency.  The insurgency since 1986 did not motivate 
widespread demands for a return to autocracy largely due to the lack of insurgent 
targeting of civilians combined with the geographical remoteness of the insurgencies. 
The past one hundred years was turbulent for the Philippines.  Economic and 
separatist discontent fermented under American rule.  Independence did not bring the 
Philippines peace.  The last fifty years were peppered with insurgencies and coups.  
Contemporary insurgency groups in the Philippines can be loosely grouped into three 
types: communist, ethno-nationalist, and Islamist.  The three insurgencies began in 1969, 
1971, and 1977, respectively.   
All three insurgencies originated under Marcos’ rule.  However, attributing the 
increase in intrastate violence to the decrease in the level of democracy is misplaced since 
the roots of the insurgency go back substantially further.  The communist insurgency was 
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primarily motivated by economic issues that arose during the 1930s rural unrest over 
landlord and farmer tenancy disputes.  As large landowners began to dominate the 
agricultural community in the post World War II era, land redistribution became a 
symbol of justice and economic egalitarianism among poor farmers.  Encouraged by the 
success of the Chinese Communists, the rural unrest culminated in the Huk Rebellion of 
the 1950s.  Although the Huks were defeated, much of their ideology was reborn under 
the armed banner of the communist New People’s Army (NPA) in 1969. 
The increase in intrastate violence was a significant cause of the country’s 
decrease in the level of democracy. Months after the NPA began its attacks, Marcos 
began portraying himself as the solution to the violence, using the classic “guns, goons, 
and gold” strategy to secure his 1969 reelection.  Although the strategy was not new, the 
breadth with which Marcos used government forces and resources marked a considerable 
expansion of the power of the executive and the inability or unwillingness of the 
legislature to challenge his actions.  The threat of the communist insurrection subdued 
political challenges to Marcos’ abuse of power.  In 1970, the political arm of NPA, the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), supported and instigated student protests. One 
such protest in January at Mendiola Bridge resulted in the death of several protestors.  
The military reacted by occupying the University of Philippines campus in Diliman, 
Quezon City.  Meanwhile, a public debate about the implications of martial law was in 
full swing.  While low-level attacks and protests provided a general sense of insecurity, 
one specific attack had a major effect.   
In August 1971, the Liberal Party (a major opposition party) held a campaign 
rally in the Plaza Miranda.  NPA soldiers tossed several grenades into the crowd causing 
several casualties.  Apparently, Marcos did not feel that this incident alone provided 
enough justification for martial law.  The next month, Marcos had the military fake 
communist attacks upon the defense minister’s car and the Manila power grid in order to 
justify his declaration of martial law.  Upon declaration, Marcos dissolved the legislature, 
eliminating both political competition and legislative restraints upon his rule.  Further, 
Marcos began a ruthless program of repressing his political opposition.   
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The citizenry was split on the declaration of martial law.  Security fears convinced 
many citizens to initially support Marcos.  Others believed that Marcos was behind the 
bombing of his opposition and was using the Plaza Miranda event as a pretext to 
consolidate power and limit critiques of his government.  In either case, the rise of 
intrastate violence acted as a catalyst towards the reduction of the level of democracy.  In 
turn, the reduction in the level of democracy incited more violence. 
The declaration of martial law sparked a violent reaction from the recently created 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  Like the NPA, the Muslim insurgency in 
Mindanao was rooted in economics.  As the Christian northerners migrated to Mindanao 
throughout the twentieth century, they took legal title of significant areas of the island.  
There is a perception among many that the northerners took advantage of the local’s lack 
of literacy and knowledge on property law even if few Muslims were forced from their 
lands.272  There was a general feeling that Muslims were being excluded from the system 
or being treated as a type of subservient caste.  Mindanao was historically under-
developed and under-resourced due in part to its difficult terrain of mountains and dense 
forests as well as its remoteness from the capital in Manila.  The Muslim area of 
Mindanao was one of the poorest regions in the country.  At many times, its per capita 
GDP was half that of the second poorest region.273   
The catalyst for rebellion came in 1968.  The Army created a special all-Muslim 
elite unit based at Corregidor.  The soldiers balked when they found their mission would 
include fighting against fellow Muslim Moros using unconventional warfare against 
Malays in contested Sabah.  For their mutiny, the majority of the unit was executed.  The 
incident, known as the Jabidah Massacre, outraged Muslim Filipinos.  Open rebellion 
began in 1971 under the banner of the MNLF in order to establish an independent Moro 
state in Mindanao.   
After several years of fighting, the MNLF agreed to a ceasefire in 1976 in 
exchange for local autonomy.  Some members, disgruntled by the MNLF’s conciliatory 
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stance, created the splinter group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977.  The 
MILF became a far more conservative organization, demanding not only independence, 
but an Islamist state.  Like the MNLF, the level of violence continued to ebb and flow as 
several ceasefires were brokered and then broken. 
It is also possible that increasing violence led to the end of martial law and a 
correspondingly marginal increase in the level of democracy.  In 1980, economic 
nationalists began an urban bombing campaign against pro-Marcos businesses.  Marcos’ 
economic policies favored a handful of international exporters at the expense of small, 
domestic businessmen.  However, the direct correlation is weak.  The bombing campaign 
held little threat to the regime itself.  Instead, it was merely an indicator of one more 
segment of society that felt ostracized by Marcos’ policies.  Although it is plausible that 
the bombing campaign threatened the profits of Marcos’ cronies, an end to martial law 
would neither provide more protection to Marcos’ allies nor change the economic policy 
that instigated the urban terrorism.   
To some extent, increases in the level of democracy coincided with reduced levels 
of insurgency.  After the end of martial law in 1981, MNLF violence in Mindanao 
decreased substantially.  While the end of repression likely played a part, Marcos was 
also able to limit the insurgency by bribing leaders with seats on the autonomous 
legislature.     
The 1986 deposing of Marcos had a limited immediate effect on the insurgencies.  
Newly elected President Aquino quickly drafted a ceasefire with the MNLF promising 
autonomy in exchange for a renouncement to independence.  Ceasefires with the MILF 
were more tenuous.274  The transition to democracy created a debate within the CPP over 
the need to continue armed struggle.  Although the Communist Party was still illegal, the 
potential for legal political gains through other leftist parties caused a split within the 
CPP.275  Unable to decide, the CPP sat out the elections of the 1980s in favor of 
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continuing armed struggle.  A variety of factors influenced a change of mind throughout 
many of the CPP.  The success of several small parties during the 1988 legislative 
elections provided evidence that political gains could be made through the new system.  
Throughout the 1980s, successful government operations, the growth of local anti-
communist paramilitary groups, and an internal CPP mole-hunt purge decimated local 
NPA cells.  Popular support for the NPA was further hurt by the Aquino administration’s 
promise for land reform. 
Although land reform was enacted under the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Program (CARP), it did little to solve the issues of agrarian society.  Key Aquino 
supporters, including landowners, businessmen, and the military, opposed significant 
land reform and ensured provisions were included which would neuter the law.276  These 
provisions provided a ten-year phased approach and exemptions to redistribution.  The 
long window of implementation gave landowners time to modify their practices in order 
to qualify for a redistribution exemption.  One method of exemption was to divide the 
land into smaller holdings so that the land would fall below the minimum acreage 
threshold for distribution.  Typically, these other holdings would be retitled using 
pseudonyms, friends, and relatives as titleholders.277  The second method of exemption 
was to replace the existing crop with a crop that was exempt from redistribution.  Critics 
complained that CARP favored landlord rights over tenant rights and was ineffective at 
correcting the inequitable distribution of land, especially among cash crops.278  Thus, the 
ideological basis for the CPP continued to thrive in some small rural barangays (villages).  
Despite the ineffectiveness of land reform, the level of NPA violence began to decrease 
in 1990. 
Ironically, the same year saw the establishment of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 
an organization with links to Al Qaeda affiliate Jeemah Islamiah.  ASG began as an 
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insurgent group, based in the southwestern archipelago that bridges Mindanao to 
Indonesia, with the intent of establishing an Islamic state.  However, ASG evolved into a 
conglomeration of groups varying from criminal elements to radical Islamic groups.  
Unlike other Philippine insurgency groups, the ASG primarily attacks civilians, 
especially tourists, using bombings, kidnappings, and executions.  Despite ASG’s 
emergence, overall levels of violence in the Philippines gradually decreased since 1986. 
Increasing the level of democracy may have had a positive effect on decreasing 
the overall level of insurgency violence.  However, the decrease in violence was gradual 
and the overall level of violence is still considerably high.  Meanwhile, fluctuations in the 
level of insurgency (e.g., ceasefires and ceasefire failures) had no significant effect on the 
sustainment of the Philippines’ high level of democracy in the post-Marcos period.  The 
lack of interaction between the two variables appears due to the insurgencies’ regional 
nature and civilian-avoidance tactics.  The insurgencies are primarily limited to the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and various lightly populated rural 
areas.  Acting more like organized crime, the insurgencies are not a direct threat to the 
average citizen and rarely prevent citizens from participating in the political process.  
Besides sporadic activities of ASG, insurgency violence is primarily targeted at 
government forces.  However, the insurgents regularly coerce voting, collect protection 
money in the form of revolutionary taxes (cash or in-kind), and extort a permit to 
campaign tax from politicians.  
To date, the prolonged insurgent violence has not resulted in calls for reductions 
in democracy.  In most parts of the country, this stance is likely due to the lack of 
insurgent targeting of civilians combined with the geographical remoteness of the 
insurgencies.  However, there are pockets of anecdotal stories of citizens reflecting upon 
the growth and security of the early martial law period with nostalgia.  They look 
admiringly at Singapore’s benign dictatorship.  For example, ARMM citizens expressed 




3. The Diffusion of Norms: The Emperor Has No Clothes 
As discussed in Chapter II, the spread of democratic ideas provides citizens 
increased awareness of the benefits of democracy relative to autocracy and an improved 
ability to analyze the existing level of democracy.  We expect that these norms will 
highlight the inadequacy of democratic processes in hybrid regimes and underscore 
democracy as the rational choice.  Norms have a wide variety of inputs including 
historical legacy, ethno-religious identity, access to information, religious organizations, 
and foreign influence.  While pre-colonial and colonial autocratic traditions and ethnic 
divergence may have initially constrained democratic norms, the early establishment of 
electoral norms, increasing education, and the significant influence of information 
technology played key roles in building, mobilizing, and sustaining interest in democracy 
in the Philippines.   
A combination of pre-colonial and colonial social and political structures left a 
legacy of political power rooted in kinship and patronage.279  The legacy brought anti-
democratic undertones, leaving little room for politics based upon ideology or common 
interests.  Despite a shared Malay ancestry, a pre-colonial divergence in ethnicity, 
religion, language, and governance resulted in a clan-based society based on kinship 
ties.280  The divergence is still seen in contemporary Philippines.  Only a third of 
Filipinos claim Tagalog ethnicity, the largest ethnic group.  Six other ethnic groups 
(Cebuano, Ilocano, Bisaya, Hiligaynon Ilonggo, Bikol, and Waray), each with their own 
indigenous language, make up almost half of the population.  Ethnic Chinese also had an 
important impact on the Philippines.  Early traders to the Philippine islands, Chinese 
immigrants progressed during the 19th century sugar boom as merchants and bankers; 
some expanding their Philippine landholdings through money lending (i.e., 
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repossession).281  Over time, these Chinese Filipinos came to dominate the economy.  
For example, in 2006, seven of the ten richest families in the Philippines were of Chinese 
descent.282  Despite the divergence, ethnicity was not a significant source of conflict in 
post-independence Philippines.  The sole exception is Mindanao where religious tension, 
poverty, and property disputes fueled conflict and diminished the relevance of ethnic 
cleavage as the explanatory factor. 
More important than ethnicity was kinship.  Kinship ties were an important 
element of survival.  Pre-colonial barangay politics were based upon patronage.  The 
villagers provided their loyalty and labor to the chief.  The barangay chief, in turn, 
provided job security and leadership for various purposes such as physical security, food 
security, and justice.  If the chief failed to provide, he would be replaced, incentivizing 
the chief to distribute patronage.  However, other services such as education, shelter, and 
medical care were accessed through an extended kinship network.283 
While the Spanish colonists delivered some services to the urban areas, rural 
communities continued to subsist through the kinship network.284  The Spanish colonial 
legacy is often blamed for integrating patronage into the political system due to the 
centralization of political power into a supreme ruler as the ultimate patron.  But, the 
legacy is somewhat overstated.  The Philippines was a remote colony.  Technically 
governed by the Viceroy in Mexico, the Governor-General in Manila had significant 
autonomy and could selectively enforce the rulings of his superiors.  However, the 
government in Manila had little physical ability to enforce its laws.  Compared to its 
Latin American colonies, few Spanish moved to the Philippines.  Those that did 
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concentrated in Manila as facilitators of trade between China and Latin America.  The 
governor maintained administrative control through pre-colonial barangay chieftans and 
political control through the Catholic Church; the only significant Spanish group to 
permeate throughout the islands.  Instead of being the cause of patronage, the Spanish 
merely perpetuated the kinship networks and patronage system already employed by the 
barangays. 
As the Philippines developed economically, wealth became an additional source 
of patronage.  Wealth provided independence from the government and dependent 
workers.  The client was dependent upon the patron for his livelihood.  This financial 
dependence, combined with a distrust of strangers, deterred clients from undertaking 
collective action that might sever the relationship with his patron.285  In politics, clients 
would vote for their patron (or his designee) rather than risk severing the profitable 
relationship.  
The American colonizers expanded the distribution of urban services 
considerably, expanding education, medial care, and government employment.  But, the 
additional services did not replace the kinship system entirely.  Instead, as the Americans 
opened politics and the bureaucracy to the indigenous population, the kinship networks 
and patronage system extended into politics.  Elections were initially tightly constrained 
as political participation and suffrage were limited to land owners.  Since the majority of 
landowners were wealthy, the limitation elevated those that were economically powerful 
under the Spanish into political power under the Americans.  Once elected, politicians 
used their office to enrich themselves, family, and friends with government jobs, 
contracts, and preferential business regulations.  Local authorities abused their regulatory 
power to grant their own business monopolistic power, protect their illegal activities, and 
seize land.  National legislators used their influence to expand their landholdings and get  
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cheap loans from the national bank.286  In a somewhat circular fashion, political power 
came to be dominated by a few, wealthy families in what some refer to pejoratively as an 
oligarchy of political dynasties.287   
In time, patronage became a multi-tiered pyramid.  Agricultural workers and 
tenant farmers were clients of wealthy landlords that provided job security.  Wealthy 
patrons became clients of the state, providing their support (and the votes of their clients) 
to politicians that could protect their land and business interests.  Politicians, in turn, 
became clients of the president, providing political support and votes in return for pork 
projects.288  Of course, clients would remain loyal to the patron only as long as the 
benefits of patronage continued to flow.  However, many patrons used violence, 
intimidation, regulatory enforcement, or withholding of government resources to punish 
defectors.  At the local level, several extreme forms of patronage arose during the 
collapse of the central government during World War II as regional politicians turned 
into Mafioso-style political bosses.289  Despite the return of a central government, local 
bosses continued to plague Philippine politics.   
The patronage system was further perpetuated by the U.S. colonial administration 
and the subsequent Philippine administrations.  The expansion of the state’s clients 
reinforced the centralization of political power.  Despite the existence of elections and 
Civil Governor Taft’s priority on decentralization, the bicameral Philippine Legislature 
had little independent power since it could not override the American Governor’s veto, 
which he maintained until the Philippines was designated a commonwealth of the United 
States in 1935.290   
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In 1935, Manual Quezon was elected the second President of the Philippines.291  
The 1935 Constitution increased political participation, but lacked competition and 
constitutional rigidity.  Suffrage expanded to all literate adult males (women’s suffrage 
was added in 1937).  But, the dominance of the Nacionalista Party created a virtual one-
party system.  This political dominance enabled Quezon to amend the Constitution to 
permit his re-election.  Quezon liberally interpreted the 1935 Constitution, hiring and 
firing local officials at will making almost all elected officials beholden to the President 
for their position.  Local politicians were key to national politics since they could direct 
their clients how to vote. Although Quezon’s second term was cut short in 1942 by the 
Japanese invasion, Quezon left a tradition of a de facto one-party system, Constitutional 
manipulation, and patronage that would carry over into post independence Philippines.   
Despite the corruptive influence of the kinship network and the patronage system, 
elections became an established habit.  Although regularly coerced and often tainted by 
violence, elections occurred regularly in much of the Philippines since 1901 except for 
brief hiatuses during the Japanese occupation and Marcos’ martial law.  Certainly, the 
democratic ideals of the United States were diffused among at least a segment of the 
population during the U.S. occupation of the islands.   
The lasting effect of the kinship network and the patronage system upon 
contemporary Philippine politics is somewhat ambiguous.  Evidence of political 
dynasties and pork-barrel patronage can be found in most democracies.  The increasing 
independence of Philippine workers disabled the patronage system as a source of votes.  
However, campaign financing is still seen as a method for obtaining preferential 
regulatory treatment for businesses. 
As for political dynasties, there is a lack of empirical evidence to indicate that 
they are overrepresented in the Philippines relative to other democracies.  Certainly 
political dynasties exist in the Philippines.  Corazon Aquino came from the wealthy 
Cojuangco family.  Her father and brother were congressmen; her uncle and cousin, 
governors.  Her husband, Benigno served as a governor and a senator.  His father and 
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brother were senators, his uncle a congressman.  However, describing Philippine politics 
as an elite oligarchy is an overstatement.  To some extent, political dynasties are a natural 
by-product of democratic elections.292  For example, Adams and Roosevelt had famous 
political dynasties in the United States. Prominent contemporary political dynasties 
include the Kennedys, the Bushes, and the Clintons while less prominent include Pelosi, 
Dodd, Dole, Romney, Gore, Taft, Rockefeller, Long, Baker, and Tsongas.   
Although the patronage system continued to survive into contemporary times, 
information technology played a key role in shaping Philippine democratic norms and as 
a catalyst to mobilize citizens to demand regime change.  Under martial law, Marcos 
banned opposition media, leaving outlets in the power of his personal cronies.  Marcos 
used the media to portray himself as a charismatic figure: a physically and mentally 
powerful man with the knowledge, influence, and stamina to solve the problems of the 
Philippines.  Marcos had staked his presidential reputation entirely upon his personality 
and his performance.  In the end, no amount of media cover-up could hide the cracks.  By 
the early 1980s, Marcos was suffering from a serious kidney problem and could not hide 
his infirmities, missing weeks of work at a time.  In his absence, his wife Imelda took up 
the mantle of power.  As his health deteriorated, it also became obvious to many prior 
supporters that Marcos’ policies were failing to solve the Philippines’ major political 
problems.   
In the midst of increasing opposition, Marcos’ increasing frailty, and Imelda’s 
increasing power, government forces assassinated opposition leader Benigno Aquino as 
he departed his flight on return from exile in the United States.  The flight was full of 
international journalists and cameramen.  The event received intense international press 
coverage as video footage of the event travelled across the Philippines despite the 
relatively low level of technology.  Whatever gains the regime had intended to gain, the 
move backfired as Benigno became a martyr for the opposition.  His assassination was 
compared to the 1896 execution of Jose Rizal, a national hero of the Philippine 
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independence movement that some claimed was a Filipino Christ.  Despite government 
attempts to blame the communists and cover their tracks through a fact-finding 
commission, public outrage turned many citizens to the opposition.   
Information technology provided both an increasing sense of disapproval from the 
international community as well as the knowledge that developing countries could 
succeed as a democracy.  Aquino’s assassination received widespread international 
condemnation.  Certainly, an element of this judgment was passed to a small segment of 
Filipinos through close economic partners in the United States, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Australia, and Europe.  Additionally, Philippine intellectuals were aware of the wave of 
democratic transitions in Latin America during the early 1980s.  However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that either regional influence or global trends had a significant effect 
on the citizens’ preference for democracy in the Philippines.  In 1987, the Philippines was 
the democratic trendsetter for the region.   
In a more direct manner, information technology was used as a call for 
mobilization during EDSA I and EDSA II.293  In 1986, Cardinal Sin announced the call 
to rebellion over Radio Bandito.  In 2001, the call to rebellion was passed via cell phones, 
a growing popular commodity among the well-educated urban youth, an increasingly 
significant demographic.  The importance of cell phones as a contributor to democracy in 
the Philippines continued to grow as cell phone penetration grew from 10% in 2000 to 
almost 60% in 2007.  Average citizens became empowered as election monitors, using 
cell phones to send texts, photos, and videos of election improprieties to local news 
channels.294 
Technology was not a major factor in the diffusion of democratic norms in the 
Philippines prior to 1986.  Elections were an established norm well before independence.  
However, information technology acted as a catalyst for democratic mobilization as well 
as a sustaining influence on democracy.  Various attempts by presidents to change the 
constitution received widespread negative publicity.  The media was also influential in 
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maintaining citizen interest in politics through a combination of investigative journalism 
and sensationalism.295  Voter participation across the Philippines is high.  One 
explanation is that Philippines politics is entertainment: a mix of cock-fighting and 
Mexican soap opera.296  In a sample two-week period in August, articles critical of 
Arroyo made front-page news on a daily basis.  Topics included extravagant dinners 
while in New York City, freeing communists in order to motivate peace talks, and 
holding hands with former President Estrada during a wedding.  During Corazon 
Aquino’s funeral, a mayor mentioned that the large numbers of people that showed 
during the funeral procession suggested that people power would prevent Arroyo from 
extending her power beyond her term.  Newspapers sensationalized the eulogy as a call 
for revolution to depose Arroyo.  Perhaps this same media sensationalism shaped the 
citizens’ expectations for democracy.  Since the average Filipino views democracy as the 
freedom to do as you please, there is a general dissatisfaction in the performance of 
Philippine democracy despite their preference for the sustainment of democracy.297 
C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY 
As mentioned in Chapter II, supply of democracy is a measure of the action, or 
inaction, taken by political institutions in support of or against the implementation or 
removal of democratic processes.  The suppliers of democracy are largely influenced by 
the same economic, security, and informational factors that influence demand.  At times, 
suppliers may be influenced directly by changes in demand.  Of course, a change in 
demand does not dictate a change in supply.  The factors that influenced demand may not 
have the same magnitude or even the same direction of influence upon supply. 
A variety of political institutions were responsible for delivering democracy to the 
Philippines.  The split within the military, the activism of NGOs, and the actions of 
political parties were all-important elements in permitting the growth and sustenance of 
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democracy.  The most critical element, though, appears to be the regime itself.  It was 
Marcos’ decision to step down that enabled democracy to blossom. 
1. The Philippine Military 
As discussed in Chapter II, the factors discussed above which influence civil 
society also influenced the military’s preference for democracy.  In the case of the 
Philippines, the military did not have a homogenous set of preferences.  This divergence 
in the military led to a critical split in senior military leadership.  The corresponding 
showdown resulted in the People Power Revolution.   
The pre-martial law military was largely apolitical, choosing not to interfere in the 
politics of the Philippines’ partially democratic processes.  However, the military took no 
steps to prevent Marcos from stealing the 1969 elections.  Logic suggests that the 
military, or at least senior leaders, supported the declaration of martial law in 1971.  First, 
it would be difficult to impose martial law if the military opposed it.  Second, 
international events and a vehement anti-communist U.S. policy likely convinced the 
military that the NPA was a serious threat to national security.  While the threat of a 
communist takeover of the regime may not have been imminent, U.S. forces were 
withdrawing from Vietnam while communist insurgencies were gaining the upper hand 
in Cambodia and Laos.  As the Philippine Army had a battalion of troops supporting the 
U.S. mission in Vietnam, the military was likely closely monitoring the progress of the 
communist insurgents and may have heightened the sense of Philippine vulnerability.   
During martial law, the military leadership had little interest in increasing the 
level of democracy.  Among the rural communities, political reform equated to land 
reform and economic equality.  The military saw rural communities as hotbeds of 
insurgency and opposed political reform, in part, because they believed it “rewarded” the 
rebellious peasants.298  Reform would be equivalent to appeasing the NPA.  In addition,  
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Marcos provided incentives to the military for maintaining martial law: doubling the size 
of the military, increasing salaries, and providing opportunities for commanders to 
exploit local economies.   
However, the imposition of martial law and other Marcos policies gradually 
created a split within the military.  In order to maximize loyalty, Marcos granted senior 
military positions based upon personal loyalty and family ties.  While the military was on 
the front lines of the counterinsurgency, they were also used to repress political dissent.  
These factors led to the creation of the Reform of the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) in 
the early 1980s with the goal of professionalizing the armed forces.  RAM advocated a 
return to merit-based promotions and an increased emphasis on the protection of human 
rights.  Many military members were especially disturbed by the military’s involvement 
in the Aquino assassination.   
The split became openly evident in 1986 when Defense Minister Juan Ponce 
Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos defected from Marcos’ government.299  
Enrile and Ramos had virtually no military forces while General Ver, the chief of staff, 
controlled the majority of the Army.  Attempts to crush the mutiny by force failed as 
civilians, especially nuns and priests, interceded to protect the defectors, physically 
placing themselves as a barrier to attack.  Aircraft that could pass over the civilians could 
not bring themselves to attack their follow officers and risk hitting civilians.  Mortar and 
helicopter units responding to the scene defected to the protestors.  Aircraft deployed to 
deliver additional loyal troops intentionally flew to the wrong embarkation points. 
Certainly, it is a stretch to say that the military brought about democracy.  But, the 
compliance of the military was a necessary element to the increase in the level of 
democracy.  The defections of Enrile and Ramos acted as a catalyst to test the loyalty of 
the army.  It was the Army’s normative value of the people over the dictator that allowed  
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democracy to flourish in the Philippines.  Also, an element of luck played its part.  If any 
aircraft or unit that had been present chose Marcos over the people, the result would have 
been a massacre.  
As Aquino replaced Marcos as President, it became obvious that segments of the 
military continued to have serious reservations about democracy.  Loyalist members of 
the military wanted to return Marcos to power.  Enrile and his RAM supporters wanted to 
establish a Latin American-style military junta to maintain the perceived benefits of 
martial law.  Aquino’s early actions disenfranchised many in the military through the 
release of communist prisoners, cutbacks in the military budget, and the establishment of 
a human rights commission.  Many in the military felt that Aquino betrayed them since 
the military helped her gain power.  The result was seven major coup attempts against 
Aquino between July 1986 and December 1989.  After the first coup attempt, Aquino 
began to embrace the military by increasing the 1986 defense budget, endorsing Ramos’ 
counterinsurgency plan, and by weakening the human rights commission.300  The final 
coup against Aquino in 1989 was deterred by a U.S. military show of force in support of 
the regime.301   
In the post Marcos years, the armed forces became more professionalized and 
independent of the executive. The military was extremely loyal to President Ramos, a 
former Armed Forces Chief of Staff.  However, President Estrada had no such influence.  
As street protests culminated in EDSA II in 2001, the military notified President Estrada 
that they could no longer support him.  After fifteen years without a coup, a small group 
of officers attempted a coup against President Arroyo in 2006 as a protest to electoral 
fraud.  But, the group had no widespread support in the military.  Even so, the military 
opposed Arroyo’s attempt to declare martial law after the coup attempt. 
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2. NGOs 
As discussed in Chapter II, NGOs have neither the force of the military to 
implement democracy nor the authority to adopt changes to the constitution.  However, 
NGOs do have the ability to monitor the freeness of elections and provide increased 
accountability of the other suppliers of democracy.  In this context, the National 
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) had a limited effect on improving the supply 
of democracy through election monitoring.  The Catholic Church had no effect on supply, 
but did mobilize political parties and citizens into action.  But, the importance of NGOs 
in the Philippines arose after the fall of Marcos.  They were instrumental in maintaining 
Philippines’ relatively high level of democracy. 
After Quirino won the 1949 presidential election using widespread fraud and 
violence, NAMFREL mobilized citizens to ensure free elections for the 1951 senatorial 
elections and the 1953 presidential election (similar to the Civil Alliance in Mexico after 
Salinas’ victory in 1988).302  In subsequent years, NAMFREL continued to advocate for 
electoral reforms and fraud reduction but, by itself, could not deliver a fully free election.  
NAMFREL reported outright fraud and voter intimidation at the polls, but was powerless 
to break the patron’s coercive grip on clients, prevent political assassinations, or remove 
the fear of violent reprisal for deciding to enter a political competition.  As NAMFREL 
reduced opportunities for vote fraud at election sites, politicians shifted their patronage to 
the vote-counters.  As votes were aggregated at each level of government, politicians had 
ample opportunity to influence the final count.303   
After the Second Vatican Council in 1965, the Philippine Catholic Church took an 
active role in promoting social justice.  The church generated several NGOs including the 
Federation of Free Farmers (FFF).  Initially very popular due to its promotion of land 
reform and tenancy protection, the organization deteriorated after its leaders collaborated 
with Marcos during martial law.  Despite the failure of the FFF, the Church became a 
                                                 
302 Hedman and Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, 
Post-Colonial Trajectories, 20–2. Hedman and Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth 
Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories. 
303 This method is locally referred to as “dag-dag bawas” (literally, add subtract). 
 187
leading opponent of martial law.  Within the first year of martial law, the military raided 
several Catholic Churches and schools.  Upset by this, the Church brokered an agreement 
with the military to coordinate raids with top Church officials.  After the military broke 
the agreement in August 1974, Cardinal Sin, the Archbishop of Manila, led a protest 
prayer vigil in the Manila Cathedral.  Additionally, the Church began to openly support 
the opposition, creating an informal anti-Marcos alliance with the business community 
and the Cojuangco clan (excluding Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.) during the 1984 Batasan 
elections.  When Enrile and Ramos defected from Marcos’ government in 1986, Cardinal 
Sin publicly endorsed the military mutiny over the radio.  With the Church’s 
encouragement, the citizens came out in droves to support the mutiny against Marcos.  In 
the case of the Philippines, Church NGOs did little to supply democracy.  Instead, the 
Church was instrumental in mobilizing the opposition party and mass protests. 
After the fall of Marcos, NGOs became prolific.  The 1987 Constitution 
specifically recognized NGOs’ rights to participate in Philippine politics.  The law 
recognized NGOs as fourteen independent sectors.  Thirteen of the sectors are referred to 
as People’s Organizations (PO).   These organizations are based on demographic features 
such as farmers, indigenous peoples, urban poor, disaster victims, children, and women.  
The POs tend to be narrow in scope. For instance, the farmer PO focuses on agrarian 
reform issues, showing little success in other issue areas.  The fourteenth sector is a 
catch-all group of cause-based NGOs that do not fit into the other thirteen sectors.304 
Partly due to this special political status, the number of NGOs doubled between 
1986 and 1995.305  The increasing influence of NGOs led to several reforms that 
provided increased political participation for NGOs at both the local and national level.  
The Local Government Code of 1991 included NGOs as a part of the local government’s 
decision-making process.  The code specified that sub-national legislatures should 
include a variety of NGO representatives such as those representing women, workers, and 
the rural poor.  At the national level, Ramos agreed to the creation of the NGO assembly 
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system.  The assembly system established a coordination hierarchy of sector councils.  
Each sector council nominated a single representative, approved by the President, to 
attend the cabinet-level NGO Assembly.  In effect, it is a system of organized lobbying of 
the executive branch.  
However, NGO success in implementing political reforms was mixed.  Although 
the NGO Assembly and the Local Government Code inculcated NGOs into the 
government’s decision-making process, government committees found ways to exclude 
the NGOs when desired or neutralize their policy recommendations.306  For example, 
several NGOs combined forces to draft the Party List Law and the Anti-Dynasty Bill.  
Although both laws were endorsed by the Commission on Elections and President 
Ramos, the Congress adopted, but neutered, the Party List Law, while the dynasty-
dominated rules committee prevented discussion on the Anti-Dynasty Bill.307   
Despite their meager political power, the social mobilization capability of NGOs 
is credited with a variety of demonstrations to defend the 1987 constitution.  For instance, 
the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines and Caucus of Development NGOs 
(CODE-NGO) led protests that convinced Estrada to cancel his plans to amend the 
constitution to his personal benefit.  Similar protests convinced Arroyo not to request 
constitutional changes that would enable her to run for Prime Minister.  Most recently, a 
coalition of NGOs led by NAMFREL advocated the automation of voting in order to 
prevent vote count manipulation.   
3. Political Parties 
Political parties are important to democracy for two reasons.  The opposition 
provides a limited constraining effect upon the ruling regime’s policy options.  Second, 
political parties act as the pinnacles of group interests.  Issues of security, economy, and 
norms are important drivers for motivating an opposition to form, voice its dissent, and 
mobilize the citizens to demand change.  An alliance of opposition parties was critical to 
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the downfall of Marcos.  Without the alliance, there would have been little justification 
for the People Power Revolution to demand Marcos to step down.  Since the defeat of 
Marcos, political parties have maximized the spectrum of political participation. 
Prior to martial law, political parties had little relevance.  The legislature was an 
“indistinct two-party system” in which the two parties “held power in alternation despite 
the absence of visible differences in their respective platforms and programmes [sic] of 
government.”308  Election results were somewhat predetermined, limiting the presidency 
to a select group of insiders.  Of the first six presidents (Osmena, Roxas, Quirino, 
Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal), all had served as either Vice President or as a Cabinet 
Secretary.309   
Political parties mattered little for either legislative or local elections as these 
were generally dominated by violence, intimidation and bribery; “guns, goons, and 
gold.”310  The system gave disproportionate power to the wealthy since they could afford 
to buy the votes of the poor or hire thugs.  Goons were typically used to intimidate voters 
at the not-so-secret ballot booth.  Goons also served as tools of violence to coerce the 
opposition or, less frequently, kill political rivals. In some cases, politicians (responsible 
for the hiring, promotion and assignment of police) turned the police under their authority 
into a private army, using them to run their election campaigns and illegal activities.311  
As the party mattered little during the election, party switching was common.  Switching 
ensured continued access to pork, though only a limited number were allowed to switch 
lest the pork be spread too thin.  Those unable or unwilling to switch became the voice of 
the opposition. 
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The declaration of martial law removed the opposition from the government.  
Therefore, the opposition during martial law was not a political party, per se, but a 
coalition of political clans that allied with the Church and the business community.  The 
opposition was not particularly powerful until the assassination of Benigno Aquino 
motivated the formation of an alliance.  Gradually, this alliance coalesced around 
Corazon “Cory” Aquino as the prospective leader.  The alliance portrayed Aquino as a 
simple, widowed housewife working to bring justice to the Philippines by deposing 
Marcos, the tyrant dictator.  In some cases, this portrayal took on religious images, 
depicting the competition as a battle between the Virgin Mary and Pontius Pilate.  As a 
widower of a man assassinated by the government, Cory Aquino wielded 
disproportionate influence.  She was very successful in her calls for a civil disobedience 
campaign and a boycott against pro-Marcos businesses, media, and banks.  In the end, it 
was the power of the opposition to get votes that brought Aquino into power.   
In the post-Marcos period, opposition parties returned to their typical weak state.  
The design of the 1935 Constitution was perceived as flawed because it resulted in a lack 
of ideology-based parties.  In an attempt to correct this flaw, the 1987 Constitution 
allowed multiple parties with low registration thresholds.  Although there were a plethora 
of new parties, only the parties on the extreme right and left had a serious commitment to 
ideology.  Party-switching of candidates was still common in order to increase the 
opportunity for pork barrel spending.  The majority of citizens had no affiliation with a 
political party.  The lack of a primary system and lack of politician commitment to a 
single party resulted in little party loyalty among the masses.  There is little stability in 
the field as new parties continue to form.  Parties form primarily for one of two reasons: 
to run a presidential candidate or to compete for party list representation.  As the major 
parties select their presidential candidates, those that thought that they should have been 
the nominee often create their own party.  For example, both Ramos and Estrada won the 
presidency after failing to be nominated, leaving their party, and forming their own party. 
Parties are also created in order to take advantage of the party list proportional 
representation system.  This system sets aside 20% of the lower house seats for minor 
parties (the major parties that dominate the other 80% of the seats are excluded from 
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participation).  While the system ensures that small parties are represented, it creates an 
unintended incentive to create new parties.  The system is essentially a fight for the 
political scraps.  Since the number of seats that any one party can attain in the party list 
system was capped at three, the more successful minor parties will create splinter parties 
in order to gain more seats.  For instance, the communist party (which runs through front 
parties), ran for party list seats across five different parties which expands its potential 
catch up to 15 seats.  On the downside, there is little ideological differentiation between 
splinter parties.  The party list system provided disincentives for small party 
consolidation, strong ideological platforms, and party loyalty.312   
4. The Ruling Regime 
From Chapter II, it is expected that the ruling regime will adopt electoral changes 
when it is in its best interests and the interests of the regime’s key supporters. Marcos 
reduced the level of democracy in response to increasing insurgent violence, but appeared 
to be also influenced by the desire to remain in power.  Marcos was convinced to step 
down by a combination of public protests, the split in the military, and U.S. influence.  
Popular protests continued to deter presidents from attempts to manipulate the 
constitution.  Protests, in conjunction with military pressure, convinced Estrada to step 
down from the presidency.  
After liberation and independence, the new Philippine government adopted the 
traditions of pre-invasion politics: a de facto one-party system, Constitutional 
manipulation, and patronage.  Besides the banning of the Communist party, political 
participation was widely inclusive.  Politics remained relatively unchanged for almost 20 
years until Ferdinand Marcos won the presidency in 1965 in a relatively free and fair 
election.  Marcos took several steps to consolidate his power.  During his term, Marcos 
named himself Defense Secretary and increased his control of the military by putting 
loyal officers into positions of power.  Marcos made his cousin and childhood friend, 
Fabian Ver, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.  When forced to suspend Ver during the 
investigation into Aquino’s assassination, Marcos put one of his second cousins, Fidel 
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Ramos, as the acting Chief of Staff.  With the military under his control, Marcos ended 
democracy in 1972 with the declaration of martial law.  A combination of factors likely 
motivated Marcos’ decision for martial law.  Marcos publicly blamed the communist 
insurgency and its terrorist attacks, but Marcos was likely also concerned about the 
growing power of the opposition behind Benigno Aquino and Eugenio Lopez.313   
Marcos’ politics under martial law subsequently wiped out all semblances of 
democratic processes.  Marcos abolished local elections, appointing and removing local 
officials at will.  Marcos maintained order through repression and aggressive coercion of 
the opposition, the media, and the justice system.  Media outlets not owned by Marcos’ 
allies were shut down.  Journalists critical of the regime were often arrested.  Martial law 
gave Marcos the power to replace judges at will and reassign cases to military tribunals, 
over which Marcos had total control.  Marcos threatened the Supreme Court with 
abolishment if it reached an unfavorable decision. 
In 1973, Marcos dissolved congress and had a new Constitution drafted.  
Delaying the implementation of Article XVII of the Constitution to create a National 
Assembly, Marcos instead created the Batasang Bayan.  The Batasang Bayan was limited 
to an advisory role to the President and only met for three days in 1976.  In the meantime, 
economic pressure was mounting.  Sugar prices collapsed.  Economic crisis was averted 
through increased government spending.  In order to solidify his patronage network and 
to provide a semblance of a return to normalcy, Marcos had the Constitution further 
amended in 1976 to create the Batasang Pambansa as a national legislature.  This 
amendment created a mixed presidential-parliamentary system with Marcos as president, 
prime minister and lead legislator.   
Perhaps Marcos had good intentions when he first declared martial law.  
However, his political and economic decisions gradually ostracized almost all major 
power groups in Philippine society.  His policies were a threat to a wide range of 
interests, culminating in a broad coalition demanding his ouster.  The Catholic Church 
was angered by government raids and lack of respect for religious sanctity.   The business 
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community was angered by the monopoly power directed to Marcos’ cronies, the inept 
government response to the banking crisis, and the deep recession that followed.  A 
portion of the military was angry about Marcos’ misuse of the military and the lack of 
merit-based promotions.  Human rights groups were critical of his regime’s repressive 
tactics.  Despite large offensives against the NPA and a ceasefire with the MNLF, 
citizens were not substantially more secure than before martial law.  The MILF refused to 
abide by the ceasefire signed by the MNLF.  Small segments of the business community 
began an urban terrorist campaign.  As all of these tensions simmered, the banking crisis 
and ensuing economic crisis was the catalyst to force political change.   
On 9 January 1981, the flight of Dewey Dee led to the Philippine banking crisis.  
Twelve days later, Marcos proclaimed the end of martial law.  Marcos started to slowly 
liberalize in 1981 by putting lipstick on the pig.  The liberalizations, including the lifting 
of martial law, were entirely fraudulent, but involved the development of some 
democratic processes.  Elections were seen as a potential outlet for rising tensions.  The 
regime permitted Barangay elections in 1982 and provincial and legislative elections in 
1984.  Although the opposition only won one third of the seats, the following year they 
attempted to impeach Marcos.  Although the move was easily deflected, the United States 
pressured Marcos to hold presidential elections in order to legitimize his continued hold 
on power.  After all, it had been 15 years since he was last elected.    
Marcos called for a snap presidential election in which he faced an opposition 
unified behind Corazon Aquino.  Marcos won the election through widespread fraud.  
Outraged, people filled the streets in protest.  The People Power demonstration was a 
clear indicator that the citizens wanted regime change.  However, the peaceful removal of 
Marcos was not foreordained.  Marcos had several options as he retained the loyalty of 
the majority of the Army. 
The catalyst for Marcos’ decision to step down can be partly tied to the actions of 
the United States. Marcos was dependent upon U.S. political support, financial aid, and 
cooperation in securing IMF loans.  The United States also operated large Navy and Air 
Force facilities near Manila.  Immediately after the Aquino assassination, U.S. 
Congressmen and State Department officials began to distance themselves from the 
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Marcos regime.314    In time, President Reagan decided that it was time for Marcos to 
step down.  As the crisis in the Philippines peaked in February 1986, Senator Paul Laxalt, 
Reagan’s informal emissary to Marcos, told Marcos that the time had come to “cut, and 
cut cleanly.”315  By the end of the day, Marcos, his family and key supporters were on a 
U.S. transport out of the country.  This analysis is not intended to suggest that the United 
States single-handedly brought democracy to the Philippines.  It simply means that U.S. 
policy and actions were critical to influencing the choices of a key supplier of democracy, 
the regime.   
After the people power demonstration in 1986, popular protests continued to have 
a powerful effect on Philippine politics.  After the fall of Marcos, each of the four 
subsequent presidents attempted to modify the constitution.  Aquino nullified the 
previous constitution and directed the development of the 1987 Constitution.  Ramos, 
Estrada, and Arroyo all attempted to convene a Constituent Assembly (ConAss) in order 
to amend the constitution.  In all three cases, protests erupted over concerns that the 
assembly was an attempt by the President to extend power or eliminate term limits.  
The end of dictatorship and the return of democracy resulted in the 1987 
Constitution.  Instead of reinstating the 1935 Constitution, Aquino called for the 
development of a new constitution, purged local officials of questionably loyalty, and 
began legislative elections in 1987.  This new Constitution adopted a multi-party system 
in order to avoid the de facto one-party rule predominant in the pre-martial law period.  
The multi-party system expanded participation, enticing the first communists to 
participate in politics (through front parties) since 1946.  Political participation was 
further increased with the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, which 
delegated resources and manpower from the national government to the local 
governments for the provision of basic services.  Despite the increased participation,  
 
 
                                                 
314 Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, 282. 
315 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy, 
1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 1987), 439–40. 
 195
there was still much criticism of the competition.  The multitude of small parties required 
coalition politics in order to win the presidency.  The complexity of inter-party alliances 
continued to encourage party-switching.316   
After the first coup attempt in 1987, Aquino toned down her social reform 
policies (e.g., land reform, breaking up the monopolies) in order to sustain her supporting 
coalition of landowners and military as well as to shore up foreign investor confidence.  
In the end, Aquino’s presidency restored many of the elites of the pre-martial law period.  
The new assembly and cabinet were riddled with many of the same old faces.  The 
ownership of land and businesses was heavily concentrated within a small percentage of 
the population.317  Patronage returned to politics, though not universally.  While some 
cities in Cebu, Mindanao and Panay showed a reduction in election intimidation and 
clientalism, similar cities in Negros and Central Luzon showed a return to patronage.318 
President Ramos, the former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, had considerable more 
political options regarding state security.  With no threat of a coup, Ramos legalized the 
Communist Party, signed a peace agreement with the MNLF, and began negotiations 
with the MILF.  Although Ramos wanted to amend the constitution to eliminate term 
limits, public protests convinced Congress not to convene a ConAss.  Partly motivated by 
the economic difficulties of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Ramos extended political 
participation through the 1998 Indigenous People’s Rights Act that delegated control 
over local resources. 
Political crisis erupted in 2001 in the middle of President Estrada’s term.  Estrada 
was impeached for embezzlement and running an illegal gambling operation.  His 
supporters in the Senate intervened to prevent the presentation of evidence which showed 
that Estrada had been depositing large sums of money under a false name.  Although 
Estrada had enough supporters in the senate to avoid conviction, the senate’s refusal to 
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admit evidence sparked outrage in January 2001 across many of the same groups that 
brought down Marcos: the Catholic Church, the business community, the middle class, 
NGOs, and the Communist Party.  Without a method of removing the President, citizens 
turned to street protests in what is commonly referred to as Power People II or EDSA II.  
In the face of the massive protests, Estrada’s coalition began to fall apart.  Vice President 
Arroyo joined the protestors.  Several cabinet members resigned.  However, Estrada 
decided to step down only after the Armed Forces Chief of Staff and the Chief of the 
Philippine National Police (PNP) notified Estrada that they no longer supported him.  
When pressed, the Supreme Court reviewed the situation and announced Arroyo as the 
new president based upon salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the 
supreme law).319  Although certainly not a model for a constitutional change of the 
presidency, the lack of constitutional options to hold the president accountable provided 
some justification to the action.  However, it is doubtful that Estrada’s removal accurately 
represented the “will of the people” of the Philippines since Estrada’s political base was 
the rural communities. 
Despite political reforms and the power of the people, coercion and corruption 
continued to plague the competitiveness of Philippine elections.  After serving for three 
years as Estrada’s replacement, Arroyo ran for president in 2004 winning amid 
widespread accusations of fraud.  After the 2004 election, tapes surfaced implicating 
Arroyo in vote padding through the Commission on Elections.  Arroyo survived four 
separate impeachment attempts.  Amid a minor coup and building anti-fraud protests, 
Arroyo declared a state of emergency, banning all rallies.  The declaration was supported 
by the PNP, but not by the military.  After only three weeks, Arroyo ended the state of 
emergency.  Unlike Estrada, though, the military never suggested that Arroyo should step 
down. 
Even with the success in maintaining the level of democracy, post-Marcos 
presidents continued to reinforce the patronage system, using pork projects and the 
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withholding of national allocations to local governments controlled by the opposition.320  
The system limits free elections if people know that a vote for a certain political party 
means a halt to government services rather than a change in policy.  The Supreme Court 
of the Philippines ruled in 2009 that the national government’s withholding of the budget 
allotment was illegal.   
Violence continues to be a problem at the local level as regional bosses attempt to 
use their power to secure their position.  For instance, some suspect that the Governor of 
Batangas used paramilitary forces to assassinate uncooperative local politicians within his 
district.  In a more recent example, in November 2009, the Ampatuan clan was accused 
of killing 22 women and 30 journalists in an attempt to prevent an opponent’s registration 
as a candidate.    
D. SUMMARY 
Those that view democracy as an economically egalitarian outcome are likely to 
have a negative view of Philippine democracy.  There is a high concentration of 
ownership of the means of production.  Market reforms under Aquino created conditions 
conducive to the rebirth of powerful landowners.  Large segments of the population 
perceive that they are not receiving the benefits of a growing economy.   Anecdotal 
stories about underemployment (e.g., housekeepers with college educations) are 
widespread.  However, if democracy is viewed as a method of selection and 
accountability of government leaders, then the Philippine has made great strides.  In the 
Philippines case, changes in the level of income, industrialization, and violence hold no 
consistent explanatory value for changes in the level of democracy; instead, the 
democracy outcome can only be understood in the context of the actors’ reactions to 
changes in security, the economy, and norms. 
GDP, by itself, appears to be a poor explanatory cause for the levels of Philippine 
democracy.  Economic income was on a rapid 50% rise while democracy was tumbling 
in the late 1960s.  Conversely, after income crashed in the 1980s, democracy dramatically 
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increased.  While moderate income levels in the Philippines might explain success in the 
sustainment of the level of democracy, changes in the level of income explains little as 
GDP in 1986 was the same as 1976.  This case suggests that economic crisis had far more 
explanatory power than income levels.  The economic crisis of the 1980s led to massive 
demonstrations, but was not an isolated factor in convincing Marcos to step down.  The 
crisis limited Marcos’ options, forcing him to cut government spending and fracture his 
alliance by disbanding government monopolies.  NGOs ranging from business groups to 
the Catholic Church to wealthy landowners turned from reluctant supporters of the 
regime to outright opponents partly based upon the economy but also due to the 
assassination of Benigno Aquino.  While the economic crisis contributed as a catalyst, the 
actions of the military and the United States were the drivers that convinced Marcos to 
permit a return to democracy.  Interestingly, the Philippines’ only other economic crisis 
during the period of study also resulted in an increase in the level of democracy.  The 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis had a positive, though limited, effect on democracy as 
President Ramos expanded political participation through the Indigenous People’s Rights 
Act in response to economic unrest. 
The correlation between economic development and democracy in the Philippines 
is ambiguous.  Industrialization in the Philippines took off in the 1960s and 1970s.  It is 
plausible that a lack of industrialization, and lack of powerful organizations, contributed 
to the citizens’ acquiescence of the collapse of democracy in 1969 and 1972.  Arguably, 
the Philippines was simply not developed enough to resist autocratization at the time.  
Over the next ten years, industrial growth, though concentrated in three major cities, 
fostered a literate, well-educated middle-income tier.  This industrialization was 
accompanied by a growing youth bulge that had both a high rate of college completion 
and underemployment.  This youth bulge and the middle-income tier provided the core of 
the masses during the People Power Revolution.  However, People Power did not 
guarantee that democracy would follow Marcos.  The economically powerful supported 
democracy as the preferred alternative to the crony system under Marcos.   
Intrastate violence also had a significant, though inconsistent effect on the level of 
democracy.  The Huk Rebellion in the 1950s had no effect on the level of democracy 
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while the 1969 NPA Rebellion led to a sharp decrease in democracy.  The difference 
between the two incidents can be isolated by the reaction of the ruling executive.  The 
military and Marcos were likely influenced by the war in Southeast Asia and U.S. policy 
towards communism.  Secretary of National Defence Magsaysay’s aggressive 
counterinsurgency campaign broke the Huk rebellion in less than two years.  After more 
than three years of counterinsurgency under Marcos, the NPA was still on the rise.  While 
Marcos blamed the NPA for martial law, it may have also been a convenient excuse for 
the consolidation of power.  Again, intrastate violence as an isolated factor does not have 
a consistent influence upon the level of democracy.  The Philippines was able to achieve 
a high level of democracy in 1986 despite sustained high levels of intrastate violence.  
However, it is plausible that the gradual reduction of intrastate violence served to reduce 
the strain that intrastate violence has on sustaining high levels of democracy. 
While economic crisis and insurgent violence were important causal factors in the 
changes in the levels of democracy, the contribution of changing democratic norms 
cannot be discounted.  Increasing economic income and economic development certainly 
led to increased potential for the spread of democratic norms through increasing social 
interconnectedness, higher university education rates, increasing interconnectedness with 
foreign democracies, and the rise of an independent media.  Increasing norms were 
evident in the birth of NAMFREL in the early 1950s as well as the People Power 
demonstrations.  During Corazon Aquino’s funeral procession in August 2009, the streets 
were lined with supporters.  There is widespread belief that the people power of the 
funeral is an indicator that the people will not stand for a return to autocracy.321  Much of 
the demand for democracy appears to be borne more from a mistrust of a Marcos-style 
dictatorship than any belief in democracy; a bad democracy is better than a Marcos 
dictatorship.  While increasing democratic norms may explain the increasing demand for 
democracy in the Philippines, it is not a sufficient explanation for the timing of the 
People Power revolt.   
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While Marcos’ decision to step down was critical to the increase in democracy, 
his decision was largely influenced by other actors.  The business community and the 
Catholic Church began to actively oppose Marcos, monitoring and reporting the 
widespread fraud during the 1986 election.  The military’s internal split, primarily 
affected by normative factors that placed protection of the people above loyalty to the 
ruler, limited Marcos’ ability to use force to crush the opposition.  Finally, the regime’s 
own actions combined with economic crisis and increasing democratic norms led to the 
creation of a powerful opposition party unified around a martyr figure.  In the end, U.S. 




VI. SENEGAL: THE CASE OF A POOR, UNDER-DEVELOPED 
DEMOCRACY  
Senegal gradually adopted a high level of democracy through incremental 
changes over 26 years from 1974 to 2000.  However, reforms since 2000 indicate that 
Senegal may be regressing towards a lower level of democracy.  Senegal was selected as 
a case because this substantial democratization occurred despite extremely low levels of 
economic income and industrialization.  Theory suggests that such an economy generally 
has a low diffusion of democratic norms and a significant aversion to democracy among 
the landlords.  Senegal is also an interesting case because it is one of the few democracies 
in a predominantly Islamic country. 
In this chapter, the analytical model discussed in Chapter II is used to analyze the 
determinants of Senegal’s level of democracy since independence in 1960. Specifically, 
this chapter seeks to identify those factors that enabled Senegal to achieve a high level of 
democracy despite significant barriers.  The model and the quantitative results from 
Chapter III indicate that low-income, low industrialization, and on-going insurgency 
should have acted as considerable obstacles to the achievement of a high level of 
democracy.   
The analytical model views the level of democracy as the result of the interaction 
of actors.  The model can be viewed as a supply and demand function.  Actors, 
influenced by structural factors, determine the supply and demand components.  The 
resulting supply-demand equilibrium is the level of democracy.  In the context of this 
study, the level of democracy is a measure of the process to select representatives through 
free, competitive elections, with open participation, and within the un-manipulated 
constraints of electoral rules. 
As discussed in Chapter II, demand for democracy is a rational choice of 
individuals and groups within a society.  This study examines the effect that the 
economy, the security situation, and the diffusion of democratic norms have on citizens’ 
demand for democracy.  Increasing internal security, economic income, economic 
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industrialization, and the diffusion of norms increase the demand for democracy.  
Conversely, high or increasing intrastate violence, low-income, and low industrialization 
have a deterrent or regressive effect upon demand.   
On the other side of the demand-supply equation, institutions make rational 
choice decisions to dedicate time, resources, and prestige to supplying (or limiting the 
supply of) democracy.  The institutions with the most impact on democracy include the 
military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling 
regime.  These institutions are affected by the same economic, security, and diffusion 
factors that shape the citizens’ demand for democracy, though not necessarily in the same 
manner or to the same magnitude. 
This chapter begins with a brief background on the political history of Senegal.  
Then, the citizens’ demand for democracy is presented in three parts: the economy, 
security, and norms.  Despite Senegal’s low level of industrialization, democratic norms 
were relatively high at independence due to its colonial experience.  While Senegal was 
one of only a few African countries able to vote under colonial rule, democratic norms in 
Senegal were limited outside of urban elite circles.  Citizen political mobilization was 
largely a reaction to economic downturns.  But, these were not specifically calls for 
increased democracy, but for Sopi (change).  Security issues had little effect on the 
average Senegalese citizen since the Casamance insurgency was geographically remote 
and electoral riots were limited in scope.     
The institutions’ supply of democracy is broken into four sections: the military, 
NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime.  The actions of the military, NGOs, 
political parties, and ruling regime were important factors in determining Senegal’s level 
of democracy.  An apolitical military and a viable, organized opposition party made 
increases in the level of democracy a possibility.  Although religious groups actively 
worked to sustain the autocratic system in exchange for local power and funding, 
economic crisis and internal party disputes strained government patronage and fractured 
the ruling party; enabling a change in government to take place.  The ruling regime 
enacted all of the major political reforms that resulted in substantial changes in the level 
of democracy.  The ruling regime responded to varying structural factors over time.  
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Nearly all of the reforms were partly motivated by an attempt to provide an outlet for 
economic discontent.  Early reforms in the 1970s were entirely economic related.  
Political reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were still driven by the economy, but less 
directly.  As frustrations grew over the economy, post-election riots broke out when 
voting failed to result in change.  Reforms were enacted to placate the demands of the 
rioters, but also to meet foreign conditional aid requirements.  In 2000, the citizens, 
disgruntled by a significant cut in government services, voted out the ruling party.  The 
ruling regime voluntary stepped down.  The military announced the results in favor of the 
opposition.  The independent media spread the word to the citizens.  Knowing that the 
military was averse to repression of demonstrators and that foreign aid donors might balk 
at a sudden increase in autocracy, the ruling regime had little choice but to step down. 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF SENEGALESE POLITICS 
Prior to the 19th century invasion by France, Senegal was a disjointed collection 
of ten states with a patchwork of ten different ethnicities.322  Located at a geographical 
crossroads, these states had gone through various stages of union and partition under 
several African empires including the Ghana, Tukulor, Djolof, and Mali Empires.  As the 
regional empires collapsed, local states established weak monarchies and aristocracies.  
The monarchies’ power was strengthened by the establishment of trade with the 
Portuguese in the 15th century and boosted again by the slave trade with the British and 
the French in the 17th century.323  
As trade with Europe flourished, Dakar became the primary port for slaves while 
Saint-Louis (see Figure 16) was the primary port for trading gum arabic.  These two 
excellent ports made Senegal an ideal bridgehead for the French to launch invasions 
across West Africa in the 19th century.  The states gave the French a mixed welcome.  
While the Wolof states resisted, several states cooperated with the French in order to 
bring down the dominant Wolof.  As the French defeated the Wolof states, the ruling 
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classes and the warrior aristocracy were eliminated, leaving the Mouride brotherhood (an 
Islamic sect dominated by the Wolof ethnic group) as the de facto leaders in northwestern 
and central Senegal.324  Although the French initially allowed cooperative tribal chiefs 
such as the Serer to maintain their authority, the local power structures were eventually 
dismantled and replaced by French administrators. 
 
Figure 16.   Map of Senegal 
As they expanded their control across Senegal, the French encouraged the 
expansion of peanut cultivation as a cash crop partly through large land grants to 
marabouts (religious leaders) for peanut farming.  The French built ports, roads, and 
railroads to facilitate peanut exportation.  Dakar, declared the administrative capital of all 
of French West Africa, became the primary port serving as an important waypoint for 
European trade routes to South America and Sub-Saharan Africa.  A two-spoke railroad 
with Dakar as the hub was built in the 1880s: northeast to the former capital of Saint 
Louis and east through the central portion of the peanut basin.  Peanut farming flourished 
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along the rail lines while the economy floundered along Senegal’s eastern and southern 
regions.  Beyond the development of infrastructure for the transportation of groundnuts, 
little industry was cultivated in colonial Senegal despite the significant presence of 
international trade and capital in Dakar. 
As they increased their control and the local infrastructure, the French 
inadvertently sparked the spread of Islam.  Previously competitive tribes were conducting 
trade and traveling by railroad.  The traditional tribal chiefs were abolished and the rural 
marabouts filled the political vacuum.325  Although originally anti-imperialist, the 
marabouts gradually developed a cooperative relationship with the French colonial 
government.  As decolonization approached, the administrative control of the French was 
carried out by the marabouts.   
Senegal became independent in 1960 through a peaceful process offered by 
President de Gaulle.  After a four-month attempt to form a federation with Mali, Senegal 
created its own government.  Although the democratic processes were limited, the 
government was far more democratic than its peers.  However, in less than two years, a 
power struggle converted the government from a competitive democracy to a one-party 
dictatorship.  Senegal gradually increased its level of democracy over a quarter of a 
century.  The next section explores the factors that led to citizen demands for something 
more in Senegal. 
B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY 
This section analyzes the change in demand for democracy in Senegal’s citizens 
in three parts.  The first part addresses various aspects of Senegal’s economy: income, 
industrialization, oil rents, and economic crisis.  The second part addresses the effect of 
the insurgency.  The final part analyzes the diffusion of democratic norms.   
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1. Income, Industrialization, and Crisis 
As discussed in Chapter II, various aspects of the economy are considered 
important variables for the growth of democracy.  An increased income level enables 
citizens to worry less about meeting basic needs and become more politically active.  
Increasing industrialization and services leads to the development of unions and 
professional associations.  In turn, these groups become important lobbying mechanisms 
to ensure that the government respects the will of the people.  Finally, economic crises, 
although not motivators for democracy, can serve as catalysts for regime change.  
Senegal’s economic experience runs against the grain of the economic theories of 
democracy.  Senegal has a very low level of income though there are pockets of higher 
income in the major cities.  Senegal has been in a 50-year economic malaise with little 
positive movement in the country’s GDP per capita.  With low levels of industrialization, 
Senegal had few significant professional associations.  Economic crises during the 1960s 
and 1970s motivated demand for change, but not democracy.  Although Senegal has 
enjoyed small periods of growth, per capita GDP has been in an economic malaise since 
independence.  However, poverty is not equally spread across the regions.  Dakar and the 
northwestern regions with major urban centers such as Thies, Diourbel, Saint-Louis, and 
Louga have the lowest poverty rates in the country.326   
Upon independence, Senegal’s economy was entirely based upon the cultivation, 
milling, and international trade of peanuts.  Attempts to diversify into textiles failed as 
the infant industry could not compete with cheap imports smuggled in through Gambia.  
As the primary commodity, peanuts became a target for the creation of government 
revenue through an export tax.  In order to more efficiently maintain accountability and 
collect the export tax, President Leopold Senghor created a government corporation with 
a monopoly on the peanut trade.  The monopoly had the additional benefit of localizing 
the economy by forcing French and Lebanese traders out of the export business.  In 1962, 
Senghor remolded Senegal into a one-party dictatorship.  As part of the rational for 
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limiting democracy, Senghor believed in modernization theory’s argument that economic 
development should occur prior to democratization.327   
At first, the Senegalese economy was kept relatively stable by French subsidies.  
But, as a condition of entry into the European Economic Community, France agreed to 
stop paying preferential prices for Senegalese peanuts.  Once France ended the subsidy in 
1968, local peanuts prices plunged 25% in Senegal.  The following year delivered a five-
year drought, exacerbating the economic problem.  The crisis brought on strikes which 
the government settled using a combination of force and incentives. 
But, the country’s second decade brought more economic problems.  The peanut 
market was hit hard in the 1970s.  Because of the disproportionately large effect that 
peanuts had on government revenue, peanut crisis equated to economic crisis.  For 
example, throughout the 1980s, groundnut products averaged only 5% of Senegal’s GDP 
while averaging 20% of exports (36% in a good year).328  But, peanut exports were 
inconsistent as the prolonged drought hurt crop yields and farmers switched to non-taxed 
subsistence agriculture.  In order to improve their profits, farmers began smuggling 
peanuts through Gambia to avoid the Senegalese export tax.329  In an effort to stem the 
tide, the government monopoly doubled its purchase price for peanuts.  While world 
peanut prices were relatively stable during the late 1970s, a strong CFA Franc (pegged to 
the French Franc) and high oil import prices narrowed profit margins on exports.  As the 
revenue stream continued to dry up, government debt increased while the state attempted 
to reign in spending. Meanwhile, in the academic literature, the development-first 
argument of modernization theory was losing favor.   Along with this change in academic 
theory, economic unrest pressured Senghor to loosen electoral rules in 1974 and extend 
participation further in 1976. 
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Struggling to stay solvent, Senegal was hit with another drought in 1977–1980 
bringing further reductions in crop yields.  Unable to balance the budget while facing 
decreasing revenues, Senegal turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
assistance.  The IMF directed Senegal to undergo a structural adjustment program as a 
condition of the loan.  Structural adjustment required economic liberalization and 
decreased government intervention in the economy.  The government dissolved the 
peanut monopoly.  But, the economy continued to suffer.  Deforestation, desertification, 
and population growth put pressure on the remaining arable land.  The export peanut 
market collapsed in the mid 1980s.  The government’s 1984 New Agricultural Policy 
ended government assistance to farmers.  Prior to the 1984 law, the government 
developed the land and provided water and easy credit to farmers.  The change increased 
capital requirements for farmers, many turning to farmer associations for help.330  As 
peanut exports collapsed 50% over two years, the export tax on nuts was removed in 
1985.331  In an effort to correct the loss of cash flow, the public administration workforce 
was cut by 10% in 1985 and an additional 20% in 1986.   
As part of the structural adjustment, Senegal passed the 1986 New Industrial 
Policy.  The policy lowered import tariffs and directed the privatization of government 
run companies.  The changes essentially wiped out Senegal’s struggling textile industry.  
The 1980s economic crisis combined with the structural adjustment caused strains to all 
sectors of the economy.  The crisis spawned an increased demand for change, especially 
in urban communities, in the 1988 presidential election.  But, the demand for change had 
little breadth.  While there were many student protests, religious leaders and the business 
community were largely absent from the demands for electoral reform. 
A preponderance of religious leaders was clients of the state.  In return for local 
control, religious leaders provided the votes of their followers to the ruling party.  Many 
religious leaders acted as landlord-clerics, providing land, credit, and equipment to loyal 
followers.  The low level of industrialization in Senegal forced the business community 
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to also be a client of the state.  The lack of capital and economic growth limited business 
independence from the regime.  Due to a lack of local capital, companies primarily 
received financing through French sources or through state regulators who could provide 
subsidized loans.332  Additionally, most services and industries survived on government 
contracts.  Those that spoke out against the ruling party could find government 
organizations choosing not to renew their contract. 
However, the portions of the business community not reliant upon government 
expenditures did organize.  The Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du 
Sénégal (UNACOIS) represented the informal sector (untaxed and unregulated); largely 
small-scale traders, retailers, and transportation workers.  UNACOIS was, in effect, a 
lobby group using protests, strikes and boycotts to oppose taxes and increased regulation.  
Although UNACOIS eventually lost the fight on the value-added tax, the group provided 
an important rally point for urban workers to participate in politics.   
Since the structural adjustment of the 1980s, the Senegalese economic landscape 
shifted considerably.  Though over two thirds of the labor force was still working in 
agriculture, agriculture sank to less than 30% of GDP, largely displaced by fish products 
and services.  Over 50% of GDP was contributed by services (e.g., commerce, 
government services, and real estate).  Industry (e.g., food processing, fertilizer, building 
materials, and utilities) remained a marginal sector, inching from 9% of GDP in 1980 to 
13% in 2000.333  After 1993, chemical product exports (solid fertilizer and phosphoric 
acid) surpassed nuts.334  Increased oil refinery capacity in 2001 provided Senegal an 
opportunity to further diversify its economic portfolio.   
Senegal’s economic development does provide a partial explanation for the level 
of democracy.  Senegal is clearly no longer a peanut economy.  The economic 
liberalization of the 1980s resulted in “the diffusion of control over economic resources 
to include groups outside of the state [which] has created diverse centers of power, thus 
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effectively limiting any hegemonic monopoly of political control.”335 While a successful 
economy is expected to result in professional associations, it was the economic crises that 
forced the bonding of interests among farmers’ associations and business groups.   
Economic crises in Senegal were a catalyst for mobilizing protests.  However, it 
was not until the severe crisis in the 1980s and the corresponding IMF-directed structural 
adjustment that businessmen and farmers began to organize into associations.  By 2000, 
the economy had recovered.  But, in order to stabilize the economy and the national debt, 
the government had cut services.  The cut in government jobs led to a serious 
underemployment problem in urban Senegal as college students become a 
disproportionately high percentage of the unemployed.  For example, in 2005, 
unemployment among university graduates in Dakar was 23.5%, ten points higher than 
those that did not attend secondary school.336  Underemployment for college graduates 
combined with increasing enrollment was a volatile mix. President Diouf was never able 
to get control of the universities, making the youth bulge an increasing electoral threat to 
his regime.337  While cutting government services enabled Diouf to balance the budget, 
the citizens punished the ruling party at the polls for the drop in services.338  Even so, the 
Senegalese citizens’ response to economic crisis appears relatively mild when compared 
to those of Mexico or the Philippines.  Perhaps this mild response can partially be 
explained by the large numbers of Senegalese emigrants who act as a safety valve for a 
portion of the economically discontent.339  
2. Intrastate Violence 
As discussed in Chapter II, an outbreak in violence is expected to deter 
democratization or encourage a regime to move towards autocracy.  Further, a transition 
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to democracy during a period of intrastate violence is unlikely to sustain democracy as a 
significant segment of the population was not involved in the design of the democratic 
processes or clearly does not agree to the “rules of the game.”  Databases for political 
violence indicate that the insurgency in Senegal ended in 1999, indicating that there was 
a potential correlation between the termination of hostilities and the large increase in the 
level of democracy in 2000.  In actuality, insurgency violence continued to persist despite 
the 2000 ceasefire.  Regardless, the insurgency in the Casamance appeared to have little 
effect on Senegalese politics even at the peak of violence.  The lack of effect can be 
attributed to the remoteness of Casamance: geographically, politically, ethnically, and 
religiously.  The security issues in the Casamance simply do not enter the political 
considerations of the majority of Senegalese.  Low levels of urban violence also appeared 
to have little effect on the overall demand for democracy.  Protests and riots never 
presented a serious security concern. 
Prior to 1982, Senegal had relatively little intrastate violence with only some 
minor riots and strikes.  In 1982, the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces 
(MFDC) began a separatist uprising in southwestern Senegal, an area dominated by 
Diola, a predominantly Catholic ethnic group with historic ties to the peoples in present 
day Guinea-Bissau.  There were several reasons for the uprising including perceptions of 
exploitation, encroachment, and ostracism.  Largely remote from Dakar due to the 
intercession of the Gambia River and the political boundaries of Gambia, the Diola 
perceived that the government provided their region less resources and favored northern 
emigrants with political appointments and land grants in the region.340  During the 1970s 
drought, many northern farmers moved to the lush Casamance region.  The migration 
inevitably caused tensions over land and the perception that the government privileged 
the rights of the northerners at the expense of the people of Casamance. 
Surprisingly, the Casamance insurgency had little impact on the rest of Senegal.  
This appears largely due to the fact that events in the Casamance have little effect on the 
security in other regions of Senegal due to its isolation.  With the ocean to its West and 
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Gambia to the North, Casamance is logistically difficult to get to from northern Senegal.  
The ocean ferry from Dakar is slow and weather-dependent.  Driving from northern 
Senegal requires the use of a river ferry and four customs and immigration inspections 
going into and out of Gambia.  It is possible that citizens are also reassured by the 
presence of French troops in Dakar.  However, the French do not provide internal 
security but instead are meant to deter interstate conflict.  Additionally, the level of 
violence from the insurgency is relatively low, rarely reaching the threshold for inclusion 
into political violence databases.  Between the Political Instability Task Force and the 
Major Episodes of Political Violence databases, only 1992–1999 were designated as 
episodes of significant violence.  Although a ceasefire was signed just prior to the 2000 
election, low levels of violence continued to persist.  Despite the fact that opposition 
candidate Abdoulaye Wade attempted to politicize the Casamance insurgency by 
claiming that he could settle the issue within 100 days, it is doubtful that the issue had 
any significant effect on voting patterns beyond the relatively few areas in the Casamance 
where security was a major concern.  
Urban unrest had a far more significant impact upon the citizenry’s political 
preferences than the insurgency.  Urban unrest began to grow during the 1984 economic 
crisis as students protested the lack of promised educational reforms and lack of jobs for 
graduates.  After the 1988 elections, urban youth and university students rioted, accusing 
President Diouf of fraud.  In response, the government arrested opposition leader 
Abdoulaye Wade as an instigator and closed the university for the school year.  The 
increasing tensions were momentarily defused by an international conflict. 
In response to desertification and drought, a joint effort of Mali, Mauritania, and 
Senegal constructed two major dams along the Senegal River in the mid-1980s 
dramatically increasing the value of nearby land on both sides of the Mauritania-Senegal 
border.  Despite the political boundary that bifurcated the two shores of the Senegal River 
Valley, there was a common ethnicity among the black Africans that farmed the land on 
either side of the river.  In 1988, Mauritania began a land redistribution campaign 
designed to increase farming efficiency by providing land to those with the capital 
required for modern farming.  The redistribution gave the appearance that the 
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Mauritanian government, predominantly Arab Moors, was seizing the lands from poor 
blacks and giving it to wealthy Moors.341  Senegalese public opinion widely sided with 
the plight of the black Africans.  Tensions flared after an incident in which two 
Senegalese were killed by Mauritanian soldiers.  Anti-Moor violence erupted in Senegal.  
In retribution, ethnic violence broke out in Mauritania.  The conflict ended with an ethnic 
trade.  Most Moors left Senegal while most black Africans left Mauritania.  Instead of 
faulting the government for its failure to prevent ethnic violence, most Senegalese 
supported the government’s aggressive stance against the Mauritanians in support of their 
ethnic brothers.342 
Senegal remained relatively calm until the next presidential election.  In March 
1993, Kéba Mbaye resigned as president of the Constitutional Council during tabulation 
of the presidential vote.  Two months later, the vice-president of the Constitutional 
Council, Babacar Séye, was assassinated during the deliberation of electoral challenges.  
The government blamed the opposition and arrested Wade, once again, amid post-
election riots.  Overall, intrastate violence had little effect on the demand for democracy 
in Senegal.  While, economic crisis and implications of election fraud motivated protests, 
containing these activities was within the repressive capacities of the state and presented 
no security threat to the overall population. 
3. The Diffusion of Norms  
As discussed in Chapter II, the spread of democratic ideas provides citizens 
increased awareness of the benefits of democracy relative to autocracy and an improved 
ability to analyze the existing level of democracy.  These norms highlight the inadequacy 
of democratic processes in hybrid regimes and underscore democracy as the rational 
choice.  Norms have a wide variety of inputs including colonial legacy, ethno-religious 
identity, access to information, religious organizations, and international influence.  
Democratic ideals in Senegal were shaped by the Senegalese political experience under 
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French colonial rule and reinforced by continual contact of Senegalese urban elites with 
France through travel and literature.  Democratic ideals gradually spread to rural areas 
through political rallies and independent radio. 
Despite the ethno-religious diversity of Senegal, the mixing bowl effect and the 
predominance of the Wolof language defused group identity as an obstacle to democracy.  
The ebb and flow of empires and migration introduced Islam into Senegal and left the 
region with nine partially integrated ethnic groups.  Western Senegal was the domain of 
the Fulbe, Lebu, Serer, and Wolof.  The Tukulor had scattered concentrations along the 
eastern border.  The south was a mixture of Bambara, Diola, Fulbe, Mandinka, and 
Sarakollé.  Wolof is the largest of Senegal’s ethnic groups comprising 40% of the 
population while Tukulor, Serer, and Diola are also major ethnic groups.  The majority of 
the ethnic groups are Muslim, though the Diola, influenced by the Portuguese in Guinea-
Bissau, are largely Catholic.  Although the separatists in the Casamance are Catholic 
Diola, the homogeneity of the insurgency has not caused ethnic or religious tensions for 
Catholics or Diola in the rest of Senegal.  A frequent explanation for the collegial 
relationship is the “joking cousins” bond that creates a mythical kinship across tribes.343 
During the majority of colonial rule, Senegalese voters were a seemingly 
homogenous group of urban elites.  Under the French, select elites, about five percent, of 
Senegalese from the Four Communes (Saint Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque) were 
permitted to vote beginning in 1848.344  Although the colonizers worked to turn the 
locals into Frechmen, the communes were not homogenous.  They were a mix of Wolof, 
Serer, and Lebu; primarily Muslim but with a significant Christian minority.  Although 
Islam is often critiqued as incompatible with democracy, Senegalese Islam is known for 
being tolerant and flexible.345  Certainly, a portion of the acceptance of democratic ideals 
is attributable to the French colonial system which developed political awareness among 
the urban Senegalese elites.  
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Democratic ideals spread little beyond the four communes until after World War 
II when suffrage was extended to males nationwide, a territorial assembly was created, 
and Senegalese representation in the French National Assembly was expanded to two 
deputies and three senators.  In 1956, women were given the right to vote.  By the time 
that independence arrived in 1960, Senegalese elites had a healthy supply of politicians, 
knowledge of democracy, and a desire to be a “modern” state.  But, this development was 
primarily urban.  Although the communes developed French-educated intellectuals for 
politicians, the rural population looked to the marabouts as their political leaders while 
universal participation did spread a national sense of citizenship with the right of 
participation.  Perhaps the most tangible democratic outcome of colonization was 
Senegal’s constitutional design.  Largely influenced by the French Constitution of 1958, 
Senegal adopted France’s mixed executive system, administrative divisions with regions 
and departments, and the length of the presidential term.   
Urban democratic ideals were strong at independence and maintained through 
social interactions, the progressive university system, and the influence of international 
norms.  There were especially significant interactions between France and Senegal; 
Senegal is a tourist destination for the French while France is popular among Senegalese 
migrant workers.  To a lesser extent, Senegalese migrant workers developed significant 
stocks in other democracies such as Italy, Spain, the United States, and Canada.   
Despite this apparent success, democratic norms had not spread to the rural 
communities.  The French administered the rural regions through a patron-client system 
operated through the marabouts.  Like Mexico and the Philippines, Senegal’s autocracy 
was highly centralized.  Although each region had a governor and assembly, their actual 
power was limited.  Rural councils gradually replaced the powerless regional assemblies 
beginning in 1972.  Although these councils had some local regulatory authority, they 
lacked independence from the existing political structure.  One third of council seats were 
reserved for the cooperatives run by the marabouts.  The leader of the rural council was a 




replace council members at will or veto council laws.  The structure of the rural council 
merely served to reinforce the authority of the executive and the patronage system 
established through the marabouts. 
The rural communities at independence were largely illiterate and un-educated.  
National literacy rates remained less than 10% through 1980.  Even as recent as 2007, 
only 39% of the population was literate in the national language while another 20% was 
literate only in Arabic or a non-national tribal language.346  Primary school enrollment, 
only 45% in 1990, in rural areas was only a third of that in the urban communities. 347  
The spread of suffrage without the spread of democratic ideals merely led to the 
institutionalization of patronage.  Government control of print, television, and radio 
media also restrained the spread of democratic norms. Even as the economy developed 
and enabled the rise of independent newspapers and information technology, information 
distribution was largely constrained to Dakar.   
Despite the lack of literacy and education rates, democratic ideals did spread to 
rural Senegal.  To a large extent, egalitarian and democratic ideals were diffused by 
politicians themselves during political speeches delivered in local languages.348  Politics 
was often discussed in communities with an unusually high level of social interaction 
through grassroots associations formed around agriculture, youth groups, and women’s 
groups.  The arrival of independent radio in 1994 multiplied this interaction while 
providing nationwide political awareness.  The independence of radio in Senegal was 
critical because it was and remains the primary method of information distribution.  
While less than five percent of Senegalese have a phone or a computer, even 
sheepherders have a radio.349  However, the spread of democratic ideals through political 
speeches and radio presented divergent understandings of democracy.  A majority of the 
population equated democracy to civil liberties while local academics often evaluated the 
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country’s democracy based upon governance outcomes such as justice or corruption.350 
Nevertheless, the importance of radio was felt during the 1996 elections when radio was 
a medium for reporting election irregularities and results.  During the 2000 elections, the 
electoral monitoring power of radio was augmented with the use of cell phones by 
journalists and democratic activists.   
C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY 
As mentioned in Chapter II, supply of democracy is a measure of the action, or 
inaction, taken by political institutions in support of or against the implementation or 
removal of democratic processes.  The suppliers of democracy are largely influenced by 
the same economic, security, and informational factors that influence demand.  At times, 
suppliers may be influenced directly by changes in demand.  Of course, a change in 
demand does not dictate a change in supply.  The factors that influenced demand may not 
have the same magnitude or even the same direction of influence upon supply. 
A variety of political institutions were responsible for delivering democracy to 
Senegal.  The acquiescence of the military and the decisions of political parties were 
important elements in permitting the growth and sustenance of democracy.  The most 
critical element, though, appears to be the regime itself.  The ruling party made the key 
electoral laws that allowed the opposition to legally take power. 
1. Senegal’s Military 
As discussed in Chapter II, the factors discussed above which influence civil 
society also influence the military’s decision to remain apolitical or to allow civilian 
control of the military.  In the case of Senegal, the diffusion of norms guided the 
military’s actions.  Senegal has a small, professional military with an incredible diffusion 
of democratic ideals, respect for the constitution, respect for other professions, and a 
commitment to remain above politics.  Senegal’s civil-military relations were shaped 
largely by professional military education. 
                                                 
350 Afrobarometer, Round 3, Survey in Senegal, 2005 and 2008, online: 
http://afrobarometer.org/senegal.htm (accessed 10 Oct 2009). 
 218
The Senegalese military began in the 19th century as riflemen for the French 
expansion across West Africa.  The units were led by French officers.  Upon 
independence, a civilian Defense Minister was placed in charge of the armed forces.  
However, the Senegalese military continued to rely upon French advisors in senior 
positions for another decade in order to cultivate a Senegalese senior officer corps based 
upon merit.  Through the 1980s, almost all Senegalese military officers received their 
college education (e.g., military academy), military training (e.g., flight school), and 
professional military education overseas, primarily in France, the United States, and 
Morocco.  Certainly, Senegalese officers had far more exposure to democratic norms 
when in France or the United States than they would have had in autocratic Senegal.  
Therefore, the foreign professionalization of the military appears to be a key determinant 
in minimizing the military’s preference for intervening in politics and its preference for 
not repressing demonstrators.   
The Senegalese military’s apolitical norms were institutionalized by the second 
Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Jean Alfred Diallo.  General Diallo kept the 
military from intervening in the power struggle between President Senghor and Prime 
Minister Mamadou Dia during the early 1960s.  In 1968, General Diallo refused to use 
force against student protestors.  Twenty years later, General Joseph Louis Tavarez De 
Souza stayed faithful to the norm and refused to use force against post-election 
protestors.   
The military’s refusal to use force against anti-regime protestors suggests a 
considerable amount of independence from the government.  Despite some of the perks 
provided to the military by the ruling regime, this independence left the ruling regime 
with a reasonable doubt as to whether the military would protect the regime in the face of 
widespread protests in the manner of the Philippines’ People Power Revolt.  Although the 
military chief of staff in 2000 was a close friend of Diouf’s nephew, the generals in 
charge of the Interior Ministry and the National Electoral Observatory (ONEL) clearly 
indicated that they would not obstruct democracy when they declared Wade as the victor 
of the 2000 presidential race. 
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The effects of the economy and violence upon the military appear limited.  
Increases in intrastate violence have not led to military requests for reductions in 
democratic processes or freedoms in order to contain the insurgency.  Although it is 
possible that the stalemate in Casamance disillusioned the military with Diouf’s 
leadership, there is no evidence to suggest that this influenced the military to prefer a 
change. 
2. NGOs 
As discussed in Chapter II, NGOs have neither the force of the military to 
implement democracy nor the authority to adopt changes to the constitution.  However, 
NGOs do have the ability to monitor the freeness of elections and provide increased 
accountability of the other suppliers of democracy.  In the case of Senegal, NGOs did 
little to successfully increase the supply of democracy in Senegal.  In fact, the marabouts 
were a significant obstacle to democracy as they contributed to the patronage system of 
coercion and incentives to warp the political system.  Although there are increasing 
numbers of NGOs in Senegal, they have not yet had the influence required to 
successfully implement change during their interaction with the ruling regime. 
Traditional NGOs have had little effect on democracy in Senegal.  The number of 
NGOs in Senegal jumped in the 1980s and Senegalese are very engaged; most 
Senegalese belong to at least one organization and are more politically active than other 
developed countries.351  Despite this, unions and civil society organizations have had 
little impact on the level of democracy.  Historically, unions were clients of the state and 
had no independent voice.  Contemporary unions are divided and have little influence at 
the national level.352  The only NGO that made significant headway was Assises 
Nationales, National Forum; a coalition of NGOs, political parties, retired senior  
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government officials, and academics.  The forum spent considerable effort evaluating and 
recommending constitutional design changes but was largely blocked by Wade’s ruling 
regime. 
While traditional NGOs had little effect in improving democracy, religious groups 
were a factor in sustaining the autocracy.  By far, the most powerful non-governmental 
organizations in Senegal are the religious groups.  Senegalese are principally members of 
Sufi Islam, which is organized in the country under two brotherhoods: Tijaniyya and 
Mouride.  Although the Tijaniyya are more numerous, the Mourides are both more 
organized, more hierachical, and more active politically.  The power of the brotherhoods’ 
marabouts, or religious leaders, is a combination of political savvy, religious ideology, 
and economic resources.   
Initially, the marabouts resisted French culture.  But, in time, the marabouts 
traded their political support to the French in exchange for peanut trading licenses and 
funding for mosques.  Upon independence, the marabouts provided their support to 
Senghor in return for his maintenance of the economic status quo in which the marabouts 
dominated the market.  The resulting structure was akin to a federal system in which the 
marabouts, although beholden to the government for resources, held autonomy over their 
areas of control.  Some marabouts even had significant influence over the appointees of 
the local rural council. 
Many Mouride marabouts rose to political prominence as part boss, part patron 
and part political dynasty.  The marabouts’s social status provided an inherent ability to 
coerce and incentivize the community while their influence on the distribution of state 
resources allowed them to establish an economic patronage system.353  Followers of the 
marabouts received land, credit, equipment, and spiritual benefits in exchange for loyalty 
and part-time labor in the marabout’s field.  Some followers had their children work full-
time for the marabout in exchange for the child’s education.354  In many cases, the 
marabout provided full-time workers with their own plot of land after ten years of 
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dedicated labor.355  However, the control of the marabouts over his followers should not 
be overstated.  The marabouts were important individuals with good connections, but 
were not considered infallible with unquestionable authority.356   
Marabout authority became a political dynasty because the marabout title was 
largely inherited.  While there are tens of thousands of marabouts in Senegal, only a 
handful have more than a local following.  Although not all marabouts inherited their 
title, the most powerful are from family dynasties because a marabout’s spiritual grace is 
said to be inherited from the founder of the brotherhood.   
In many cases, some marabouts acted as a patron to the people and a client of the 
state.  Some marabouts ordered their followers to vote for the incumbent party, the Parti 
Socialist (PS).  In exchange, the PS delivered state resources and recognition of the 
marabouts’ religious authority.357  The relationship began to crack in 1988 when Caliph 
Abdou Lahatt created resentment when he ordered followers to vote for Diouf in 
exchange for government funding of projects in the holy city of Touba.358  As the next 
presidential election approached, public debates erupted over interpretations of a 
marabout’s ndigel (religious command or recommendation).  The translation of the term 
is ambiguous precisely because the use of the term was ambiguous.  To some it was a 
religious command that if not followed jeopardized the transgressor’s opportunity for 
paradise in the afterlife.  To others, it was simply a recommendation that should be 
considered among other factors. 
By 2000, citizens had largely come to separate their political and religious beliefs.  
Many influential marabouts supported Diouf but he lost anyway.  After his victory, Wade 
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maintained the marabouts as clients of the state, giving them funding, cash, or diplomatic 
passports.  Many perceive the marabouts, particularly the Mourides brotherhood, as a part 
of the ruling party.  Because of this perceived tie to the ruling party, the marabouts’ 
political recommendations for the incumbents are viewed by some with suspicion.   
3. Political Parties 
Political parties are important to democracy for two reasons.  First, the opposition 
provides a limited constraining effect upon the ruling regime’s policy options.  Issues of 
security, economy, and norms are important drivers for motivating an opposition to form, 
voice its dissent, and mobilize the citizens to demand change.  Second, the ruling party is 
often the power base of the coalition supporting the ruling regime.  When the party 
fractures, the regime’s ability to maintain power is weakened.  In the case of Senegal, the 
fracturing of the ruling party and the existence of a viable, organized opposition party 
enabled a peaceful change in government to take place, greatly increasing the level of 
democracy in Senegal.    
The roots of contemporary Senegalese political parties began well before 
independence.  Initially under colonial rule, all politicians were French.  Over time, the 
Senegalese cultivated their own politicians; electing one of their own, Blaise Diagne, to 
the French National Assembly in 1914.  As the number of Senegalese politicians 
increased, political parties proliferated.  One of the most popular and most powerful in 
the 1950s was the Bloc Democratique Senegalais (BDS).  In 1958, the BDS consolidated 
its power by merging with several smaller parties; renaming itself the Union Progressiste 
Senegalais (UPS).   For 40 years, the UPS, later renamed the Parti Socialist (PS) under 
Senghor’s three-party system, was a defender of the semi-autocratic system. 
The major political parties were powerful entities.  Under the one-party system, 
the PS determined all of the candidates in an entirely undemocratic manner.  The 
proportional representation, party list system adopted during the 1970s institutionalized 
this power.  Under the party list system, the party leadership determined which names 
were put onto the party list.  Since the majority of political positions were determined by  
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party list and few candidates ran as independents, the party leadership largely determined 
candidates.  Since the elections were not very competitive, the party leadership was 
essentially selecting the representatives. 
The strength of the PS party members and their importance to the presidential 
coalition was not readily apparent until Diouf replaced Senghor as President.  The PS 
party’s old guard resented that Senghor chose the younger Diouf to be president.  Diouf 
exacerbated the tensions by pushing the old guard, and their constituents, out of party 
power.  As Diouf reduced the thresholds for party creation partly in an effort to fracture 
the opposition, disenfranchised party leaders created their own party; weakening the PS 
over the long term.  Over time, the splits eventually created 73 registered political parties, 
though this generally equated into six to fifteen coalitions for a presidential candidate.359  
Similar to the experience in the Philippines, the party splits resulted in ambiguous 
ideological differences between parties, people instead rallying around the charisma of 
the party leader.  Recognizing the weakening of the PS, Diouf brought several of the old 
guard back into party power in preparation for the 1993 elections.  Even so, the PS 
continued to suffer major defections in the 1990s.  Djibo Leyti Kâ, former Minister of the 
Interior, split from the PS in 1998 to create the Union for Democratic Renewal.  
Moustapha Niasse, the Foreign Minister, split from the PS just prior to the 2000 election 
to create the Alliance of the Forces of Progress. 
As the PS weakened during the 1990s, the opposition party led by Wade, the Parti 
Democratique Senegalais (PDS) gained momentum, especially among the universities 
and young urban adults.  Population trends worked in the PDS’ favor as migrants fed the 
urban population, university enrollment increased, and the population boom led to a 
youth bulge.  However, party influence on the supply of democracy was indirect at best.  
PS actions over the 40 years of its rule largely encouraged the autocratic status quo.  The 
weakening of the PS strained the government’s ability to sustain the autocratic system.  
Although the PDS did not supply democracy per se, the existence of a viable, organized 
opposition was critical to the political change in power in 2000.  However, once in 
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power, the PDS began to adopt measures that suggested an attempt to decrease the level 
of democracy.  But, despite the efforts of the parties, the final call on political reform 
rested with the ruling executive. 
4. The Ruling Regime: Incremental Departures from Autocracy 
From Chapter II, the ruling regime will adopt electoral changes when it is in its 
best interests and the interests of the regime’s key supporters.  In the case of Senegal, the 
ruling regime was the direct implementer of political reforms.  These reform periods can 
be grouped into three periods: the single party (1960-73), clientalistic democracy (1974–
88), and competitive elections (1989-present).  Economic unrest was a consistent 
motivator for Presidents Senghor and Diouf to approve democratic reforms.  As the 
economy worsened under President Diouf, influencing factors upon reform broadened to 
post-election riots, international pressure, and the anti-repression norms of the military. 
After independence and a brief failed experiment as a member of the Federation 
of Mali, Senegal created a political system based upon the French model.  Free, 
competitive elections with open participation led to the selection of Senghor as Senegal’s 
first president.  More unusual than the free election was the acceptance of the defeat by 
his opponent who had significant support within the urban community.  What appeared to 
be a shining example of African democracy quickly became a sham as the system 
devolved into a one-party dictatorship.   
An ideological split arose between President Senghor and Prime Minister Dia.  
Dia’s attempts to push the government to the far left resulted in his censure and 
imprisonment in 1962.  In order to prevent such a future crisis, Senghor, with the 
approval of the legislature, enacted a constitutional reform that transferred additional 
powers to the executive branch.  Senghor used his increased authority to coerce and 
incentivize opposition parties into joining the governing party.  Parties that refused to 
join, such as the Marxist Parti Africain de l’Independence and the Bloc des Masses 
Senegalaises, were banned.  By the 1968 legislative elections, only candidates from the 
governing party were competing.  Senghor attempted to deflect criticism of this one-party 
rule by referring to the system as unified party rule.  Senghor used similar coercion and 
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incentives to bring the various unions into the government-sponsored union, the National 
Union of Senegalese Workers (UNTS).  Disobedient or disruptive unions were often 
disbanded.  When the UNTS went on strike in 1968, it was dissolved by the government 
and replaced by another national union, the National Confederation of Senegalese 
Workers.  Senghor’s control of the political parties and the unions ensured his re-
elections. 
Several factors motivated Senghor to reform the Senegalese political system in 
the 1970s.  Although Senghor certainly understood democratic ideals from his experience 
under French rule, his actions towards Dia and his coercive tactics against the unions and 
opposition parties makes it difficult to conclude that reform occurred solely because of 
Senghor’s democratic ideals.  However, Senghor did want to portray Senegal as a modern 
society to France and the United States.  As mentioned previously, Senghor believed 
modernization theory’s argument that development should precede democracy.  But, by 
the 1970s, the modernization hypothesis was facing much criticism while Senegal was 
suffering a prolonged economic malaise.  Droughts and volatile peanut prices were 
hurting the local economy and cutting into the government’s tax revenues.  In order to 
provide an outlet, Senghor began incrementally permitting additional parties to 
participate in politics.  At first, with the urging of Wade, a single opposition party, the 
PDS, was allowed to become an official party in 1974.   
Two years later in 1976, the rules were rewritten, creating a three-party system 
based upon predetermined ideological lines: social democratic, liberal democratic, and 
Marxist.  The ruling party took the mantle of the social democrats.  The previously 
banned Marxist party, the Parti Africain d’Independence logically took the Marxist 
banner.  The PDS, unhappy about having to adopt a specific ideological tag, 
begrudgingly accepted the liberal democratic category.  A few years later, in 1979, a 
fourth category was added for a conservative party, which was filled by the Mouvement 
Republicain Senegalais.  Despite the reforms, one popular party was intentionally 
excluded, the Rassemblement National Democratique led by the charismatic and 
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accomplished historian, Cheikh Anta Diop.360  Regardless, the reforms dispersed little 
real political power as the three new parties initially garnered little popular support.  Only 
with the help of the newly instituted proportional representation system did the 
opposition manage to gain a few seats in the legislature, technically ending the one-party 
system.  However, representation was a mixed system with the majority of the seats still 
filled by a first-past-the-post majoritarian election that favored the incumbent party.  The 
Senghor reforms provided a controlled outlet for political dissent with only a minimal 
increase in the level of democracy. 
Despite his party’s continued dominance, Senghor’s control over future 
presidential elections was threatened by competition.  In order to compensate, Senghor 
created a patronage network using the marabouts as his clients.361  The patronage 
included the controlled distribution of land, credit, and peanut trade licenses.  In turn, 
marabouts used these benefits to create a client base of their own which they would use to 
support Senghor, the ultimate distributor of benefits.    The open public voting system 
(secret ballots were rare) enabled patrons to monitor the voting choices of their clients.  
Ballots were arranged by party affiliation.  To vote for the opposition, a voter had to 
select the opposition ballot in plain view of the voting officials and those in line to vote.  
A vote for the opposition would quickly be known by the client’s benefactor. 
Senegal’s debt crisis in the 1980s greatly constrained Senghor’s ability to 
maintain the patronage network.  With his support base splintering, Senghor agreed to 
voluntarily step down from power.  When Senghor retired from the presidency in 1981, 
the constitutional rules of succession made Prime Minister Diouf the new President.  
Widely hailed at the time as a rare peaceful transition of power in African politics, the 
succession was entirely constructed.  Senghor used the reforms of 1978 to move the  
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power of appointing the Prime Minister from the National Assembly to the President and 
designate the Prime Minister as the successor to the President.  In this manner, Senghor 
was able to personally determine his successor. 
From the start, Diouf did not have the same political power as Senghor.  The 
undemocratic nature of Diouf’s accession was seen by many inside and outside of the 
government as illegitimate.  In the eyes of the PS old guard, their loyalty and years of 
service were insulted by the selection of the young Diouf as President.  Meanwhile, 
unrest was continuing to grow over the enduring economic slump.  In an attempt to shore 
up his power, Diouf immediately set about instituting political reform by lifting the 
limitations on creating political parties.  The reforms appeared democratic in nature but 
the effect fragmented the opposition and temporarily solidified the power of the ruling 
party.  Ironically, over the long term the reform weakened the ruling party as it gave party 
leaders and government ministers the opportunity to defect from the PS without joining 
the ideological opposition. 
Even though he won the 1988 election, Diouf was starting to lose his grip on 
power.  His victory sparked urban protests over perceived voter fraud.  Although it is 
possible that fraud was a factor, Diouf had significant support among the rural 
population.  Although the opposition dominated the cities, the PDS lacked the resources 
to make inroads into the rural areas where the majority of the population lived.362   
The election unrest, combined with continued tensions in the Casamance and 
increasing economic and international pressure, influenced Diouf to adopt additional 
reforms.  In an attempt to diffuse regional tensions, Diouf enacted the Second 
Administrative Reform, which delegated various functions and resources to rural councils 
and city mayors.363  As Senegal continued to struggle through structural adjustment, 
Diouf turned to the French for additional financial aid.  As a condition of the aid, French 
President Mitterand demanded political reforms.  As a first step, Diouf created a coalition 
government in 1991, which brought four opposition leaders, including Wade, into the 
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government as cabinet level officials.  Once inside the government, the opposition leaders 
used the opportunity to craft a new electoral code.  Under pressure from France and with 
an eye to preventing future electoral protests, Diouf agreed to adopt the new electoral 
code. 
The 1992 electoral code mandated the secret ballot, implemented various rules 
designed to reduce vote fraud such as a national identification card, enacted Presidential 
term limit of two terms while increasing the term to seven years (from five), and 
instituted a requirement for a run-off vote if the leader did not receive votes exceeding 
25% of registered voters (not votes, but registered voters).  Several months after the 
reforms were signed into law, Wade left his government position so that he could legally 
compete in the 1993 presidential election. 
With the new electoral rules, the opposition gained ground in the legislature.  But, 
President Diouf won re-election.  Once again, urban supporters of Wade rioted, 
protesting the suspected fraud.  Wade was arrested, though later released, under the 
pretext of the murder of the vice president of the Constitutional Council.  Although 
French pressure on Senegal for political reforms eased in 1993 when Balladur became 
President of France, limited increases in democracy sprang up in several of Senegal’s 
neighbors.  From 1991 through 1994, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger each 
dramatically improved their level of democracy.364  Senegal no longer represented the 
pinnacle of West African democracy.  Maintaining Senegal’s image as a modern country 
was an important priority for Diouf.  As the Soviet Union collapsed, a high level of 
democracy came to be associated as a core element of a modern state.  Diouf’s support 
for reforms in 1996 and 1997 were likely a combination of a continuing desire to prevent 
post-election riots and a desire to retake Senegal’s place as the beacon of modernity in 
West Africa.  In 1996, the executive removed the Interior Ministry’s oversight power of 
local governments.  In 1997, Diouf approved the creation of the National Electoral  
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Observatory (ONEL).365  ONEL was the Senegalese version of Mexico’s Federal 
Electoral Institute; it was a non-partisan organization that worked to ensure the fairness 
of elections. 
Although willing to adopt more democratic elections, Diouf was not interested in 
relinquishing power.  In 1998, Diouf counteracted several of the 1992 reforms by 
removing presidential term limits, allowing Diouf to run for re-election.  The change also 
founded the senate, a legislative body in which the majority of the seats were filled by 
Presidential appointment, further consolidating the President’s power.  The creation of 
the senate also provided Diouf a patronage outlet for party loyalists as the PS starting 
losing seats in the legislature.366 
Despite these moves, Diouf lost the 2000 election to Wade.  Diouf’s loss was not 
entirely a surprise.  Influenced by the independent university education, the independent 
media, and the decreasing government expenditures amid increasing unemployment and 
poverty, the increasing youth demographic voted for Wade.  Meanwhile, Diouf had 
ostracized many of his senior political leaders who left the PS to start their own parties, 
weakening Diouf’s support base.   
Diouf had little choice but to step down.  Wade’s victory was widely exclaimed 
through the media and validated by the military generals running the electoral 
commission and the interior ministry.  The riots after the 1988 and 1993 elections likely 
served as an indicator of what might occur if Diouf refused to step down.  Diouf could 
not be sure that the military would back him.  Only the year before in nearby Cote 
d’Ivoire, massive street protests led the military to oust President Henri Bedie.  But, even 
if the military did support Diouf in such a move, Senegal’s closet allies, France and the 
United States, would condemn his autocratic action and likely cut aid, a key input to 
keeping the Senegalese government functioning. 
Wade’s victory in 2000 was an indicator that the electoral reforms of the 1990s 
were successful.  Senegal had reached its pinnacle of democracy, though it was the 1990s 
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reform and not Wade’s victory itself that brought democracy.  In fact, many experts argue 
that Senegalese democracy has taken a step back during Wade’s administration.  Wade’s 
first reforms were promising.  He redesigned the constitution in 2001 through a 
referendum, reinstating term limits for the President, reducing the President’s term to five 
years (from seven) and abolishing the senate.367   
After 2001, reforms took a troubling turn.  Unable to institute his policies with a 
PS majority in the legislature, Wade called for early elections.  The new legislative 
elections, riding the momentum of Wade’s victory, formed a PDS majority legislature.  In 
2007, the prospects for sustaining democracy in Senegal started to look bleak.  Evidence 
suggests that Wade rebuilt the patron-client system used by Senghor and Diouf.      
Reminiscent of 1988, a senior marabout said on national television that Wade’s reelection 
in 2007 would be good for the holy city of Touba.368  However, the return on investment 
for the marabouts alliance is unclear since their ability to provide votes has been limited 
since the 1988 debacle.  Wade gave the military the right to vote, allegedly hoping that 
the military would thank him with votes.  Wade reinstated the senate.  Just as before 
Wade abolished it, two thirds of the members were appointed by the President.  This not 
only solidified Wade’s hold on power, but was a method of patronage to provide senior 
government positions to his supporters.  A twelve-party (including two major parties) 
opposition boycott over electoral rolls during the 2007 elections dramatically pushed the 
assembly further into the PDS camp.  But the legislature was not entirely new.  Like the 
Philippines experience, many PS politicians switched to PDS in recognition of the change 
in power.369  
There is some concern that Wade is working to both extend his tenure and select 
his successor.  The reinstatement of term limits in 2001 was carefully worded to ensure 
that Wade’s 2000 election did not count towards the two-term limit.  Wade helped ensure 
his re-election in 2007 by reducing the term limit to five years.  After getting re-elected, 
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the term was lengthened back to seven years for the term beginning in 2012. Even if 
Wade decides not to run in 2012, many suspect that Wade will rule behind the scenes 
especially if a PDS member like his son, Karim Wade, is elected.  Karim Wade is widely 
suspected of nepotism due to his prime government positions.  Shortly after the senior 
Wade was elected, Karim became the personal advisor to the President.  As a stepping 
stone towards the Presidency, Karim Wade ran on the Dakar city council party list in an 
effort to become the Mayor of Dakar.  When Karim’s party list failed to win enough seats 
on the city council to guarantee him the mayorship, he was granted a national cabinet seat 
as the Minister of Transportation. 
The checks and balances within the government were lacking.  The legislature 
was weak.  Wade routinely exercised the presidential authority to hire and fire the Prime 
Minister, firing five prime ministers within seven years.  Evidence of repression of the 
media and the opposition increased through the police and Wade’s youth security team.  
Books providing detailed evidence of government corruption are banned.  In 2005, 
Idrissa Seck was arrested on trumped up charges due to a growing political rivalry with 
President Wade.  Seck was released eight months later.   
Senegal’s current democracy appears to be over-rated.  The president’s power 
over the prime minister, control of the senate, and a super-majority in the house, suggest 
dramatically less constraints on the executive than comparatively scored polities.  
Increasing reports of repression also suggest that Senegal is neither as competitive nor as 
participatory as previously thought.  It would appear that Senegal has returned to the de 
facto one-party state, but merely under a new party.  However, the March 2009 elections 
appear promising: the opposition won city elections in every major city, indicating that 
democracy continues to survive in Senegal. 
The Western academic literature often exaggerates the level of democracy in 
Senegal perhaps because it was long a rarity across Africa.  But the quality of democracy 
in Senegal is somewhat analogous to the country’s Statue of the Renaissance.  The statue 
is a beautiful, giant statue akin to the American’s Statue of Liberty.  It shows a man with 
a woman at his side and a baby in his arm.  The statue is supposed to symbolize Africa’s 
progress towards modernity.  Although progressive in concept, everything about the 
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statue seems wrong.  Besides the decadent opulence of the statue in a poor country, the 
statue has several features that complement neither the desired image nor the host 
country.  Allegedly built by North Koreans, the figures’ facial features, hair, and clothing 
simply do not look African.  Contrary to depicting gender equality, the Barbie-skinny 
woman, with long straight hair blowing in the wind, is being pulled along by the muscle-
bound man.  The figures are scantily clad, the woman partially nude, in a community that 
dresses very conservatively.  The ragged clothing looks like something from the jungles 
of a Tarzan movie instead of traditional dress.  Like democracy in Senegal, the statue 
looks good at a glance.  But, when analyzed, it has serious flaws. 
D. SUMMARY 
One of the driving factors behind all of Senegal’s periods of democratization was 
Senegal’s high level of democratic norms.  Senegalese citizens had a high demand for 
democracy since colonial times.  An elite desire to maintain Senegal as a modern state in 
the image of France and Senegal helped sustain a high demand for democracy throughout 
the urban community.  Senegal’s unusually high level of democratic norms overcame 
Senegal’s low-income, lack of industrialization and correspondingly low education and 
literacy rates.   
However, Senegal’s pre-existing democratic norms do not adequately explain the 
timing of democratization.  For Senegal, the most important structural influence upon 
actors was the economy and international pressure.  The economic crisis of the 1970s 
drove the ruling regime to increase political participation as an outlet to public unrest.  
However, the changes were designed to limit the decrease in the ruling party’s power.    
The ruling regime agreed to reforms in 1992 and 1997 due to post-electoral protests, the 
continuing economic crisis, and the corresponding conditional aid from France.  While 
many of these factors continued to influence an increased demand for change during the 
2000 election and the fracturing of the ruling party, the peaceful handover of power was 
primarily influenced by the military’s aversion to repression as well as the potential for 
reduced aid for undertaking autocratic measures in the post-Cold War era. 
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Beyond the urban post-electoral protests that had only limited violence, intrastate 
violence had virtually no impact on Senegalese democracy.  The insurgency was limited 
to Senegal’s periphery with a relatively low level of violence.  While ceasefires continued 
to fail, the overall death toll from the insurgency is fairly low, not even meeting the 
minimum threshold for many databases that track political violence.  Due to its 
remoteness, the insurgency in Casamance was not a security concern for the majority of 
Senegalese and therefore, had little effect on preferences for either citizens or actors. 
Each of Senegal’s three Presidents has shown a tendency to revert to power 
consolidation.  These reductions in the level of democracy were less a result of structural 
factors than the threat of a rising opposition power.  Senghor was threatened by Prime 
Minister Dia’s political maneuvering.  In response, Senghor created the one-party and 
one-union state.  Diouf was threatened by the growing strength of the PDS; he removed 
term limits and created the senate.  Wade was threatened by the return of the PS; he 
dissolved the legislature, called for early elections, and re-introduced the senate.  The 
future of Senegalese democracy stands on the tip of a blade.  While a return to autocracy 
is not inevitable, the threat is very real.   
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VII. CONCLUSION: AN INTEGRATION OF STRUCTURE AND 
ACTORS 
This dissertation is an exploration of the determinants of the level of democracy.  
Using existing theories in democracy studies, this study deduced a model of polity 
change.  The model proposed that changes in polity are the result of the strategic 
interaction of the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime.  The study 
hypothesized that the preferences of these key actors is influenced by changes in 
structural factors including economic income, economic development, violence, and the 
diffusion of democratic norms.   
The study tested the effect of the structural factors upon democracy using a 
combination of econometric and computational analysis.  It explored the impact of the 
structural factors upon actor preferences and the subsequent strategic interaction through 
three qualitative case studies on Mexico, the Philippines, and Senegal.  The combination 
of econometric, computational, and qualitative analysis was far more compelling than 
any method individually.  No one approach is superior or more empirically valid than the 
others.  The econometric analysis provided statistically significant causal explanations; 
computational analysis provided trend and distribution data that was easily 
comprehensible; and qualitative analysis put the data into context.  The combination of 
methods produced a comprehensive answer to the research question.  For instance, 
qualitative analysis highlighted that structural factors often had cascading effects that 
could not be detected by regression analysis.  The 1982 economic crisis in Mexico did 
not produce a significant GDP loss until the following year; the effect on political change 
was not evident until the next presidential election five years later.   
The combined analysis determined that violence, industrialization, income, and 
the diffusion of norms are all important factors in the determination of the level of 
democracy.  However, no one factor or combination of factors could definitively predict 
a change in the level of democracy.  Each of these factors affected the motivations and 
capabilities of key actors: the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime.  
While the actions of the ruling regime can be singled out as the actual implementing 
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factor of democracy, the preferences of the military and political parties influenced the 
regime’s decision-making process.  While NGOs had little influence over the other 
actors, they were successful in improving democratic processes independent of the ruling 
regime’s decisions.  In each case, changes in the level of democracy occurred as the 
result of complex interactions between the four key actors.  In all three cases, the ruling 
regime was the final arbiter of political reform.  Of course, the ruling regimes did not 
adopt political reforms for philanthropic reasons but were highly influenced by other 
actors.  In each case, the collapse of the patron-client system ended NGO support for the 
autocratic system, mobilizing civil society to demand political change through peaceful 
protests, riots, and increased political activism towards the achievement of free elections.  
Citizens’ demand for political change resulted in the growth of a viable opposition party, 
a core element to a competitive election.  In the final stages, the military’s refusal to 
repress the opposition and acquiescence towards democracy left the ruling regimes little 
choice but to allow political reform and political change.      
This chapter includes three sections.  First, the effect of structural factors upon the 
level of democracy is reviewed.  Section B presents the conclusions of the qualitative 
analysis on the preferences and interactions of key actors.  The final section recognizes 
the policy implications for democracy and democracy promotion of the findings in the 
first two sections.   
A. STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
Structural factors do not have a consistent, linear effect upon the level of 
democracy.  Instead, they exert either centripetal or centrifugal forces upon the level of 
democracy.  Violence and poverty, and to a much lesser extent under-development, 
provide a strong centripetal effect towards the center of the polity spectrum.  Catalysts 
such as economic crisis and the loss of an interstate war have a weak centrifugal effect 
that pushes polities towards the extremes of the polity spectrum, full autocracy and full 
democracy.  Although economic income and development contributed to the potential for 
democracy, neither factor affected the timing of changes in democracy.   
 237
1. Violence  
How does violence affect democracy?  Intrastate violence can act as a catalyst for 
a change in the level of democracy.  Although a change in violence is not determinative 
in itself, generally an increase in violence is strongly associated with a decrease in 
democracy while a decrease in violence has a small effect on increases in democracy.  
For example, rising intrastate violence in the Philippines from 1969 to 1971 led to an 
increasing acceptance among citizens of a reduction in the level of democracy in the form 
of martial law as a tradeoff for increased security.     
Violence is a catalyst for regime change.  While violence is typically an obstacle 
to democracy, there are a few cases in which a country adopted a higher level of 
democracy despite a high level of violence or even an increase in violence.  In the case of 
Mexico and Senegal, outbursts of violence actually motivated the ruling regime to adopt 
small increases in democracy in a conciliatory move to defuse the violence.  The 
incidents did not result in increased calls for democracy but in increased calls for political 
change.  An increase in democracy was a means to achieve political change.  In the case 
of Mexico, rising crime, the 1994 Zapatista uprising, and political assassinations fueled 
the perception that social upheaval was imminent.  As it did in 1977, the PRI allowed 
political reform in order to avert the spread of uprisings.  In Senegal, urban post-electoral 
protests motivated some minor political reforms.  On the other hand, the Casamance 
insurgency had virtually no impact on the preference for democracy due to its low death 
toll and geographic remoteness.  In 1987, the Philippines returned to democracy despite a 
high level of insurgency violence.  In all three cases, because the violence targeted few 
civilians and was geographically remote, it presented little threat to the large metropolitan 
centers.  Since the centers of political and economic power were not seriously threatened, 
civil society’s preference for democracy was not adversely affected.   
2. Industrialization 
Does industrialization lead to democracy?  While countries with high levels of 
industrialization tend to be democratic, the cause-effect relationship is weak.  Changes in 
Mexico’s industrialization provide little explanation for changes in the level of 
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democracy.  Senegal increased substantially in democracy despite continued levels of 
under-development.  Only the Philippines showed a significant relationship between 
industrialization and increased demand for democracy. 
Mexico during the 1960s and 1970s was highly industrialized with a well-
educated and highly literate work force.  Yet, the Mexican Revolution tempered civil 
society’s demand for democracy because it provided a patronage system with incentives 
for workers and farmers to sustain the autocratic system.  Yet, it is impossible to prove 
that industrialization was not a contributory factor in the growing preference for 
democracy in Mexico during the 1980s. 
The advancement of industrialization in the Philippines during the 1960, 70s, and 
80s corresponded well with the rise in democracy in 1986.  In the Philippines, a regional 
proliferation of manufacturing, the adoption of modern agriculture techniques, and 
Marcos’ economic policies degraded the effectiveness of the agricultural-based patronage 
system.  The proliferation of manufacturing enabled the development of democratic 
ideals in urban areas.  Industrialization of the Philippines began in earnest in the 1960s.  
By the early 1980s, the Philippines had a large concentration of manufacturing in three 
major cities.  The adoption of manufacturing led to an increase in the size of the middle-
income tier, high levels of literacy, and an alternative source of income for the wealthy.  
The political power of landlords diminished as the cost of election campaigns grew, the 
independence of the workers increased, and the number of tenants declined.   
While countries with low levels of industrialization have had difficulty 
maintaining a high level of democracy, the relevance of industrialization as a determinant 
of democracy appears to have waned over time as a rash of under-industrialized countries 
progressed towards democracy since the end of the Cold War.  Senegal had a very low 
level of industry during its large increase in democracy in 2000.  Modernization of 
agriculture is far less prevalent in Senegal than in the Philippines.  Although numerous 
farmers’ associations developed in the late 1980s, change in the level of industry appears 
to have little explanatory effect for democracy in Senegal.  The adoption of democracy 
by a variety of other low industry countries suggests that the importance of 
industrialization was displaced by some other factor.  Since the literature explains the 
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industry-democracy relationship as the method of spreading democratic ideals through 
education and literacy, it seems clear that other methods of spreading democratic ideals, 
such as diffusion from international social interaction and increased information access, 
have become more significant contributors. 
The relevance of economic development and industrialization as a determinant of 
democracy appears to wane over time.  While the case research limits the explanatory 
power of industrialization, it is difficult to entirely discount the variable as ineffective.  
For future research, it is important to consider that industrialization may be an over-
aggregated variable.  Variables such as literacy, education, and relative position of 
economic groups may have more explanatory power over the long term.  Of course, it is 
also critical to consider regional variations within countries. 
3. Income 
Does income affect democracy?  Income, by itself, appears to be a poor 
explanatory cause for democracy.  No level of economic income can force a country to 
increase its level of democracy.  For the three cases, democracy did not come at the 
height of economic income, but only after a severe economic crisis.   
The effect of the economy on level of democracy was not consistent over time or 
across polity types. The 1980s was a pivotal turning point in the economic determinants 
of democracy as the explanatory power of income and economic crisis increased while 
the relevance of oil decreased.  Income had a linear effect on changes in democracy 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  During this time, moderately wealthy countries across Latin 
America and Eastern Europe dramatically increased their level of democracy.  Beyond 
these two decades, income had a polarizing effect upon polity type.  Instead of pushing 
countries towards democracy, income pushed countries towards the polity extremes of 
full autocracy or full democracy, creating a U-curve relationship between income and 
democracy.   
Economic crisis also appeared to have a polarizing effect upon democracy though 
the statistical results were not definitive.  Surprisingly, the 1980s economic crisis had a 
profound, positive effect upon all three cases studies though the timing delay of the 
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subsequent increase in democracy varied greatly across countries.  The 1980s economic 
crises in Mexico, the Philippines, and Senegal degraded the traditional patron-client 
relationships, reducing the benefits for maintaining the autocratic regime.  In all three 
cases, growing economic unrest contributed to a significant increase in democracy only 
when is was combined with other structural factors 
The U-curve relationship between income and democracy indicates that few poor 
countries are likely to sustain democracy.  For instance, countries with less than $2,000 
GDP per capita rarely achieve or maintain a high level of democracy.  Only India, 
Mongolia, and the Solomon Islands managed the feat for any significant period of time.  
More recently, Ghana, Senegal, and Liberia are working to achieve the same.  But, their 
success remains to be proven.  The success of these countries at democracy is not limited 
because they are poor but because the distribution of rare resources in the country is often 
corrupted by a patronage system, which is not conducive to democracy. 
Similarly, it is the patronage system in oil states that inhibits democratic 
processes.  Oil’s effect upon democracy is not universal, but can be used to perpetuate the 
capacity for a patronage system.  In fact, Mexico’s collapse in oil rents led to the demise 
of its patronage system and the rise of democracy.  In general, achievement of high levels 
of democracy in an oil state is unlikely unless the patronage system is dismantled. 
This analysis was unable to prove or disprove the neo-Marxist focus on class 
structure as the key to political change.  While the middle class represents potential 
adopters of democratic ideals, the case study analysis found the operationalization of 
middle class a significant obstacle.  Variations in national and sub-national costs of 
living, standards of living, and currency fluctuations made detailed calculations of a 
middle class problematic. 
4. Norms 
Democratic changes in one country have a direct relationship on the level of 
democracy in peer countries.  This effect is most influential post-1980, likely due to 
improved technology and transportation capabilities that enhance the diffusion of ideas.  
Interestingly, this same time period saw an increase in low-income and under-developed 
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countries attaining high levels of democracy.  Although not definitive, it is highly likely 
that increased diffusion capabilities negated the need for income and development as 
means to develop democratic ideals.  In other words, increased economic, social, and 
technological interaction brought democratic ideals to new frontiers that lacked 
education, literacy, televisions, and civic associations.   
High degrees of economic and social interaction with France and the United 
States brought democratic ideals to Dakar, northern Mexico, and Manila.  However, tight 
control of the media enabled the government to constrain the spread of democratic ideals 
nationwide.  All three cases had a history of limited democratic processes with a long 
tradition of voting and a written constitution.  It was not until the rise of an independent 
media that the cracks in the autocratic system began to show.  The free media highlighted 
the imperfections of the political system.  It questioned the legitimacy of political 
assassinations.  It highlighted the critiques of the autocratic system from the religious 
community, major trade partners, and allies.  For Mexico and Senegal, the media 
highlighted the bankruptcy of the one-party system after the end of the Cold War; reform 
was necessary in order to maintain the country’s image as a modern state as many of their 
















Income High Medium Low 
Industrialization High Low-Medium Low 
Violence Low-Medium High Low 
Diffusion High Low-Medium Medium 
  Table 12. Summary of Structural Factors by Case Study 
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The results in Table 12 suggest that no single structural factor is a consistent 
determinant of democracy.  While the diffusion of norms has explanatory power for both 
Mexico and Senegal, it holds little exploration for the timing of democracy in the 
Philippines.  Section B looks at how these structural factors shaped actor preferences. 
B. ACTORS 
The effect of structural factors was inconsistent over time because actors 
responded differently depending upon the specific context and the behavior of other 
actors.  Structural factors did influence actor preferences.  However, it was the interactive 
decisions by actors that determined the resulting change in the level of democracy.  The 
most important actors in determining polity change were the military and the ruling 
regime.  NGOs and political parties were factors but had considerably less ability in 
controlling the timing of lasting political change. 
The military’s’ preference for political change was largely driven by the diffusion 
of norms.  However, the norms adopted did not embrace democratic processes.  In none 
of the three cases did the military take action designed to bring about democracy.  In each 
case, the military adopted professional norms regarding human rights, restraint against 
peaceful demonstrators, and respect for the constitution.  In the case of the Philippines, 
the partial adoption of these norms led to a split in the military in 1986, which marked the 
beginning of the People Power Revolution.  However, the defectors were not motivated 
by democratic ideals as evidenced by the seven subsequent coups attempts against 
President Corazon Aquino.  However, the military’s internal split limited Marcos’ ability 
to use force to crush the opposition.  
In the case of Mexico and Senegal, it was the military’s inaction that is of interest.  
Neither military took decided steps to bring about democracy, but neither did they 
attempt to oppose an increase in democracy.  Both militaries received generous benefits 
from the incumbent party and faced an insurgency threat.  But neither military showed a 
significant interest in maintaining the incumbent party in order to preserve their resources 
or move towards autocracy as a counterinsurgency strategy.  The military permitted 
democracy to occur for several reasons.  First, the insurgencies in Mexico and Senegal 
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were low-casualty, geographically remote affairs.  The insurgent groups were not a 
serious threat to the existence of the state.  Second, the military was professionalized and 
independent.  The fate of the military was not tied to the fate of the regime.  Third, all 
three countries were already democracies according to their constitutions.  It is possible 
that the military leaders did not recognize the increases in democracy as a change in the 
domestic balance of power and therefore had little effect on the military’s interests.  
Finally, all three militaries had developed a normative aversion to repressing 
demonstrators, limiting the executive’s ability to remain in power through the use of 
force.   
Although NGOs could be important harbingers of democracy, in Mexico and 
Senegal, NGOs were co-opted into being clients of the state.  It was only when economic 
crisis radically reduced the distribution of patronage that NGOs began to assert their 
independence from the state and demand political change.  In Mexico and Senegal, 
NGOs formed formal and informal alliances, respectively, to conduct election 
monitoring.  In the Philippines, business groups and the Catholic Church joined forces in 
anti-regime protests and boycotts, culminating in the formation of a successful political 
opposition.  In the post-democracy environment, NGOs served as a source for social 
mobilization and increased accountability of the military, political parties, and the ruling 
regime.   
In all three cases, a viable, organized opposition party was a requirement to 
increased democracy.  Without it, the ruling executive would have remained in power.  
The opposition’s victory was made possible, in part, by a split in the ruling party.  
Disagreements over power-sharing, ideology, and patronage resulted in defections from 
the ruling party.  The splits in all three cases were partly motivated by economic crisis.  
The party patronage system was strong during periods of economic stability but could not 
be maintained during crises. 
In all three case studies, the ruling executive was the final arbiter of change in 
democracy.  President Zedillo of Mexico, President Marcos of Philippines, and President 
Diouf of Senegal all approved election reforms that would enable the rise of the 
opposition.  Of the three, only Marcos refused to acknowledge defeat.  His refusal 
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resulted in widespread unrest that the military was unwilling to repress.  The U.S. 
notification that it would no longer support his rule indicated that Marcos would lose 
foreign aid critical to the upkeep of his regime; Marcos had little choice but to abdicate.  
It is possible that Zedillo and Diouf learned from the Philippines and other similar 
situations.  Their decision to abide by the election results was partly driven by the 
potential for unrest, the ambiguity of the military’s willingness to repress unrest, and the 
possibility of losing foreign aid and investments.  Additionally, Zedillo and Diouf also 
valued democracy, or at least the value in being perceived as a democracy. 
The explanatory power of changes in structural factors on actor preferences was 
mixed (see Table 13).  Rising income appeared to have little consistent, explanatory 
power.  Only severe economic crises motivated an increased preference from democracy.  
Economic crises motivated civil societies to demand change, decreased NGO’s stake in 
maintaining autocracy, consolidated the political opposition, and reduced the regime’s 
ability to provide patronage.  Change in industrialization does not explain timing of 
changes in democracy.  This is largely because economic development primarily affects 
demand for democracy among civil society with little effect upon the preferences of 
actors that supply democracy.  For instance, the growth of independent media was critical 
in increasing civil society’s preference for democracy but appeared to have little 
influence on other actors.  Surprisingly, changes in violence did not consistently affect 
the preference of the military but was often a significant factor in motivating regimes to 
implement political reforms.  Diffusion surprisingly had a very high impact on the 
military’s preference for democracy.  Further, it had a varied impact on civil society.  
Diffusion explains very little about democratic change in the Philippines, but is far more 


































Income Medium Low Medium Medium Medium 
Industrialization Medium Low Low Low Low 
Violence Medium Medium Low Low High 
Diffusion Low to High High Medium Medium Medium 
Table 13. Explanatory Power of Structural Change upon Key Actors 
C. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN CONFLICT-RIDDEN STATES 
Over the past decade, the success of democracy in conflict-ridden countries has 
become a major policy concern.  For future research, this study’s model could be 
extended to conflict-ridden states such as contemporary Iraq or Afghanistan.  Although 
the cases in Iraq and Afghanistan are certainly not generalizeable to the majority of 
changes in democracy, the amount of resources and manpower used to create a change in 
regime and build democracy in those two countries make these cases interesting. 
The model from this study predicts that Iraq has a moderate chance of 
maintaining democracy.  Iraq is well industrialized but is plagued by economic turmoil 
with GDP per capita less than $2,000.  However, Iraq had a long history of autocratic 
traditions and tightly controlled information channels, which likely hampered the spread 
of democratic ideals despite high levels of education, literacy, and technology.  
Furthermore, Iraq is surrounded by non-democratic neighbors, limiting the potential for 
norm diffusion.  Regional democracies such as Israel and Lebanon are hardly peers that 
Iraq would like to emulate.  Therefore, civil society in Iraq is unlikely to demand a high 
level of democracy.  However, high voter turnout and large, organized protests are a 
positive indication that civil society is actively engaged.   
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Violence is the primary obstacle to sustaining democracy in Iraq.  Iraq’s prospects 
for maintaining democracy will improve if the insurgency can be marginalized to 
peripheral areas away from the centers of economic and political power.  Without a solid 
base of democratic ideals, the citizenry is likely to prioritize security at the expense of 
democracy.  With a high level of violence and a low level of demand for democracy, Iraq 
appears poised to be a hybrid regime with only limited democratic processes.   
A brief examination of the key actors in Iraq suggests that none will undertake 
action to cause a significant change in the level of democracy.  The military is growing in 
strength, but power is highly decentralized.  A coup attempt would likely split the 
military.  A coup seems an unlikely possibility in the near term unless the military budget 
is drastically cut.  Although there are few significant local NGOs, international NGOs 
have made significant efforts to monitor Iraqi elections.  Based upon the current political 
situation, one-party rule seems unlikely; any attempts to do so would likely spark civil 
war.  Iraqis have a substantial capacity to mobilize and protest, increasing the potential 
risks for autocratization.  Finally, it is unlikely that the ruling regime would adopt a 
sudden decrease in democracy even after the U.S. military departs.  Any move towards 
autocracy would ostracize one of the major political parties, again potentially motivating 
civil war.  Additionally, autocratization risks the loss of foreign aid, critical to Iraq’s 
survival and reconstruction.   
Afghanistan appears to be a far more difficult problem.  Afghanistan has never 
been industrialized or received significant levels of income.  Education and literacy are 
poor and the country is surrounded by non-democracies.  The exception is unstable 
Pakistan, which seems to encapsulate all of the potential dangers that democratization can 
hold.  Civil society is far more rural and less organized than in Iraq, but small levels of 
mobilization do occur.  As an anecdotal indicator of the low demand for democracy in 
Afghanistan, the 2009 presidential election was widely criticized as fraudulent, yet there 
were no major election protests.  The presence of NATO creates an artificial supply of 
democracy in Afghanistan.  The cost-benefit analysis of maintaining the current regime 
type will change for the military and the ruling regime when NATO withdraws.  Yet, 
Afghanistan seems unlikely to autocratize as actors in Afghanistan have similar 
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constraints to those in Iraq; a move towards autocracy risks civil war.  It is ironic that the 
sub-national power structures that complicate the effectiveness of democracy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan also ensure its continuation.   
The likelihood of either Iraq or Afghanistan achieving a high level of democracy 
in the near term seems low.  However, prospects of achieving high democracy in these 
two countries or any other target of democracy promotion can be improved.  Demand for 
democracy, though a complex and indirect process, can be encouraged through increased 
literacy, education, independent media, and information distribution channels that have 
broad reach in local languages.  In many developing countries, religious organizations are 
an important conduit of democratic norms.  At a minimum, it is important for these 
organizations not to actively oppose democracy.  In order to foster demand, the urban 
areas of economic and political power require security and a stable economy; otherwise 
there is increased risk that elites will support a move towards autocracy.  Further, without 
the potential for jobs and security, the masses will have little motivation to undertake 
activities that require a long time horizon such as learning to read or getting a degree, 
both important factors in building democratic ideals. 
Spreading democracy also requires the development of an endurable supply.  
First, the military should be professionalized; its obligation should be to the democratic 
constitution, not an individual or office.  Second, a viable, organized opposition party 
must exist.  Without it, there are few constraints upon the executive.  Finally, the ability 
to use political pressure to encourage another country to democratize only appears to 
work during a period of economic crisis within a country that lacks the capability or will 
to repress its citizens. 
 
 248
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 249
APPENDIX 1: DATA MODIFICATIONS 
Polity2 modifications following Plumper and Neumayer: 
 Afghanistan 78-88 changed to -7 
 Angola 91-96 changed to -6, -6, -5, -4, -4, -3 
 Bosnia 92-94 changed to missing 
 Burundi 92-95 changed to -7, -7, -7, -5 
 Cambodia 75 changed to -6 
 Chad 78-84 changed to -7 
 Comoros 95 changed to 4 
 Congo Kinshasa 92-02 changed to -8 
 Cuba 59-60 changed to -7 
 Cyprus 63-67 changed to 8, 8, 8, 7, 7 
 Czech 68 changed to -7 
 Ethiopia 74 changed to -9; 91-92 changed to -8, -4 
 Hungary 56 changed to -7 
 Laos 61-72 changed to -1 
 Liberia 90-95 changed to -6 
 Nicaragua 79-80 changed to -8, -5 
 Somalia 91-2007 changed to missing 
 





West Africa North Africa 
Congo, Republic of 
Zaire 




East Africa North 
Egypt North Africa Mid East 
Turkey Mid East Europe 
Sudan East Africa Mid East 
Iran Mid East South Asia 
China East Asia South 
Myanmar South Asia East 
Panama Central America South 
Columbia South America Central 
Mexico Central America North America and Europe 
Table A.1 Region Conversions 
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A Note on Colonial Legacy: The identification of a state’s colonial ruler is not as 
straightforward as it might appear.  Many colonies traded hands.  The British took 
Guyana and Sri Lanka from the Dutch.  The Americans took the Philippines and Cuba 
from Spain.  After World War I, the German colonies were distributed among the British, 
French, and Belgians.  Does one legacy overwrite the other?  Ottoman and Portuguese 
imperialism muddies the water.  The Ottoman Empire was not colonial in the traditional 
sense.  Most states were tribute-paying territories with significant amounts of autonomy.  
The Portuguese were early seafarers and established outposts throughout Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia.  While the Portuguese established a few colonies in Brazil, 
Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the majority of their explorations were trading posts.  
While the natives may have been introduced to European customs and goods in places 
like Angola, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Sri Lanka, 
and Thailand, these areas were not governed by the Portuguese.  In the case of the 
Ottoman Empire and most Portuguese territories, the state bureaucracy was not created 
by the colonial ruler. 
Arguably, the nationality of the colonizer is irrelevant; it is the type of 
bureaucratic structure enacted that matters.  For instance, the colonial structure that the 
British imposed upon the American colonies was far different than the one imposed upon 
Nigeria.  The colonial structure imposed is partly influence by the pre-colonial socio-
economic structure and the size of its population.  The empirical exploration of cross-
sectional colonial structures upon the evolution of democracy has not been adequately 
explored.
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APPENDIX 2: TRANSITION 
CASES 
 









Korea, S 1960 






Bolivia  1982 




Chile  1989 
Panama 1989 
Bulgaria  1990 























Sri Lanka 1970 
Pakistan 1973 
Columbia  1974 
Cyprus  1974 
India 1977 
Botswana  1987 








South Africa 1994 
Nicaragua 1995 




Korea, S 1998 
Slovak 1998 
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Sri Lanka 1948 
Singapore 1959 
Benin  1960 
Congo  1960 
Somalia 1960 




Botswana  1966 
Guyana 1966 
Equatorial Guinea 1968 
Zimbabwe 1970 
Comoros  1975 
Solomon 1978 
Namibia 1990 






Armenia  1992 
Azerbaijan  1992 
Slovak 1993 











Columbia  1957 
Venezuela 1958 
Pakistan 1962 





Sierra Leone 1968 
Thailand 1969 
Ghana 1970 
Argentina  1973 
Thailand 1974 
Burkina Faso  1978 








El Salvador 1984 
Brazil  1985 
Guatemala 1986 
Sudan 1986 











Bangladesh  1991 
Benin  1991 
Zambia 1991 





Cambodia  1993 










Sierra Leone 1996 
Albania 1997 
Iran  1997 
Armenia  1998 





Ivory Coast 2000 
Serbia Yugo 2000 
Comoros  2002 
Algeria  2004 
Burundi  2005 
Guinea-Bissau 2005 
Krygyzstan 2005 









Transition from Full Democracy to 
Autocracy 
 




























Sri Lanka 1978 
Gambia 1981 
Argentina  1989 








Transition from Partial Democracy to Autocracy 
 
 





Cuba  1955 
Ecuador 1961 
Peru 1962 
Benin  1963 
Congo  1963 









Equatorial Guinea 1969 
Somalia 1969 
Ecuador 1970 
Sierra Leone 1971 
Sudan 1971 
Ghana 1972 
Korea, S 1972 
Philippines 1972 
Chile  1973 
Guatemala 1974 
Argentina  1976 
Comoros  1976 
Thailand 1976 
Guyana 1978 








Azerbaijan  1993 
Belarus  1995 
Albania 1996 
Armenia  1996 
Cambodia  1997 
Congo 1997 
Comoros  1999 
Haiti 2000 
Nepal 2002 
CAR  2003 
Guinea-Bissau 2003 
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